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Abstract
WHO GOVERNS THE INTERNET?
THE EMERGING POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND GOVERNANCE OF
CYBERSPACE
by
Robert J. Domanski
Sponsor: Professor Donna Kirchheimer

There remains a widespread perception among both the public and elements of
academia that the Internet is “ungovernable”. However, this idea, as well as the notion
that the Internet has become some type of cyber-libertarian utopia, is wholly inaccurate.
Governments may certainly encounter tremendous difficulty in attempting to regulate the
Internet, but numerous “architectures of control” have nevertheless become pervasive.
So who, then, governs the Internet? Our contentions are that the Internet is, in fact, being
governed; that it is being governed by specific and identifiable networks of policy actors;
and that an argument can be made as to how it is being governed.
This project will develop a new conceptual framework for analysis that
deconstructs the Internet into four policy “layers” with the aim of formulating a new
political architecture that accurately maps out and depicts authority on the Internet by
identifying who has demonstrable policymaking authority that constrains or enables
behavior with intentional effects. We will then assess this four-layer model and its
resulting map of political architecture by performing a detailed case study of U.S.
national cybersecurity policy, post-9/11. Ultimately, we will seek to determine the
consequences of these political arrangements and governance policies.
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Part I.

INTRODUCTION
&
HISTORICAL CONTEXT

2
Chapter 1 – Framing the Question, “Who Governs the Internet?”

As the Internet continues to become further integrated into all aspects of the
global culture and economy, society has an increasing stake in pursuing socially
beneficial and collective goals. Most people would agree, for instance, that society has a
definite interest in preventing the dissemination of illicit child pornography or in
mitigating the effects of widespread computer virus outbreaks. Some type of governance
is vitally necessary in order to serve the interests of the public community, and indeed,
such governance of the Internet has already emerged – although how these systems have
emerged remains something of a puzzle. How have government institutions, private
commercial firms, and the scientific academic community been able to create and
implement rules and procedures for both the functional operation of the Internet and the
behavior that takes place on it? To what extent and in what ways have these governance
policies and arrangements emerged as a result of institutional decision-making and public
policy processes at the federal level in the United States?
This study’s main objectives will be, first, to develop a new model that
deconstructs the Internet into four conceptual layers with the aim of helping scholars and
policymakers better understand various Internet policy issues, and, second, to use this
model in formulating a new political architecture that accurately maps out and depicts
authority on the Internet by identifying who has decision-making authority and, therefore,
a clear ability to shape behavior. We will then assess this four-layer model and its
resulting map of political architecture by performing a detailed case study of U.S.
national cybersecurity policy, post-9/11.
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This study will examine the Internet from a public policy perspective, with a
particular focus on policymaking processes and institutional arrangements. Specific
institutions of various types have played a crucial historical role in shaping the direction
of both how the Internet has evolved technologically as well as in setting the rules for
how people use it. The Internet did not emerge spontaneously, nor did its present
incarnation develop by accident. Rather, the Internet and all of its characteristics were
consciously shaped as a direct result of explicit policy decisions.
The central question, then, is who governs the Internet? Which institutions,
individuals, or other actors are shaping both the substance and direction of Internet
governance policies? As the Internet continues to become more culturally and
economically significant, it is important to investigate what type of governance is
emerging and why it is emerging in that way.

What Do We Mean By "Governance"?
So what do we mean when asking, "who governs"? The definition which will be
used adopts a broad policymaking approach and views governance as having three
criteria: 1) the ability to constrain behavior; 2) the ability to enable behavior; and 3) the
ability to produce intentional effects. Actors are said to govern when they have clear
decision-making authority to create and implement policies with intentional effects that
meet all three of these criteria.
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To be clear, the issue here is one of governance, not government1. From Robert
Dahl to C. Wright Mills, scholars have long sought to determine who has power, why
they have it, and how they use it. In pluralist theory, power has many dimensions and is
held in varying degrees by numerous actors – from individual people to large
corporations to formal governmental institutions. Indeed, Dahl's approach in famously
asking "Who Governs?" was to question how various interest groups compete in the
political sphere, and that governance is ultimately determined by the relative capacities of
different actors to influence governmental decision-making2. The questions at hand, in
the context of the Internet, remain how all of those different actors are organized in
creating and exercising their relative levels of authority. However, what sets the Internet
apart from Dahl’s analysis, as will be demonstrated time and again, is that on the Internet
it is not merely a matter of government having final decision-making authority, but also,
to a considerable degree, numerous private actors as well. The Internet governance
dynamic is characterized by various competing interest groups not only trying to
influence government, but also competing to influence each other, and sometimes
government trying to influence them. Identifying who holds authority versus who is
trying to wield influence, perhaps more clear in Dahl’s day, is an increasingly difficult
task. Thus, not only do we need to ask who has power, but also who has more power
than whom?
1

B. Guy Peters and John Pierre, “Governance Without Government? Rethinking Public Administration,”
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8.2. (April 1998): 223-243.
2

Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1961). See page 3: "if there are great inequalities in the conditions of different citizens,
then there must also be great inequalities in the capacities of different citizens to influence the decisions of
their various governments".
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Understanding who has the power to govern, from a research perspective, is
initially a problem of definition. Governance is inextricably linked with concepts of
power, and in that context, both must be defined for the purpose of this project. This is
not to say that we plan on comprehensively defining these two ideas at the heart of
Political Science - governance and power - once-and-for-all. Rather, it is necessary to
clearly state which definitions will be used to carry out our specific research.
The literature on governance has markedly shifted in recent years from focusing
on hierarchical governmental structures towards greater reliance on horizontal,
hybridized, and associational forms of governance3. In the field of Public
Administration, for instance, scholars such as Frederickson and Smith have observed this
re-focus from the bureaucratic state and direct government to the "hollow state" and
“third-party government"4. Governance theories that incorporate ideas about the role of
“conjunctions” or “associations” among organizational entities have become increasingly
widespread5.
This "governance fever"6 focusing on horizontal relationships between public and
private sector actors has seen a deconstruction of the governance concept into several
categorical types. Network governance, most frequently used for characterizing the
Internet, is commonly associated with ideas of "self-governance" or "self-regulation". It

3

Carolyn J. Hill and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., "Is Hierarchical Governance in Decline? Evidence from
Empirical Research," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15.2 (2005): 173-195.
4

H. George Frederickson and Kevin B. Smith, The Public Administration Theory Primer (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2003).
5

Hill & Lynn 175.

6

Hill & Lynn 174.
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refers to loosely structured coordination among numerous actors that function like an
"organic or informal social system"7. Network governance, as Taylor has argued, arises
because of modern societies' complexities and their consequent requirement for
distributed knowledge acquisition and decentralized problem-solving8. In contrast,
hierarchical governance embraces the activities of government, law, and statutory
regulation9. It describes processes that are characterized by vertical integration and
managerial control within a set of lead institutions, and is the traditional method of
analysis for studying top-down bureaucratic organizations. Meanwhile, market
governance is equated with the forces of effective free-market competition with the
invisible hand governing behavior10. There have also recently been new additional
theories developed as scholars have sought to meaningfully depict what’s occurring on
the Internet specifically. Adhocratic governance, for example, is based on the idea of
policy being made "ad-hoc", meaning in an improvised, on-the-fly type of manner, and
that decision-making is guided by simply dealing with problems as they arise.11
According to scholars like Mintzberg, "adhocracy" is a system superior to bureaucracy
and one that will even eventually replace it. It is "any form of organization that cuts

7

Candice Jones, William S. Hesterly, and Stephen P. Borgatti, “A General Theory of Network
Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms,” The Academy of Management Review 22.4
(October 1997): 911-945.
8

Mark C. Taylor, The Moment of Complexity (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

9

Richard Collins, Three Myths of Internet Governance: Making Sense of Networks, Governance, and
Regulation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009) 59.
10

11

Collins 60.

Piotr Konieczny, “Adhocratic Governance in the Internet Age: The Case of Wikipedia,” Journal of
Information Technology and Politics 7.4 (October 2010).
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across normal bureaucratic lines to capture opportunities, solve problems, and get
results".12
These are some of the theories about governance, but when it comes to actually
defining the broader concept of the term, specifically from a policymaking perspective,
the approach undertaken by Lawrence Lessig and others is most helpful13. This is the
Foucauldian conception of power that involves both constraint and enablement14.
Actors are said to hold power if they have demonstrated the ability to 1) constrain certain
forms of behavior as well as to 2) enable other forms of behavior. This is echoed by
Mills who defined the power elite as being “in positions to make decisions having major
consequences” and that “whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important
than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions”15. It must be stated, however,
that also central to our understanding of governance is the importance of intentionality.
Bertrand Russell is famous for arguing that power is “the production of intended
effects”16, and considering the level of intentionality of potential governing actors is

12

Henry Mintzberg, Tracking Strategies: Toward a General Theory (Oxford, England: Oxford University
Press, 2007).
13

Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999). Lessig
does not explicitly define "governance", but makes references to how code and "architecture regulates
behavior" in cyberspace, and to "constraints on how you behave". See Chapter 7.
14

Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin
Gordon (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1980).
15

C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford University Press: New York, NY, 1956). See pp. 3-4:
“Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such
pivotal positions: their failure to act, their failure to make decisions, is itself an act that is often of greater
consequence than the decisions they do make... Often they are uncertain about their roles, and even more
often they allow their fears and their hopes to affect their assessment of their own power. No matter how
great their actual power, they tend to be less acutely aware of it than the resistances of others to its use."
16

Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London, England: Allen and Unwin, 1938).
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extremely important for our discussion insofar as intentionality signals causality. We
want to be able to distinguish between those actors who are structurally positioned to
make decisions and create policies with intentional effects versus those who can be
weeded out from the governance discussion because their role in causality is hazy, at
best.
If such a definition for power is utilized then identifying who holds power on the
Internet can be answered more scientifically. The goal of our research is to identify those
actors who simply have influence in the policy process versus those who have repeatedly
provided evidence of their decision-making authority through policymaking. Who has
influence versus who has authority is a critical distinction.
With the regard to the Internet, it follows that governance can be defined as the
practical exercise of decision-making authority through a demonstrated ability to
create policies that constrain or enable behavior with intentional effects. Recurring
throughout the existing Internet governance literature is the idea that governance is the
persistent shaping of the environment through explicit decision-making17. We will build
on this notion to show that the Internet’s policies – inclusive of policies not only made by
governments, but by various private actors as well - are authoritative insofar as they meet
the criteria of our definition above, and that empirical evidence comes in the form of
existing statements of policy intent that correlate with evidence of policy actions. Actors

17

Laura Denardis offers a helpful definition of Internet governance referring to "policy and technical
coordination issues related to the exchange of information over the Internet" in the context of architecting
civil liberties into IPv6 protocol design. See Laura Denardis, Protocol Politics: The Globalization of
Internet Governance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
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who have the decision-making authority to create policies that effectively constrain or
enable Internet behavior can reasonably be said to govern.
Determining who has this ability to govern through policymaking can further be
analyzed by examining what Marcus Franda has called “single controlling points”18. We
will examine the numerous “single controlling points” on the Internet where behavior is
constrained or enabled – examples include the web hosts that operate servers, the Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) who deliver Internet access to their customers, the websites that
control user accounts through Terms of Service agreements, and the local and national
governments who can still assert their territorial jurisdiction. By analyzing exactly where
Internet policies are being created that intentionally constrain or enable behavior, it is
here where our inquiries for determining governance will focus.
This interpretation of governance refers to coordinated efforts among various
types of actors operating at multiple levels in their efforts to achieve desired ends.
Because of the complexity involved, what we will refer to as the Internet’s “political
architecture” is a visualized mapping of power and authority that includes the
relationships among various institutions and other influential actors and policymakers
who are best positioned to directly affect change in their environment. Again, this is why
our discussion encompasses the full governance spectrum, and not merely the public
policies that are made and enforced by formal governmental institutions. Governments
and the public sector are limited in their policymaking capabilities as a result of, first, the
global dimension and “borderlessness” of the Internet, second, the decentralized

18

Marcus Franda, Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2001).
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architecture of the environment, and third, the limits of technological capabilities. These,
along with a unique developmental history characterized at least as much by grassroots
movements as by governmental agencies, are the reasons Internet policymaking is
differentiated from, by comparison, other policy venues like traditional
telecommunications regulation.
Defining governance in this way helps to place the title question at the heart of
this study in context. For years, legislators of governments around the world have often
grown frustrated when trying to transpose their authority to regulating Internet content
and behavior. Problems inevitably arise involving territorial jurisdiction and frequent
anonymity achieved through technical measures, and, as a result, many such
governmental policymaking processes and implementation strategies have been rendered
largely ineffectual. Attempts by U.S. national, state, or local governments to generate
policies using a strictly vertical governmental approach have largely been ineffective at
achieving desired ends - thus relegating such policies to the status of being merely
symbolic actions. Rather, policies of governance, emphasizing coordination among
various public, private, and hybrid institutions at every stage throughout the policy
process, have become the primary mechanisms for constraining and enabling different
aspects of Internet behavior. To be clear, governments are still extremely relevant and
essential in the policy process. However, the role of formal governmental institutions has
often been fundamentally transformed in the Internet sphere to that of leading
coordination-based strategies, acting as a policy catalyst for private sector actions, or
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formalizing and legitimating previously made policy decisions after other actors had
already propelled the policymaking process forward.

What Do We Mean by "The Internet"?
The Internet is a rather generic term that often means very different things to
different people. So in asking the question, “Who governs the Internet?” we need to
clarify exactly what it is we are referring to.
In terms of a functional definition, the Internet is a global decentralized network
of computer networks, each of which is independently managed in whichever ways its
administrator deems fit. Decisions, particularly over technical protocols, are often made
by “rough consensus”, and their implementation relies completely on voluntary measures
being adopted in order to facilitate reliable interconnection and communication.
Moreover, the term refers to both the hardware and software components that connect the
various networks and computing devices to each other.
In conceptual terms for our discussion of governance, the various entities and
ideas that together form the basis of the Internet must be deconstructed into their
constituent parts in order to analyze what specifically is occurring with regard to
governing the Internet as a whole.
The model we propose in addressing this problem for explaining governance of
the Internet is based on the conceptual scheme first put forth by economist and legal
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scholar Yochai Benkler19. This framework conceptualizes communications systems into
three layers: the physical architecture, the logical infrastructure (or the code), and the
content layers. Benkler originally devised this scheme to understand structural media
regulation, arguing that modern emerging network technologies make a decentralized and
democratized information environment possible – “enabling small groups of constituents
and individuals to become "users” (or participants), rather than simply “passive
consumers”. Benkler’s three layers were conceived as a means of presenting “a new set
of regulatory choices” that governments have in decentralized networked environments,
and though pertaining primarily to media regulation, we argue that they are valuable for
conceptualizing entire modern information communications systems, including the full
reach of the Internet itself.
Benkler’s framework was later applied by Lawrence Lessig, who used the threelayer model to argue that the Internet “mixes freedom and control at different layers”. In
his attempt to assess notions of property rights and “the commons” in cyberspace, Lessig
extended Benkler’s model in two fundamental ways. He utilized the three layers as a
way of conceptualizing the Internet specifically, and he used them as a lens for analyzing
systems of control – what is free, what is shared, and what is owned in cyberspace20.
This is particularly important for our purposes in determining governance.
Our proposal is to build upon this framework, yet also modify Benkler and
Lessig’s code layer to create a new distinction within the code layer. This study will
19

Yochai Benkler, “From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation,” Federal
Communications Law Journal 52 (2000): 561-563.
20

Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New York, NY:
Vintage Books, 2002).
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demonstrate that, when identifying the various actors and institutions involved in Internet
governance, two fundamentally different types of actors emerge within the code layer,
and therefore it is important to draw this distinction in order to formulate a better
understanding of governance arrangements. This will be done by emphasizing the
difference between code, understood as technical protocols, versus code as the software
developer’s tool for creating applications which the end-user encounters. The result is
the emergence of what may ultimately be deemed a fourth layer, separating the code
layer of Benkler into a protocols layer and an applications layer. This will highlight not
only the differences between institutional actors who either create technical protocols or
create private, proprietary web applications, but also the different types of actors involved
in decision-making.
Thus, in contrast to Benkler’s three-layer model of 1) the physical architecture, 2)
the logical infrastructure (the code), and 3) the content, I propose a new model be
introduced that aims to conceptualize the Internet into four layers:
1. The Infrastructure
2. The Technical Protocols
3. The Software Applications
4. The Content
The purpose of this four-layer model is to create a lens for policymakers who seek
to produce intentional effects, and this is accomplished by breaking down the different
political dynamics at each layer so that policymakers’ goals can be better aligned with
implementation strategies. These various political dynamics will then be analyzed by
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addressing three questions within each layer: 1) Why is it important? 2) Who governs it?
3) How are policies being made within it?
By building upon this framework, the task of determining who governs the
Internet becomes far more manageable. Public policies and governing efforts at each
individual layer, examined independently and separate from one another, can be more
clearly ascertained as coherent strategies and tangible entities. Actors at each layer are
readily identifiable, and their roles in the policymaking process provide a greater capacity
for reasonable analysis. In other words, my approach to answering, “Who governs the
Internet?” will be broken down into “Who governs at each layer?” and “Who is
governing across layers?”.

Literature Review
The field of Internet governance is relatively new by academic standards having
only just emerged in the past two decades, and has been developed by a strikingly multidisciplinary cross-section of scholars originating from the fields of law, economics,
public administration, international relations, and more. Books on the subject loosely use
the terms “govern”, “rule”, "regulate", and “control” almost interchangeably, which
belies the point that governing is based on a more complex political architecture of
authority. Understanding both the technical and political dimensions across disciplines is
vital in the study of the Internet. Too often policymakers draft regulatory laws applying
to Internet technologies with little understanding of the technologies themselves.
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Likewise, far too few programmers of such pervading technologies have any involvement
in, or knowledge of, the legal systems or the political systems which they are so deeply
affecting. Our intention, therefore, is to help bridge this gap by building upon the
existing literature across disciplines to develop a new framework central to understanding
the governance on the Internet.
There are two general approaches that scholars have used to study Internet
governance and public policy: 1) How the Internet is reshaping government and politics,
and 2) How government and politics are reshaping the Internet. Our focus shall be on the
latter.
The academic literature exposes several distinct arguments in answering how the
Internet is being governed. There is an evolution of ideas in answering the question of
who governs the Internet – and the wide range of answers include code, national and
local governments, international regimes, self-regulation, private engineering consortium
groups, and more. Each of these not only serve as a potential counterargument to what
will be presented in the chapters that follow, but they also help frame the scholarly
evolution of the debate, placing our discussion in better context.
In his path-breaking scholarship isolating architecture as a constraint on behavior
online, Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig famously argued that code governs
cyberspace, meaning that software is programmed to set the rules for behavior, and
therefore code and its designers are the central authority21. This “code governs”
argument is extremely insightful in emphasizing how, in digital environments, technical
decision-making has inherently political consequences. Because code itself is an agent of
21

Lessig, Code.
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authoritative power – constraining and enabling behavior by defining what actions are
even possible in a given space – programmers have a disproportionate amount of
authority at several of the single controlling points already mentioned. For example,
whether it is controlling the operations of web servers or establishing network bandwidth
caps, programmers make binding decisions over their private virtual spaces that all users
of their service must adhere to. They may not completely have free reign – again, the
dynamic is too complex than to say any one group of actors controls everything and can
do whatever they choose – but in their ability to write code to shape the environment,
these programmers definitely prove themselves to be a large part of the governing
equation.
However, the great limitation of this argument is that Lessig – to his credit – only
claims that code governs cyberspace; not the Internet as a whole. This is a crucial
distinction often misunderstood. Though commonly used as a synonym for the Internet,
the term “cyberspace” actually refers to only one aspect within the Internet – the virtual
environment where people interact with one another and where content, such as websites,
images, ideas, and experiences, proliferate. As scholar David Bell has explained it,
cyberspace is a cultural artifact - a “product of and producer of culture simultaneously”.
It is the part of the Internet that “is lived”22 By contrast, the Internet itself is a
communications network defined by its physical infrastructure comprised of wires and
cables connecting devices. Its hardware can be found at specific geographical locations;
it can be touched. To briefly put this in context: someone may post a digital video to a
website in cyberspace, so long as their computer remains connected to the Internet.
22

David Bell, An Introduction to Cybercultures (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001) 2.
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Lessig is correct in asserting that code governs cyberspace because, in this context, that is
where code is deployed. However, code and its programmers play a far smaller role in
the governing dynamic when examining different aspects of the Internet – namely, for
instance, the regulation of the physical infrastructure. This is the great limitation of the
“code governs” argument – it is immensely valuable for understanding how policies get
made regulating cyberspace, but not comprehensive enough to apply it to the Internet as a
whole.
A contrasting argument was put forth by legal scholars Jack Goldsmith and Tim
Wu who countered with the proposition that local and national governments
increasingly govern cyberspace, as such governments have begun taking more proactive
roles in formulating vertically designed public policies affecting cyberspatial content 23.
Again, the focus seems to be on cyberspace, however, their narrative suggests that
national and local governments derive their power from an already-existing and clear
ability to regulate the physical aspects of the Internet – notably, through a re-assertion of
their territorial jurisdiction. By leveraging their authority over the physical world - and,
hence, the physical infrastructure of the Internet within their sovereign borders - but
applying it to regulating content in cyberspace, Goldsmith and Wu are significantly
taking a "cross-layer" approach, albeit in a limited fashion, by seeking to explain how
authority over one aspect of the Internet can translate into powerful consequences in
another.

23

Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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Meanwhile, international relations scholar Marcus Franda argues that the Internet
is governed by an international regime consisting of both the public and private sectors,
and formalized through international agreements between governments24. This is
certainly a more comprehensive view of the Internet in its totality, and it utilizes a similar
definition of governance based on coordination among multiple actors at multiple levels.
However, Franda explores Internet governance from a strict international relations
perspective, and as a result his conclusions focus almost exclusively on formal
institutions and organizations at that level. Ultimately, his approach is a comprehensive
model that can be applicable to the Internet as a whole, but by under-emphasizing the role
of individuals and grassroots efforts that have historically played a vital role in driving
the Internet’s evolution forward, his argument doesn’t adequately portray a full picture of
power arrangements and policymaking efforts in a convincing manner.
Milton Mueller, a scholar of political economy, took a more narrow definition of
Internet governance, referring to the phrase only in terms of the functional operation of
the Internet, arguing that ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers) and a small handful of semi-public international consortium groups
comprised mostly of academics and engineers govern the Internet, particularly through
standards-setting processes, and uses the creation and administration of the domain name
system as the primary example25. This narrow definition, since adopted by many
scholars, certainly lends itself to solving the problem of who creates policies regarding

24

25

Franda.

Milton L. Mueller. Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2002).

19
the functional, day-to-day operation of the Internet – and international consortium groups
like ICANN clearly demonstrate a decision-making authority in that realm.
Unfortunately for our purposes, defining Internet governance in this way is generally
unhelpful for understanding any Internet issue area other than those focused on technical
functionality.
Countering these different notions of code or some type of public or private
institutions governing the Internet are Web 2.0 proponents who argue that the Web is
increasingly self-regulated by the masses of users, or netizens, who actively engage in
cyberspatial activities and social networks. There are several problems with this
argument. First, again, the argument is only intended to apply to cyberspace; not the
Internet as a whole. Second, and more importantly, even just as the argument applies to
cyberspace, there is a seemingly endless list of examples that contradict the notion that
self-regulation is what is currently taking place. The anarchic vision of cyberspatial
behavior having a complete lack of oversight is more a part of Internet mythology than it
is reality. When people visit websites, they are subject to several single controlling
points such as the rules of the website, the web server, the ISP, the telecommunications
carrier, and the government or governments who can claim territorial jurisdiction. As
will be demonstrated repeatedly throughout this project, self-regulation is a normative,
not empirical, depiction of Internet governance today.
Furthermore, much of the debate identifying who governs the Internet has
centered on normative issues of alternative cyber ideologies regarding systems of control.
The libertarian model for Internet governance was famously crystallized in John Perry

20
Barlow's classic Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace in 1996, calling for
governments of the world to completely stay out of cyber affairs, and that “selfgovernance” by users will inevitably arise26. However, recent literature has emerged
which suggests that while the cyber libertarian model may be desirable to a point, in
practice the Internet is developing with “architectures of control” becoming increasingly
pervasive27. Additional scholars like Barbrook and Cameron have offered direct
challenges to the cyber libertarian model, dissecting the principle components of the
“Californian school” by seeking to expose it as little more than an incursion of capitalist
values28.
There is a longer literary history concerned with the political nature of
technologies. As it relates specifically to an Internet context, this is embodied by the
debate over how technological systems institute control and order in online human
activities29. The architecture of the Internet facilitates and constrains certain forms of
political behavior, and therefore that technical architecture and the policies which sustain
it must be viewed as inherently political30. This is a major point that ought not to be
undervalued. In the context of Internet policymaking, technical decisions often have
very political consequences. As will be explored throughout this study, decisions over
26
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which technical protocols to adopt or what type of software code to create have a direct
effect on setting the rules for what types of behaviors are even feasible in different cyber
spaces, and such decision-making, therefore, inevitably embodies certain political values
at the expense of others.
It is in this vein of the technical becoming political that Lessig’s “code is law”
argument gains so much credence. He purports that just as laws regulate behavior in realspace, code regulates behavior in cyberspace, as “the software and hardware that make
cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace as it is”. Technology is powerful but not
uncontrollable, Lessig notes; it can be designed by human intervention to embody certain
values. In the final analysis, cyberspace is made of code, created by people. How people
write that code - the type of architecture they set up to protect certain values - will
determine if cyberspace will become "free" in the libertarian sense, or "regulable".
Indeed, he claims, the invisible hand of cyberspace, guided by commerce, has already
constructed an architecture based on control and highly efficient regulation. 31
As to some examples of when code is law, Lessig cites 1) how in some places you
must enter a password before you gain access, while in others you can gain access
whether identified or not; 2) how in some places the transactions you engage in produce
traces that link those transactions back to you, while in others this link is achieved only if
you want it to be; or 3) how in some places you can encrypt your communications, while
in others encryption is not an option.
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However, Tim Wu formulated a direct counterargument to Lessig's "code is law"
argument, publishing an article in the Virginia Law Review actually titled, "When Code
Isn't Law"32. He asks, if the goal is to understand the net effect of code's regulatory
forces, how can we not examine the reaction to those forces? In other words, code only
has the effect of law if it is largely being complied with, and in cyberspace that's certainly
not always the case.
He argues that code is more a mechanism for avoidance of the law than it is for
change, or even a form of law itself. As he states, "Nothing the code designer does
rewrites laws. Instead, code design defines behavior to avoid legal sanctions". The
examples he cites to illustrate how code is actually used for avoidance of the law include
1) virtual child pornography, 2) overseas gambling, 3) junk email, and, 4) P2P
filesharing.
Thus, according to Wu, code isn't law because, although it can influence the
success or failure of a law's effects, it is more accurately viewed as a tool that interest
groups use to avoid legal sanctions or use for legal advantage.
Meanwhile, in continuing with the thread of the technical becoming political,
Milton Mueller’s aforementioned position on Internet governance being more narrowly
focused on reliably maintaining the operation and functionality of the Internet, and
concerning himself almost exclusively with technical issues, has spawned an entire
subgroup of scholars who have adopted that approach. Such proponents conceive of
Internet governance primarily as ways in which technical decisions over which standards
and protocols to adopt have shaped the Internet and its capacities, such as the creation of
32
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the DNS system for domain name registration. Building upon this premise, the technical
dimension to governance has been examined by analyzing the role of international, semipublic agencies such as ICANN (International Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers), the W3C (World Wide Web Consortium) and the IETF (Internet Engineering
Task Force), among others.
However, Mueller's techno-centric approach to Internet governance has been
criticized by scholars like Richard Collins who have emphasized how, despite the
Internet being a global medium, most of this scholarship takes the United States'
experience as its focus. While conceding the value of much of this work, Collins writes
that, "the idiosyncrasies of the U.S. has, misleadingly, constructed a world of for-profit
domain name registries, fretting about network neutrality and the like as a global
experience. It is not." He further goes on to highlight three myths of Internet governance
that are commonly made in the academic literature: 1) that Internet governance works
best when the market decides; 2) that self-regulation is both pervasive and effective
(national policies are only marginally important); and 3) that the Internet regulatory
environment is distinct from legacy media. 33
The main problem with the body of Internet governance literature to-date is that
each of these approaches ultimately lead to a far too narrow understanding of the
governance of the entire Internet. Internet governance, particularly viewed through a
policy lens, is far too complex to suggest that there is just one answer to the question akin to one single individual or conspiracy of organizations behind the magic curtain
pulling all the levers. The aforementioned literature either focuses on only one particular
33
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aspect of the Internet or oversimplifies a very complicated topic in order to arrive at a
single coherent answer. In the former case, it leaves the reader unsatisfied; in the latter,
unconvinced.

The Political Architecture of the Internet
My contentions are that the Internet is, in fact, being governed; that it is being
governed by specific and identifiable networks of policy actors; and that an argument can
be made as to how it is being governed.
There exist different sets of primary actors and political arrangements at each
Internet layer. As a result, the policies that govern at each layer often have
fundamentally different motivations underlying them and seek to achieve different, and
often conflicting, objectives. The consequence of this dynamic has been the emergence
of policy processes which often address issues and formulate policy alternatives too
narrowly, failing to incorporate all four Internet layers. In my conclusion, I will argue
that a more comprehensive policy process involving all of the layers is needed for
effective governance of the Internet, and that such a process ought to be open and
transparent.
The Internet is, in fact, being governed. Staking out a historical-institutionalist
approach, it will be demonstrated that policies have been intentionally developed which
have shaped and continue to reshape the Internet itself. One undeniable example is the
existence of the DNS, or domain name system. The reason why when a user types the
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URL “www.yahoo.com” into their browser they can reliably expect to reach the website
of the Yahoo search engine is that a public-private hybrid institution named ICANN has
been developed over time to create a system for administering Internet domain names,
creating requirements for registration and implementing formal dispute resolution
mechanisms. ICANN is a non-profit institution that was originally created by privatesector actors in response to a mandate issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce under
the Clinton Administration, which sought to cede control over the management of the
Internet's system of centrally coordinated identifiers, for reasons which will be explored
in Chapter 2. ICANN manages the DNS system, maintaining the Internet’s operational
functionality, using a multistakeholder model that incorporates businesses, governments,
civil society organizations, and academic and scientific organizations, and is international
in scope.34 It is responsible for overseeing the Internet’s core root name servers and all of
its 22 generic top-level domains (gTLDs) and 248 country code top-level domains
(ccTLDs) 35, as well as for making decisions over the adoption of future TLDs, which
have sometimes proven to be controversial.36 The very fact that the domain name system
exists and keeps the Internet operational is direct evidence of governance policy, and
certainly refutes notions of the Internet being “ungovernable”.
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Not only is the Internet, in fact, being governed, but it is being governed by
specific and identifiable networks of policy actors at each of the conceptual layers.
Governments and public institutions, private commercial firms, public-private hybrid
institutions, international agencies, and various NGOs – including specific interest groups
and engineering consortium groups – are all actively involved in coordination-based
governance policies.
What this study will seek to accomplish in Part I is an identification of which
types of policy actors have decision-making authority – an ability to govern, by our
previously stated definition – at each conceptual layer. To be certain, there exist different
politics, relevant actors, institutional arrangements, and types of public policies at all four
of the Internet’s layers. It is their identification that is the primary task at hand.
In Chapter 2, we will develop a brief narrative of the Internet’s history from a
governance perspective. After reviewing its evolution from being a Defense Department
project to being transferred under NSF control to, finally, being largely privatized and
commercialized, we will see how all four of our conceptual layers came about
chronologically and evolved through very different processes. We will argue that this
historical development, including the parallel roles of both the public and private sectors,
still has tremendous ramifications for understanding Internet governance in the four
conceptual layers today.
In Chapter 3, we will examine governance of the Infrastructure layer of the
Internet, consisting of the wires, cables, and airwaves that make up the physical network
itself. We will determine that the Internet’s wired network is governed by a small
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handful of private telecommunications firms and cable companies who own and operate
the infrastructure, and the national governments around the world that, to varying extents,
regulate them, and we will explain the political dynamic using an Advocacy Coalitions
framework. Meanwhile, when it comes to governing the Internet’s wireless spectrum, we
will assert that the Communications Act of 1934 and the spectrum-allocation auctions of
recent years serve to demonstrate how and why the federal government - primarily the
F.C.C – is the central governing authority, along with an epistemic community of
engineers that is paramount in guiding its decision-making.
In Chapter 4, we will examine governance of the Protocol layer, referring to the
technical standards and protocols that facilitate digital communication over the network.
We will argue that decision-making authority is held by a small handful of international
engineering consortium groups - primarily, the Internet Society (ISOC), its Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) – and we
will then analyze the constitutional makeup of these organizations and assert that
policymaking is best characterized by the “rough consensus” principle. Finally, we will
assert that the decisions over which technical protocols to adopt, and how they are to be
designed, are, in themselves, an important form of policy which constrain and enable
behavior on the Internet.
In Chapter 5, we will examine governance of the Applications layer, referring to
the software applications that enable people to use the Internet. We will illustrate how
the code underlying both desktop and web applications is a form of policy itself. These
software applications enable and constrain the actions of every Internet user on a
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technical basis, and thus we will demonstrate how code constitutes a unique type of
policy, one in which the environment itself is designed to deny the user even a capability
to act in defiance. We will then argue that a relatively small handful of the most wellcapitalized private commercial software firms govern the Internet’s applications the most
– and this will be demonstrated based on several usability metrics. Ultimately, we will
assert that Lawrence Lessig’s “code is law” argument best explains how code constrains
and enables Internet behavior, only, we will argue, that the code written by private
commercial firms often indicates an implicit recognition of the sovereign authority that
traditional governmental institutions retain over them.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we will examine governance of the Internet’s Content layer,
the most highly visible and controversial layer of them all. By highlighting several
prominent issue areas such as the regulation of pornographic material online, efforts to
mitigate spam, and the regulation of file-sharing over peer-to-peer networks, we will
argue that while national governments certainly have governing authority over Internet
content to an extent, ISPs and private website operators (through their TOS Agreements)
also have demonstrated their authority to make policies that directly constrain or enable
behavior with intentional effects, particularly in the transnational context.
Fundamentally, these layers are not sequential, nor are they necessarily mutually
exclusive. Policies made at one layer typically have significant consequences for shaping
the policy environment at the other layers. For example, at the Protocol layer, the
decision to adopt the TCP/IP standard, which is open and universally accessible, over that
of X.25, which allows for far more centralized control, directly led to the development of
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the open and decentralized Internet that currently exists. If the alternative decision had
been made to adopt the X.25 standard (as has since been done in China), the policy
environment affecting cyberspace at, say, the Content layer would be fundamentally
different, allowing for greater government-imposed systems of control – as centralized
authority would be built into the technology itself.
As a result, from a prescriptive point of view, we will argue that policy objectives
can be best achieved by either identifying which layer is most appropriate to a
specific problem and designing narrowly-targeted policies with the context of that
specific layer’s political dynamics in mind, or by targeting one layer with the direct
intent of causing cascading effects at another layer entirely. In other words, whether
policymakers choose to work within the political architecture of one specific layer, or
whether they choose to take a cross-layer approach seeking cascading effects, either way
it is the conceiving of Internet-based problems in terms of our conceptual layers that will
ultimately prove to be a valuable tool for policymakers. Doing so will enable the
development of better Internet policies that can more reliably achieve desired outcomes.
Policymakers ought to utilize this conceptual model because it accounts for the
Internet’s complexities, both in technical and political terms. The four-layer model and
its resulting map of political architecture creates four distinctive policy arenas, each with
its own set of criteria for determining what policy designs are most appropriate, and each
with its own political dynamics that will ultimately influence to what extent a policy will
be effective in achieving desired outcomes. The question is as old as Political Science
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itself: If something needs to get done, who has the power to do it? The four-layer model
and its resulting map of political architecture provide the answer.
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The Case of U.S. National Cybersecurity Policy
In Part I of this study we will explore each of the four conceptual Internet layers –
the Infrastructure, the Technical Protocols, the Software Applications, and the Content.
At each, it will be ascertained why that layer is important, who governs it, and how are
policies being made that affect it. Viewed in its totality, this will define the current
political architecture of the Internet.
In Part II we will apply this new four-layer model and resulting political
architecture by performing a detailed case study on U.S. national cybersecurity policy,
post-9/11. As will be demonstrated, this case is a prime example both of what works and
what doesn’t when policies are designed to coordinate actions among governments,
private commercial firms, hybrid institutions, and the software and engineering
communities – in other words, within the context of the political architecture that will be
laid out.
The story of U.S. cybersecurity policy can be thought of in two parts. First, in the
initial years following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the story is about the
policymaking process that ultimately led to the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
policy document. Second, in the years since, the story is about the formation of a new
bureaucratic regime headed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Our objective will be to utilize our four-layer model and its resulting map of
political architecture by analyzing the issue of national cybersecurity from a broad public
policy perspective in order to test the hypothesis, and commonly held perception, that
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cybersecurity policy’s failures are the result of a flawed policy design that focuses almost
exclusively on voluntary public-private partnerships.
First, we will conduct a descriptive analysis of the problem definition underlying
the issue. The generalized problem which U.S. national cybersecurity policy is designed
to address – namely, digital threats to the nation’s critical cyber assets – can be made
more specific by deconstructing the problem using a layer-based approach. At the
Infrastructure layer, the threats include outright destruction of the Internet’s physical
components, such as critical telecommunications lines or operating centers, and the
hijacking of industrial control systems, such as regional power grids. At the Applications
layer, the threat is comprised of malicious code infiltrating vulnerable software
applications to steal data or hijack network devices. At the Content layer, the threat
comes in form of defacement of websites or websites being taken offline completely.
The problem definition will be further analyzed by highlighting the categorical
and specific mechanisms by which threat agents pursue their goals at each of the
aforementioned layers. We will introduce a new typology that draws important
distinctions between cyberterrorism, hacktivism, cracktivism, and cyberwarfare, and
place specific deployment mechanisms like viruses, worms, botnets, and distributed
denial-of-service attacks in this context. Again, our objective is to clarify the problem
that cybersecurity policy is designed to address, and conceptualizing this complex, often
vague, problem in terms of layers will prove useful for understanding the subsequent
policy analysis.
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Second, we will perform a detailed analysis of the primary document currently
guiding U.S. national cybersecurity policy - the Bush Administration’s National Strategy
to Secure Cyberspace.37 The policy design of this document is important in how it
implicitly addresses all four layers in our conceptual framework. It calls for enhancing
the protection of the nation’s critical cyber assets by bolstering the defenses of the
physical infrastructure, and directly references how this can be achieved through
designing more secure technical standards and protocols, promoting more secure
software application development in the private commercial sector, and by patrolling
Web content.
Third, we will examine the policymaking process that led to the National
Strategy. This process can be characterized as open, but flawed. A Presidential advisory
board released 53 questions to the public for comment, then drafted an initial proposal
which was discussed in several town hall meetings across the country, ultimately leading
to the final version of the policy. It was heavily influenced at every stage by large private
corporations, and from the outset of its implementation came under heavy criticism for
failing to allocate enough resources to the problem and for relying on a strictly voluntary
public-private approach. Implementation was further hindered by a high turnover rate at
the top levels within the newly created Executive bureaucracy - the Department of
Homeland Security's National Cyber Security Division (NCSD). As we will
demonstrate, this policymaking process was inclusive of most of the major governing
actors set forth in our political architecture (and that in itself is significant), however
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organizational conflicts between them, again contextualized in terms of who has authority
at each specific layer, played a large role in derailing the policy’s implementation.
Next, we will seek to clarify the current bureaucratic regime governing U.S.
national cybersecurity policy. As will be explained, this regime had been headed
primarily by the NCSD division within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
however, following a weakened period of having conflicting roles with the newly-created
National Cyber Security Center (NCSC), the NCSD is now competing intensely to retain
its governing authority with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Security
Agency (NSA), particularly the military’s CYBERCOM command center.
Finally, we will then attempt to tie all of this together by examining cybersecurity
policy in action – namely, what actually happens in the face of a cyberattack. What
becomes evident is the centrality of the private sector, particularly in preventing attacks;
also, the reliance on software applications and technical protocols both in prevention and
response, particularly network-monitoring tools and specific anti-virus products; and
finally, that the federal government’s role is relegated primarily to being a coordinator
among private actors. US-CERT is vital to raising awareness about cyberattacks and for
information-sharing, but ultimately, U.S. national cybersecurity policy thus far limits the
federal government from taking more forceful measures beyond that point. The fourlayer conceptual model again proves helpful in contextualizing both the problem stream
and solution stream surrounding the issue by framing it in these terms.
Ultimately, by applying our four-layer model and its resulting map of political
architecture to the issue of U.S. national cybersecurity policy, we will argue that its
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overriding policy design and policymaking process are reflective of how all four
conceptual layers are important in their own right, and that this confirms the utility of the
four-layer model in general. The acknowledged failures of U.S. cybersecurity policy
have more to do with an implementation process characterized by institutional turmoil
within the Executive Branch of the federal government than with a flawed policy design
or policymaking process – and, in fact, this only serves to reinforce our argument that
government alone does not have adequate governing authority to achieve their desired
outcomes. Even the common criticism of the NSSC’s policy design relying too heavily
on public-private partnerships is not so much a flawed design element as it is a
recognition of the Internet’s decentralized reality where numerous governing actors have
authority at different layers. The lessons of U.S. cybersecurity policy reaffirm that the
best way to create meaningful Internet policies that can be effectively implemented lies in
creating policies that target the layer most appropriate to specific problems in order to
produce intentional cascading effects at, what is often, another layer entirely.

In summary, the main purpose of this research project will be three-fold: 1) to
develop a new conceptual model that deconstructs the Internet into four layers; 2) to use
this model in formulating a new political architecture that accurately maps out and
depicts authority on the Internet - ultimately determining who governs at each layer; and
3) to use the case of U.S. national cybersecurity policy, post-9/11, in order to evaluate the
usefulness of both. If we are to answer, “Who governs the Internet?”, we need to know
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how to frame the question, how to answer it, and whether or not our method of framing
and our answers are helpful. That is our goal in the following chapters.
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Chapter 2 – A History of the Internet: Parallel Narratives of Public and Private
Catalysts

The Internet of today did not arise by accident nor did it emerge overnight, but
rather is the product of a half-century long evolutionary process. In order to place our
governance discussion in an appropriate context, it is necessary to understand the
Internet’s historical development. This history is comprised of two competing narratives
– the role of public institutions (including government agencies and government-funded
university programs) versus the role of decentralized private stakeholders (encompassing
both private commercial firms as well as independent, non-affiliated individuals). The
Internet today is not really a single entity, but rather is more accurately described as a
collection of millions of privately owned and operated computer networks, independent
from one another, and each with its own set of rules prescribed by its own administrators.
How did this structure come about, and why is the historical process still relevant in
determining governance today?
Histories of the Internet abound, and it is not our intention to rehash what
previous scholars have written about at length.38 Our approach for this project will be
simply to highlight the major events in the Internet’s history that directly relate to our
governance discussion focusing on the four conceptual layers – specifically, the constant
interplay between public institutions and decentralized private stakeholders that has
characterized the Internet throughout its history. Rather than simply choosing which lens
– public or private - is “correct” and which to disregard (or minimize in importance), our
38
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narrative will describe the vital role that both have played in shaping the Internet since its
inception. We refer to this approach as incorporating “parallel” narratives because, as
will be discussed, although the federal government played a central role in creating and
funding the original network, beginning in the 1970s there were essentially multiple
networks – some of the non-profit government-sponsored variety, while others
decentralized and privatized – operating simultaneously and in parallel to one another.
We will also illustrate how our four conceptual layers came about chronologically
and evolved through different processes – some, like the Infrastructure, were built upon
pre-existing legacy systems, while others, like the Protocols, had to be newly created
from scratch. As a result, the constant interplay that will be described between the
various public and private actors, which continues to the present day, will be valuable in
explaining current governance arrangements at each layer, as well as the unique
challenges that the Internet continues to pose to policymakers.
Ultimately, this chapter will utilize the historical narrative put forth to develop
two key arguments that will recur throughout this project; first, that each Internet layer
has unique developmental characteristics including different policymaking processes that
have carried over to the present day. Thus, the layers are distinct and they matter.
Second, that history has demonstrated how sometimes governments and public policies
have had governing authority, while other times the engineering community’s technical
decisions or other private-sector policies have been authoritative; the central point being
that the determination of governance all depends on which layer is being analyzed.

40
Part I. ARPANET & The Internet’s Early Years

The creation of the Internet can be attributed to a direct response on behalf of the
U.S. Government to the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957. As a
consequence of Sputnik’s launch, the Defense Department issued Directive 5105.15
establishing the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in 195839. ARPA’s
mission was:
to assure that the U.S. maintains a lead in applying state-ofthe-art technology for military capabilities and to prevent
technological surprise from her adversaries.40
Both ARPA’s objectives and funding were supplied by the military, which later renamed
the agency the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1972. Its
broad mandate led to a research agenda in pursuit of military goals which were not
necessarily limited to military applications. It was at ARPA in the 1960s and 1970s that
scientists propelled forward major technological advances in the fields of
microelectronics, computing, and network communications41. Consequently, the
Department of Defense took the primary role in governing the Internet during these early
years.
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The Internet itself was directly born as a result of the military’s desire to be able
to analyze a battlefield situation remotely and as the battle was progressing. Joseph
Licklider and ARPA’s Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) had been
charged with the task of applying a computer’s analytical power to ever-changing
battlefield situations, and the problem emerged of how to communicate the results backand-forth between the command center and the battlefield. Some type of remote access
to the computer running the analysis was necessary. In the late 1960s, this led to
invention-by-necessity – the creation of the world’s first computer network called
ARPANET. An interconnection of ARPA’s host computers was distributed mostly to
universities located across the United States and used existing telephone lines to transfer
data. This was additionally significant because, by deciding to utilize the existing
telephone network for data communication, the Internet’s physical infrastructure was
already in place.
On November 29, 1969, the first two nodes of the ARPANET – the University of
California at Los Angeles (UCLA) and the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) – exchanged
their first message. This was made possible by IPTO’s Larry Roberts who made the
decision over ARPANET’s technical design, choosing among protocols for fully
interconnected point-to-point leased lines, line-switched (dial-up) service, or packetswitching42. The decision was ultimately for a packet-switched system, and the initial
host-to-host software used to connect ARPANET’s first few host computers would later
be replaced by the NCP protocol in 1970, and then eventually replaced with the TCP/IP
42
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protocol in 198343. This first transmission was also the result of a contract that ARPA
awarded to the private firm BBN to build an interface message processor (IMP) –
essentially, a first generation packet-switched router - outbidding other firms like
Raytheon and Jacobie Systems44. Within a month of UCLA and SRI’s first packetswitched message being transmitted, two additional nodes were added – the University of
California at Santa Barbara and the University of Utah. Within a year, the ARPANET
was growing at a rate of one new node per month, and in less than two years the planned
15-node network was in place and operational.45
Already evident at this early stage are a few noteworthy characteristics that are of
great significance to our Internet governance discussion. First, in terms of simply
creating a functional ARPANET with a mere 15 nodes, a physical infrastructure of wired
telephone lines was prerequisite, and a common language or communications protocol
needed to be used by all nodes desiring to function on the network. Thus, our first two
Internet layers – the Infrastructure and the Protocols – have already emerged.
Second, the way these two layers have emerged, even at this early stage in the
narrative, is instructive for understanding how those layers are governed to the present
day. At the Infrastructure layer, the federal government acted as a central coordinator in
its capacity of regulating the existing telephone network (this will be explored more
thoroughly in Chapter 3). At the Protocol layer, the decision-making process that led to
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the adoption of a packet-switched protocol – a process characterized by public Request
for Comments (RFCs) and seeking a rough consensus among the engineering community
– will be the pattern of decision-making used for protocol adoption to the present day
(explored further in Chapter 4).
Third, the federal government, private commercial firms, and universities have all
emerged even at this embryonic stage as being vital to the ARPANET. In fact, while the
4 original nodes of the ARPANET in 1969 were all located at universities, an
examination of the network’s next generation of nodes reveal that an institutional mix of
universities, government agencies, and private commercial firms were already connected.
The ARPANET nodes following the original four were MIT, Harvard, BBN
Technologies, Systems Development Corp., Stanford, MIT's Lincoln Labs, CarnegieMellon University, Case-Western Reserve University, NASA/Ames, RAND, and the
University of Illinois-Urbana.46 This reveals ARPANET’s public-private hybrid makeup
even in 1971, and it is a crucial point that should not be understated.
In order to overcome the skepticism of the people who were being requested to
attach their equipment to and use the ARPANET, Larry Roberts made connection to the
ARPANET mandatory for all computer centers funded through the IPTO. This policy
was motivated largely by cost. By the mid-1960s, ARPA was the major funding source
for most of its contractors, and buying equipment for them represented a large expense
for the agency. Requiring the various computing centers to connect to the ARPANET
would not only pool hardware, software, and data resources more efficiently from a
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technical perspective, it would also eliminate the need, and corresponding cost, of
“wastefully duplicating” the same state-of-the-art resources at each facility. 47 In other
words, the ARPANET was a means for sharing resources and avoiding redundancy, and
making connection to it mandatory was a way of cutting expenses for the ARPANET’s
chief benefactor. This is a clear case of the federal government using its procurement
powers as leverage to drive the Internet’s early growth.
Funding for the ARPANET project was by no means a priority within DoD. As
former ARPA Director Stephen J. Lukasik describes, the Agency’s previous work had
been carefully watched by the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and the President’s
Science Advisory Committee, but with the ARPANET project Licklider was largely “left
alone”. Licklider recalled:

[The Director] seemed too busy, he was just relieved to get
somebody to run the office ... I talked with him periodically
[and] he would make suggestions about directions of
things, but pretty much let me do what I wanted to do.48

However, despite this seemingly high-level of independence in guiding the direction of
ARPA’s research, the politics of funding the Agency within Congress were another
matter. Lukasik explains that by 1968:

The environment for ARPA was quite different. While the
need for survivable networks had not changed, political
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forces were tightening the screws on ARPA. The Agency's
budget was shrinking, partly to help pay for the Vietnam
War and partly because opponents to the war in the
Congress were using every opportunity to cut programs in
DoD. "Fraud, waste, and abuse" was a frequently invoked
litany of sins. Lack of relevance to national security was
another. Senator Proxmire periodically identified projects
for a Golden Fleece Award, projects with scientifically
accurate but easy-to-ridicule titles. Senator Mansfield was
soon to demand "relevance statements" for every R&D line
item in DoD.49

Nevertheless, funding for ARPA and the ARPANET was ultimately appropriated
as part of the larger DoD budget. But it was a result of this sometimes-hostile political
environment in Congress that the decisions were made to first implement the small fournode network before expanding to one more robust, and to the very selection of which
four universities would be included in it.50
The next major event in the Internet's historical development came at the
International Conference on Computer Communication (ICCC) in 1972 when ARPA
engineers along with associated university faculty and students successfully demonstrated
the potential of the network through a number of simulations. The new conference
“marked a turning point”. Organized by ARPA’s Larry Roberts and Bob Kahn with the
express purpose of promoting the ARPANET51, and attended by approximately 800
computer communication professionals, government employees and academics,
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simulations demonstrated interactive chess games and “conversations” between
computers located at MIT and Stanford, and were accessed from the conference terminals
in Washington D.C. Suddenly, the experimental ARPANET, a testbed for networking
theory and technology, had been transformed into a functional tool with exciting and
practical applications. The ICCC was “for packet switching what the Centennial
Exposition in Philadelphia in 1876 was for the telephone: the public unveiling of a
technological discontinuity”. According to first-hand accounts, people weren’t leaving
the room until well after midnight every night.52
In the month following the conference, ARPANET traffic increased 67%.53 At
this point, 30 institutions were connected to the network ranging from industrial for-profit
commercial installations and private consulting firms like BBN, Xerox PARC, and the
MITRE Corporation, to government sites like NASA’s Ames Research Laboratories, the
National Bureau of Standards, and Air Force research facilities, to numerous
universities.54
However, the successful demonstrations at the ICCC conference had significant
unintended consequences. Rather than a large movement toward the ARPANET itself,
the more general concept and application of computer networking was the real revelation
to those in attendance. Following the conference, “people started to apply their
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newfound appreciation for networking in highly original and unanticipated ways that
suited their own needs”. While the federal government remained the principal funding
source and governing authority for the ARPANET, the newly arising innovative spirit
coming out of the ICCC led to a highly decentralized approach to the next developmental
stage of networking technology. The direct consequence was a surge in growth of
private, local area networks (LANs) that existed outside the ARPANET.

Part II. NSF Control and The Rise of Parallel Public and Private Networks

Throughout the 1970s, the ARPANET would continue its slow growth under the
Defense Department’s control, but the spread of thousands of private LANs would occur
independent from the government in the private sector. The IPTO could create mandates
and set policies for all computer resources linked to the ARPANET due to their
procurement power, such as banning the use of the network for commercial purposes,
however the IPTO had no such policymaking capability over computer resources
connected to networks which were not the ARPANET, and the proliferation of private
LANs demonstrated this point as private network administrators were independently
making decisions affecting their own networks. At this stage, it is clearly evident that
two parallel narratives were both in play – the ARPANET was developing under the
direct guidance and funding of the federal government while, simultaneously, thousands
of private local networks were developing in a highly decentralized manner apart from it.
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A shift in control of the ARPANET would occur in the 1980s. As more
universities, research centers, and private entities increasingly used the network for
various purposes, the military created a separate network which it named the MILNET
where it could, once again, pursue strictly military objectives. As the military migrated
to MILNET, control over, and funding of, the ARPANET was transferred from the
Defense Department to the National Science Foundation (NSF).
Meanwhile, more earnest efforts were being made to interconnect the ARPANET
with ever-more government agencies and universities as well as with the commercial and
more freely accessible private LAN networks that existed in the private sector. A core
technical problem arose: the methods and protocols that each LAN implemented were
often different from one another, and that was an obstacle to interconnecting all of the
various networks together. The solution was the deployment of the TCP/IP protocol in
1983.55 TCP/IP overcame such differences among the networks by shifting the
responsibility for technical reliability away from the network itself and instead towards
the host devices.56 As a result, both the ARPANET and private LANs were able to much
more easily interconnect with outside networks. There no longer needed to be a uniform
set of technical policies amongst all networks in order to maintain operability. An
Internet of heterogeneous networks became possible.
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The great insight to be drawn from TCP/IP’s development and ultimate
deployment is that, as the demand had grown for existing public and private networks to
interconnect, there was no demonstrable governance over all of the networks involved,
and thus no central authority to turn to. It became clearly evident that the Internet did not
represent the master plan for a global network of any individual, university, corporation,
or government. As the case of TCP/IP illustrates, no single body governs the Internet’s
functional operation, determines what services it will or will not provide, or decides who
can and cannot use its resources. The Internet is not one entity; it is a collection of
millions of privately owned and operated networks, located across the globe, each setting
its own policies for the behavior that will take place on it.
Interconnection of various networks, owned and operated by different entities,
meant that there needed to be some agreement over which technical protocols would be
implemented in order for the computers on different networks to communicate with one
another. As each private network chose which protocols it deemed were best for itself,
the drive towards interconnection meant that others would have to follow suit and adopt
the same protocols. Some decision had to be made in order to ensure interoperability.
Here is the prime example of how the historical development of the Internet was
not driven solely by the military, government, universities, a commercial firm, or any
other single entity, or even by a trust-like form of collusion. Decisions were not made by
a central authority, but rather resulted from a highly decentralized process involving
numerous actors of various types, all seeking to further their own self-interest – in this
case, defined as interoperability. As more and more networks adopted certain protocols,

50
particularly TCP/IP, a rough consensus developed over which were to be used on a mass
scale. This process, or “rough consensus principle”, is still a defining characteristic of
Internet governance57. No single entity had the authority or decision-making capability
to force the adoption of certain protocols, but when a rough consensus by Internet users
had developed, if someone didn’t adopt those protocols then they simply would not be
able to interconnect.
Rather than government institutions or relatively large, well-capitalized private
companies rising to the forefront of protocol decision-making, it is during these years that
epistemic communities of engineers, embodied in consortia groups like the Internet
Society (ISOC) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), came to prevail and,
over time, establish their governing authority.58
By the late 1980s, the National Science Foundation had taken over funding for the
operation and continued development of the Internet – funding appropriated by the U.S.
Congress and approved by the President – while simultaneous research and
developmental efforts were being pursued at universities and at numerous private
commercial firms, independent from the NSF. The Defense Department – DARPA,
specifically – had voluntarily ceded its governing authority to the NSF as it refocused on
its core mission to act as a research agency, not a communications operator. Meanwhile,
the NSF built its own network in 1986 to link its supercomputers called the NSFNET,
which was different from the ARPANET in one fundamental way. The ARPANET was
still a single, homogenous network, whereas the NSFNET consisted of two distinct types
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of networks – local, geographically regional networks in addition to a central high-speed
backbone.59
This difference in architectural design would become significant in ushering in
ARPANET’s demise - not as the result of an intentional government decision to do so,
but in response to technological forces and a practical need to maintain functionality and
interoperability. Unlike the ARPANET and the rest of the Internet at that time, the
NSFNET did not immediately use the TCP/IP protocol, and this was viewed as a large
deficiency. In order to make the transition to TCP/IP, its backbone had to be taken
offline, and thus, while the change was being made, an arrangement was setup whereby
the NSFNET would use the ARPANET as its backbone. This connection, “seemingly
insignificant at the time”, permanently changed the Internet itself by making the
NSFNET available to most universities for the first time. The Internet suddenly included
regional network operators as well as a variety of new supercomputer facilities.60
An awareness quickly developed that the new NSFNET backbone would be a
faster and more ideal solution for both transitioning the Internet to the latest technologies
as well as for removing any vestiges of the military’s involvement from what had become
a largely civilian enterprise. The move to the NSFNET backbone was made with the vast
majority of Internet users never even being made aware of the switch, and in February
1990, the ARPANET was permanently shut down because of the rapid exodus that had
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already begun towards the NSFNET’s faster backbone.61 As with the adoption of
TCP/IP, the shutting down of ARPANET illustrates how decision-making was being
heavily influenced by technological efficiency and, in this case, faster bandwidth speeds.

Part III. Privatization, Commercialization, and the World Wide Web

With the infrastructure and technical protocols now largely in place, the next
stage in this historical evolution was ushered in with the privatization and
commercialization of the Internet, which came shortly thereafter. Even as control of the
Internet passed from the Defense Department to the civilian authority of the NSF,
commercial traffic nevertheless remained prohibited because the NSF was still a
government agency and its Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) clearly stated that all
commercial traffic by for-profit institutions across its backbone was prohibited.62 This
AUP ban on commercial traffic hindered the Internet’s growth and its adoption by new
classes of users.63 However, in keeping with an already-established tradition of
decentralized development, independent private commercial networks began to emerge to
meet the needs that the NSF was not satisfying. As the operations of these independent
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commercial networks grew, and as some merged to form larger networks, and as others
made agreements to share and route traffic between their various networks, the result was
an internetwork of commercial TCP/IP networks that paralleled the non-commercial
Internet run by the NSF. Once again, the competing narratives of an institutional nonprofit Internet versus a decentralized commercial Internet could be seen simultaneously
running parallel to one another. While it is true that the original networking technology
of the ARPANET had been sponsored by government funding, the further development
of that technology, by the 1980s, had veered off in a number of directions largely due to
private capital, and through processes in which the government played no role. These
narratives of an institutional non-profit Internet versus a decentralized commercial
Internet are “parallel” because, by this time, both internets were operating
simultaneously.
Observing this development, by the late 1980s, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) - a presidential advisory agency with the Executive Branch,
created by Congress - established committees to propose a process whereby the NSF
could transition the Internet from a government-funded operation into a private
commercial service64. Consequently, in November 1991, the NSF’s new Project
Development Plan called for Internet service to be delivered by independent and private
commercial and nonprofit Internet Service Providers (ISPs), each of whom would operate
its own network and backbone65.

64

The Federal High Performance Computing Program (Office of Science and Technology Policy,
September 8, 1989). Retrieved on October 4, 2008 from <http://www.ostp.gov/cs/about_ostp>.
65

Abbate, Inventing the Internet 37-38.

54
Ultimately, the committees pushed for full privatization and wholesale
commercial use of the Internet amidst “little or no public debate”.66 Congressional
hearings took place before the Subcommittee on Science of the Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology in the U.S. House of Representatives, however these hearings
didn’t focus at all on the issue of whether or not to privatize, but rather only on the best
way to privatize67. By the early 1990s, the political climate was one in which
telecommunications policy for both political parties was based upon notions of
deregulation and competition.68 Indeed, privatization came to be seen as virtually
inevitable as politicians and telecommunications executives alike made it clear that the
private sector would own and operate the Internet.69 Senator Al Gore infamously coauthored the High-Computing Performance Act of 1991 that formalized this privatization
and opened the Internet for commercial use by establishing the National Information
Infrastructure (NII), later nicknamed the “information superhighway”.70
Without much public debate or controversy over the decision to privatize the
Internet, an important question beckons: Did the federal government simply give away
an asset that would soon foster billions of dollars’ worth of transactions on a daily basis
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for free? The answer is yes, so the real question that academics have been preoccupied
with is why it wanted to. Scholars such as Shah and Kesan have argued that their reasons
for privatization were three-fold: first, privatization was the dominant policy approach by
both political parties in the early 1990s; second, the NSF was encouraging the regional
networks to find commercial customers believing that the revenue from new customers
would allow the networks to expand and use the economies of scale to lower costs for
everyone; and third, there was a growing expression in the private sector about their
desire to send non-governmental and commercial traffic across the Internet, and for the
telecommunications companies to start selling connectivity and infrastructure.71
If there was any controversy at all, it was the debate over whether the NSF's
policies provided a level playing field for network service providers – certain
stakeholders like Performance Systems International (PSI), AlterNet, the Commercial
Internet Exchange Association (CIX), and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) were
concerned that a small handful of companies like ANS, IBM, and MCI would be the
recipients of a structural competitive advantage if the NSF’s network management plan
went into effect in its original form. The NSF Inspector General reviewed the
management plan72 and, in addressing those critiques, his revised report led to the
Scientific and Advanced-Technology Act of 1992 which gave the green light to private
and commercial use of the network so long as it would increase the network’s utility for
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education and research73. This privatization policy replaced “the need for the NSFNET
backbone, any involvement from the NSF, and, in the process, eliminated entirely the
commercial restrictions imposed by the NSF’s AUP”.74
In May 1993, the NSF released a formal solicitation to accommodate and promote
the privatization and commercialization of the Internet.75 This document mandated the
creation of four Network Access Points (NAPs), which were ultimately sold via closed
bid to Sprint, Pacific Bell, Ameritech, and MFS. Regional networks would no longer
connect to the NSFNET backbone, but rather to commercial providers, which would
interconnect via the NAPs. Once this migration was complete, the NSFNET was
officially retired in April 1995, and shortly thereafter, the NSF ended its sponsorship of
the four public NAPs. By this point, the government had transitioned from contracting
out Internet backbone services to allowing the market to fully provide them.76 The
privatization process behind the management of the network was now complete.
Once the Internet was privatized and commercialized, the arrival of the World
Wide Web became the “focusing event” which would finally launch the Internet into the

73

Public Law No: 102-476, 43 U.S.C. 1862(g): Scientific and Advanced-Technology Act of 1992.
Retrieved on April 24, 2011 from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:S.1146>. The bill was
co-sponsored by Senators Mikulski (D-MD), Cochran (R-MS), Sanford (D-NC), & Sarbanes (D-MD), and
proceeded through the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee by Unanimous Consent, passed
Without Objection in the House, and was signed by President George H.W. Bush.
74

Okin 105.

75

NSF 93-52: Network Access Point Manager, Routing Arbiter, Regional Network Providers, and very
high speed backbone network services provider for NSFNET and the NREN(SM) Program (National
Science Foundation, May 6, 1993). Retrieved on September 19, 2012 from
<http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/stis1993/nsf9352/nsf9352.txt>.
76

Shah and Kesan.

57
mainstream culture77. One of the largest complaints about the Internet of the late 1980s
and early 1990s was its lack of locatable resources. While it was possible to remotely
connect one machine to another over the infrastructure and share resources via the
TCP/IP protocol, the user still had to know exactly where to find a particular machine,
and then would have to search that machine to see what content was available. Even
when the sought-after material was found, customized software often had to first be
installed in order to view it. A better type of software application was needed to make
the Internet more useful.
Addressing this problem, Tim Berners-Lee, while working at the European
Organization for Nuclear Research known as CERN78 in Geneva, Switzerland, invented
the World Wide Web in 1991 in order to allow researchers and other individuals to make
their work more readily available - either within a local area network, or across the
Internet.79 It was a killer-app designed as a simple document sharing and publication
tool, making use of uni-directional “hyperlinks” as electronic cross-references to
interconnect documents. The creation of globally unique identifiers for resources on the
Web, known as Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), made the search and discovery of
such resources far easier. Also, the Web was designed to be accessible to anyone who
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had web browser software installed and Internet access, regardless of what hardware
platform or operating system was being used on behalf of the user.
Although the Internet and the Web have often become synonymous in popular
vernacular, they are, in fact, separate entities – and their distinction is particularly
noteworthy from a historical development perspective. While the Internet made it
possible for computers to communicate remotely with one another, it was the World
Wide Web - conceived of as an application that runs on the Internet - that allowed
documents to be shared, linked to, and found in a practical manner.80 The Web proved to
be such a killer-app that, with the introduction of Mosaic browser software in 1993,
traffic on the Web proliferated at an astounding annual growth rate of 341,634%.81
Furthermore, on April 30, 1993, CERN announced that the Web would be released into
the public domain, making it free for everyone, with no fees due – producing a rapid shift
away from pay-to-use services that made use of Web alternatives like Gopher82.
Beginning, then, in the mid-1990s - using primarily the telephone network
infrastructure, the TCP/IP protocol, and the application known as the World Wide
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Web - what resulted was an explosion of content. As of July 2008, according to Google
Search, over one trillion unique URLs had been discovered83.

Thus, the Internet is truly not an entity that can be rightfully claimed to be owned,
operated, or governed by any single entity. It is a decentralized network of networks,
each of which is independently managed in whichever ways its administrator deems fit.
Decisions, particularly over technical protocols, are often made by “rough consensus”,
and their implementation relies completely on voluntary measures being adopted in order
to facilitate reliable interconnection and communication. Historically, both public
institutions and decentralized private stakeholders have played vital roles in guiding the
Internet’s evolution, and it would be an egregious oversimplification to downplay the role
of either. However, as it currently stands today, despite governing authority originally
resting in the hands of, first, the Defense Department and, subsequently, the NSF, the
contemporary Internet is more characteristically described as being a private sector
phenomenon.
As will be shown in the following chapters, formal governmental institutions
continue to play a significant role in setting the rules for Internet behavior, especially
regarding the physical infrastructure of the network, but it is private commercial firms
and non-affiliated individual computer programmers who are currently the agents
primarily responsible for guiding its numerous innovations. The formal handing-over of
governing authority by the NSF in the 1990s, coupled with the advent of the World Wide
83
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Web, has led to the current state of the Internet: a fully privatized and largely
commercial assortment of computer networks, independent from one another, but with
certain shared common interests. This constant interplay between public institutions and
decentralized private stakeholders, evident throughout the Internet’s entire history,
continues to shape the governance discussion today – as will be seen in the next section.
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&
THE POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET
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In order to answer, “Who governs the Internet?” we must first clarify what exactly
it is that we’re referring to. As the historical narrative previously explained, the Internet
is not a single entity, but rather is a collection of many privately owned and operated
networks, each with its own set of policies and decision-making processes. As such, if
we are to reasonably go about trying to answer, “Who governs the Internet?” we must
break down the question into its constituent parts. Who governs each different aspect of
the Internet?
This can best be answered by introducing the concept of layers. It is a term used
throughout the academic literature on the subject, and each layer is meant to refer to a
different aspect of the Internet – typically either a physical or logical component.
Because our focus for this project is adopting a policy-based approach, not only will we
define layers substantively in terms of their physical and logical dimensions, but we will
also conceive of them in terms of distinct issue areas for policymaking. Deconstructing
the Internet into conceptual layers in this manner will help us identify distinct issue areas
which ought not to be lumped together in discussions of policymaking, for each layer has
its own distinct set of problems, solutions, and governance arrangements. Only when
taken together do these layers form a complete vision of the Internet and all of the
activity that takes place on it.
The following chapters will examine each conceptual layer of the Internet using a
policymaking approach. By analyzing numerous case studies and using both public
policies and private-sector Internet policies as its primary units of analysis, it will be
demonstrated which actors hold primary governing authority at each layer – that is, who
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has proven the ability to create policies that constrain or enable Internet behavior with
intentional effects – and, additionally, what types of policymaking processes are evident
at each layer. Ultimately, this study will argue that the resulting map of the Internet’s
political architecture is an accurate depiction of Internet governance today. It is
something that can be meaningfully utilized not only for better understanding the core
typological differences among Internet issues, but also the consequences of those
differences. Finally, the arguments will be made that effective Internet policies are those
which target the layer most appropriate to a particular problem, and also that targeting
one particular layer as the object of policymaking and/or policy implementation is often
an effective strategy in producing intended effects at a different layer entirely. In other
words, these layers have demonstrable cascading effects, and, from a policy perspective,
that is something that can be utilized as well.

Scholars have formulated several conceptual schemes for analyzing the Internet –
both its policies as well as its operational functionality. One scheme put forth by Milton
Mueller is the “three-layer model of assignment”. Conceived as a form of technical
coordination - specifically in order to hand out unique values and address space and
attaching them to users or objects - Mueller divided the Internet into three conceptual
layers: 1) a technical layer, where coordination must ensure uniqueness, 2) an economic
layer, where decisions are made rationing scarcity, and 3) a policy layer, where decisions
are made about rights.84
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In contrast, Marcus Franda formulated an alternative conceptual scheme. In order
to structure his discussion of international regimes and the role they play when it comes
to the Internet, Franda conceptualizes such issues in terms of their 1) technical, 2)
commercial, and 3) legal dimensions.85
Legal scholar Laura Denardis used the case study of IPv6 to propose four
additional areas of Internet governance to supplement the technically-focused layers of
Milton Mueller: 1) critical Internet resources, 2) intellectual property rights, 3) security,
and 4) communication rights.86
The seminal Atkins Report written for the National Science Foundation in 2003
also used a layer-based model in formulating its now widely used concept of
“cyberinfrastructure”. Arguing for the development of a new “advanced infrastructure
layer”, the report cites as its base: 1) integrated electro-optical components of
computation, storage, and communication, 2) software programs, services, instruments,
data, information, knowledge, and social practices applicable to specific projects,
disciplines, and communities of practice, and 3) a cyberinfrastructure layer of enabling
hardware, algorithms, software, communications, institutions, and personnel. 87
While these and numerous other conceptual models have been proposed, the
conceptual scheme which will be used here is based on the one originally put forth by
Yochai Benkler. In writing to describe the dynamics of media regulation, Benkler
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conceptualized communications systems into three distinct layers – 1) the physical
architecture, 2) the logical infrastructure (or the code), and 3) the content layers. 88
Benkler formulated this three-layer model to explain the dynamics of structural media
regulation, arguing that decentralized and democratized information environments are
being made possible by emerging network technologies. His layer-based approach was a
means of presenting “a new set of regulatory choices” that governments increasingly face
in decentralized networked environments.
Benkler’s model would later be utilized and developed further by scholars like
Lawrence Lessig who took its application beyond the scope of media regulation and
towards understanding systems of freedom and control on the Internet, specifically.89 I
argue that Benkler’s model is additionally helpful if we extend it even further; towards
Internet policymaking. The Internet is, after all, a telecommunications entity, and, as will
be demonstrated, the types of policies that apply to regulating its infrastructure, for
example, differ fundamentally from those that apply to its content. They are made by
different actors and through different processes. No other existing model proves as
helpful in explaining the dynamics between competing Internet-related policies.
That does not mean, however, that it is a perfect fit, and upon closer examination
it becomes clear that Benkler’s three-layer model leaves too much unanswered when
transposing it into the Internet policymaking arena for which it was not originally
intended. My proposal is, therefore, to build upon Benkler’s model in order to make it
88
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better suited for the Internet policymaking context which is at the heart of this study. We
will accomplish this by redesigning the model to incorporate the following elements:
First, the term “architecture” tends to often have a quite different meaning in
telecommunications than it does in the context of the Internet and software engineering.
Thus, in this study we will substitute the term “infrastructure” in its place, for reasons
which will become apparent. Second, this study will demonstrate that Benkler’s “code”
layer remains too abstract for our purposes here. When identifying the various actors and
institutions involved in creating authoritative Internet policies, two fundamentally
different types of actors emerge within the code layer, and therefore it is important to
draw this distinction in order to formulate a better understanding of governance
arrangements. We must emphasize the difference between code, understood as technical
protocols, versus code as the software developer’s tool for creating applications which
the end-user encounters. The result is the emergence of what may ultimately be deemed
a fourth layer, separating the single code layer of Benkler into one layer dedicated to
technical standards and protocols and another dedicated to software applications. This
will highlight not only the substantive differences between institutional actors who either
create technical protocols or create private proprietary applications, but also the different
types of actors involved in decision-making.
Thus, the conceptual model we will employ to understand Internet
governance and policymaking will break down the Internet into the following four
layers: 1) The Infrastructure, 2) The Technical Protocols, 3) The Software
Applications, and 4) The Content.
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The purpose of developing this model is to create a lens for policymakers who
seek to produce intentional effects, and this is accomplished by breaking down the
different political dynamics at each layer so that policymakers’ goals can be better
aligned with implementation strategies. Towards that end, at each of these four
conceptual layers, let us now examine 1) why that layer is important, 2) who governs it,
and 3) how policies are being made that affect it.
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Chapter 3 – Who Governs the Infrastructure?

At its most basic level, the Internet remains a collection of various devices
connected to one another. The infrastructure – or the physical wires, cables, and,
increasingly, the airwaves – is what actually connects those devices. Without the
infrastructure, devices would have no means of communicating with one another,
rendering any activity at the other layers meaningless. In sum, the Internet could not
exist. As a consequence of this importance, governance over the Internet’s infrastructure
translates into the ability to make authoritative decisions over Internet access, behavior,
and content.
In this chapter, we will examine governance of the infrastructure’s two core
components: the wired and the wireless. Both have distinct histories which span decades.
When it comes to the wired network, we will illustrate how the Kingsbury Commitment,
the “natural monopoly” approach to regulation, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996
all led to how, we will argue, the Internet’s wired network is governed by a small handful
of private telecom firms and cable companies who own and operate the infrastructure,
and the national governments around the world that, to varying extents, regulate them –
explaining the political dynamic using an Advocacy Coalitions framework. Meanwhile,
when it comes to governing the Internet’s wireless spectrum, however, we will assert that
the Communications Act of 1934 and the spectrum-allocation auctions of recent years
serve to demonstrate how and why the federal government - primarily the F.C.C. – is the
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central governing authority, along with an epistemic community of engineers that is
paramount in guiding its decision-making.
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I. WHY IS THE INFRASTRUCTURE IMPORTANT?
The infrastructure is important because when machines cannot connect to one
another, the Internet and all of the communication, information, and transactions it
facilitates, cease to exist. Perhaps more than any of the other layers, the infrastructure is
also extremely vulnerable. Its physical dimension makes it particularly susceptible to
attacks and even outright destruction. It is also characterized as being finite, especially
when considering its global scale, and, as a result, several infrastructural “chokepoints”
create a scenario where the severing of a few cables may indeed cut off entire continents
from the network.
These risks are not merely conjecture, but have, in fact, occurred several times in
the Internet’s history. For example, in February 2008, five undersea cables that connect
Europe to Egypt, and thus the rest of the Middle East all the way to India, were
unexpectedly cut almost simultaneously, resulting in Egypt losing 70% of its connection
to the outside Internet, and nearly 60% of India's connectivity was “similarly lost on the
westbound route critical to the nation's burgeoning outsourcing industry”. Initially,
experts "said that ships' anchors, dragged by stormy weather across the sea floor, were
the most likely culprit, but Egyptian authorities noted that no ships were in the region”.90
In a similar case in December 2008, four undersea cables were severed in the
same region, and even included some of the very same cables that were involved in the
February 2008 incident. Fourteen countries were adversely affected, including The
Maldives which were 100 percent down, followed by India, which had an 82 percent
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disruption. Qatar, Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates were the next most widely
affected areas with about 70 percent service interrupted. Disruptions for Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and Pakistan range from 51 percent to 55 percent.91
These cases simply highlight the fact that cyberspatial activities are still entirely
dependent on real-world infrastructure. In each case, individuals’ computers still worked,
and there were no widespread computer viruses or software problems disrupting the
network; it was just that there was no longer a PHYSICAL connection between the
machines.
The map of the world’s Internet undersea cabling infrastructure illustrates that,
not only are there a relatively few number of trans-oceanic cables in total, but certain
regions of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa and New Zealand, are sometimes only
connected by a single cable. When the severing of a single cable can cut off large regions
of the world from the network entirely, it is evidence of how this major design
vulnerability poses a serious cybersecurity threat.
Because the overwhelming majority of Internet users connect through private
ISPs, access to the infrastructure is made additionally vulnerable as ISPs have become a
“chokepoint” in and of themselves.
This was demonstrated in March 2008, as a business disagreement between two
different ISPs escalated to the point where Internet traffic was stopped across parts of the
Atlantic. U.S.-based Cogent Communications shut down their links to the Swedish-based
ISP Telia in what was described as a contract dispute about the size and locations of the
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pipes connecting the two ISPs. Many large ISPs – Cogent and Telia, among them – have
“peering arrangements” where they agree to interconnect their networks at multiple
points and trade roughly equivalent amounts of data traffic. The contract dispute between
Cogent and Telia, centered on whether and how to provide fat enough pipes to some of
the peering locations, resulted in making it impossible for Swedes and residents of other
Nordic and Baltic countries to reach websites hosted on Cogent’s network, and vice
versa.92
The infrastructure is additionally vulnerable, not only through its inter-regional
cables or its ISP chokepoints, but also through “Meet-Me rooms”. Assuming all of the
major undersea and land cables that form the backbone of the Internet’s infrastructure are
undamaged and operational, there remain, out of necessity, locations where the disparate
infrastructural and network elements ultimately connect to each other. These locations,
where large networks physically connect to each other, are called “Meet-Me rooms”, and
they form a chokepoint of their own. If any of the Meet-Me rooms was suddenly
damaged or destroyed, again, large regions would be cut off from the rest of the Internet.
For example, the world’s most densely populated Meet-Me room is located in the
One Wilshire building in downtown Los Angeles. It is a room where over 260 ISPs
connect their networks to each other, and, if this facility went down, most of California
and parts of the rest of the world would not be able to connect to the Internet. Despite
public misperceptions about the Internet being an ultra-high-tech, decentralized system of
remote carriers, the Meet-Me room at One Wilshire, characterized as “a phalanx of
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cabling spill[ing] out of its containers”, illustrates both the infrastructure’s lack of
hardware sophistication as well as its undeniable centralization, particularly at certain
physical chokepoints, and in doing so, further highlights its vulnerability.93
Ultimately, the infrastructure is vital to the functionality and very existence of the
global Internet as the physical connections it facilitates are the prerequisite for any
subsequent digital communication to occur.

II. WHO GOVERNS THE INFRASTRUCTURE?
The physical infrastructure is owned and operated by private commercial firms in
the form of telecommunications and cable companies. In some nations, the infrastructure
is nationalized.
In terms of governance, the question needs to be framed by determining who has
real authority when it comes to making policy decisions over the infrastructure. In other
words, despite a confluence of influences, such as the role of the media, the mobilization
of grassroots activists, and the lobbying efforts of consumer advocacy groups, the only
actors who have decision-making authority over the infrastructure - meaning that they
have a proven ability to create policies that constrain or enable behavior with intentional
effects - are the owners and operators of that infrastructure. This translates into private
telecom firms and cable companies, and the national governments around the world that,
to varying extents, regulate them.

93

Dave Bullock, “A Lesson in Internet Anatomy: The World’s Densest Meet-Me Room,” Wired March 3,
2008. Retrieved on January 21, 2009 from
<http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/multimedia/2008/03/gallery_one_wilshire>.

74
The list of telecom firms in the United States which take a leading role in
governing the infrastructure primarily include the remaining Baby Bells - AT&T,
Verizon, and Qwest - as well as other major backbone players - Level 3 and Sprint
Nextel. The entire cable industry put together actually owns very little of the core
infrastructure, by comparison. The cable companies’ strong influence in policymaking
terms is the result of its focus on the notorious “last mile” of the infrastructure.94
Increasingly, the wireless spectrum is proving equally vital to the nation’s digital
infrastructure, and it presents a slightly different governing dynamic because of its
transmission of data over the airwaves.
In contrast to the privately owned and operated physical elements of the telecom
network, it has long been the policy of the United States that “the public owns the
airwaves”. The wireless spectrum of frequencies has, therefore, long been regulated by
the federal government, in its role as an agent of The People. Because no physical
connections need to be constructed in the air, in the same sense as the wires and cables of
the physical infrastructure, the ownership of the airwaves has been fundamentally defined
in a very different way from that of the physical telecom infrastructure. The wireless
spectrum is legally owned by the public, rather than private commercial firms, and the
allocation of its frequencies is administered by the government on the people’s behalf,
creating a situation whereby private companies simply lease access to the spectrum
through an application process that occurs on annual basis.
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The wireless spectrum in the United States, then, is clearly governed primarily
and directly by the federal government. Private commercial firms in the form of
broadcasters can be said to govern only in their capacity to make authoritative decisions
after they have been granted a license by the federal government, and even at that point,
their decisions are subject to further governmental oversight and regulatory policy. This
is in stark contrast to the governing dynamic of the physical infrastructure, where the
private telecoms and cable companies actually own the infrastructure outright.
For demonstrable evidence that the Internet’s infrastructure is governed by
national governments and the private telecommunications and cable sectors, one need
only look at the instructive example of cybersecurity policy in the United States.
As concerns over the physical security of important buildings and national
landmarks were heightened following the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in 1995, President Clinton’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) surprised many observers by generating a report titled,
“Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures”95, that “did not focus on the
vulnerability of key buildings around the country but instead on the security problems in
the new phenomenon of cyberspace”96.
Cybersecurity policy was, from this relatively early point, viewed in large part as
a problem of protecting the physical infrastructure – and the responsibility of creating
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policies to mitigate that problem was perceived from the outset as falling under the realm
of the federal government, working in conjunction with the private telecom sector.
While cybersecurity is a complex case study which will be examined in more
detail shortly, for now let us merely assert that cybersecurity policy, while multidimensional, nevertheless contains a strong component highlighting the primacy of
infrastructure protection. In other words, as will be demonstrated in the pages to follow,
the design of cybersecurity policy itself clearly demonstrates 1) the fundamental
importance of the infrastructure, and 2) that the federal government, in conjunction with
private telecommunications firms and cable companies, primarily govern that
infrastructure.
This is a historically repetitious pattern with established predictability. It was the
case through both the Clinton and Bush Administrations, and even President Barack
Obama, before taking office, proposed that much of his stimulus plan “to rebuild the
nation’s infrastructure” actually be devoted to, not only roads and bridges, but,
additionally, digital infrastructure projects. This is further recognition of the fundamental
importance of the Internet infrastructure, and the stimulus’ plan to implement such
projects primarily through direct government subsidies to private telecom firms and cable
companies is evidence that this governing dynamic shows no sign of significantly
changing in the immediate future.
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III. HOW ARE POLICIES BEING MADE AT THE INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER?
The pattern of policymaking over the network’s physical infrastructure is most
clearly an example in support of the Advocacy Coalitions framework.
In the United States, the history of telecommunications policy forms the basis of
the Internet infrastructure’s governance. The inventions of the telegraph and telephone in
the late 19th century meant that a physical network infrastructure must, of necessity, be
constructed in order for long-distance communication to occur utilizing these new
technologies. Very quickly, the United States government stepped in to ensure that a
system of redundancy did not emerge whereby each new entrant into the telecom market
would have to build their own network from scratch and continually lay down new wires
and cables, identical to those of their business rivals, physically connecting to all of the
same destinations, buildings, and residences. This possibility was deemed unnecessarily
redundant and grossly inefficient. Already by this time, in response to burgeoning
competition, AT&T (which until this period identified the telegraph as its core business)
had begun acquiring rivals and smaller telephone companies, prompting the federal
authorities to initiate antitrust action. In what became known as the “Kingsbury
Commitment” in 1913, AT&T agreed to allow competitors to interconnect with its
network and pledged that for every new local system acquired, it would sell an equal
share of lines to rivals.
The Kingsbury Commitment, then, initiated a policy course on behalf of AT&T
and the federal government whereby telephone service would be classified as a “natural
monopoly”. This argument presumed that redundant telephone infrastructure was

78
economically inefficient, and that monopoly power could simply be mitigated through
rate regulation97. Support was ensured for this policy because AT&T would enjoy
government protection from competition (limiting access to the market), while public
officials could guarantee to their constituents “One Policy, One System, Universal
Service”98. Regulatory authority was formalized in the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 as
vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and later in the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in 1934, justified on the basis of best serving the
“public interest, convenience, or necessity”99.
This natural monopoly argument, coupled with a policy context whereby only one
network infrastructure would be built and operated by the private sector, but regulated by
the federal government, would set a course of path dependency that would endure for
most of the next century.
In the 1970s, the U.S. Justice Department filed an antitrust lawsuit against AT&T
based on complaints of anti-competitive practices by MCI and other long distance service
providers, prompting a landmark settlement which forced AT&T to restrict its services to
the long distance telecom market, while its local services were divested into seven
regional operating companies, which after a series of mergers and acquisitions later
became four – SBC, Verizon, Bellsouth, and Qwest. Thus began in 1982 a policy
environment where local and long distance services would constitute a “regulatory
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disconnect”, where the federal government imposed an artificial legal distinction between
local and long distance services, despite technological advances that would render any
such distinction obsolete100. Once again, during this era of the “Baby Bells”, a sudden
and transformative shift in the telecom policy environment was followed by years of
relative stability and entrenched interests.
Then, in the early and mid-1990s, with the advent of the World Wide Web and
other digital network technologies, regulatory challenges created by the local vs. long
distance distinction began to cross industry lines. The new telecom environment became
one of “convergence”, meaning that digital technologies could allow operators to offer all
types of telecommunication services – local, long distance, wireless telephony, cable
broadcast, and Internet access – regardless of which type of network infrastructure they
used. Consequently, new regulatory problems emerged such as whether the Internet
should be classified as long distance, whether cellular service could be classified as local,
or whether the Baby Bells could provide “information services” to clients with
interregional offices.
In response to these external technological forces that were fundamentally altering
the regulatory landscape, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which
sought to resolve these disputes by putting an end to the monopoly franchise system
governing local calling101, thus beginning the current policy environment of
“deregulation”.
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was nothing less than a dramatic
reformulation of the entire nation’s communications policy, which had been essentially
unchanged since 1934.
What forces led to the complete reversal of 70 years of telecommunications
policy? It is crucial to note at this point that, at a fundamental level, the
telecommunications sector is characteristically different than some other policy arenas
because of its heavy dependency on technical and scientific expertise. Because of this,
the political process is only one element in the formulation of policy, and technical
decisions often have the effect of law. The integral reliance of technical expertise in
telecommunications has historically given the epistemic community of engineers a
disproportionally large role in formulating telecom policy102.
In political terms, however, it was the confluence of three events which led to the
Telecommunications Act. First, the Clinton Administration, and particularly Vice
President Al Gore, came to office determined to “wire the nation’s classrooms”, and to do
so through market competition rather than public spending103. Several Democratic
legislative efforts that strongly reflected the Administration’s position failed in 1993,
such as H.R. 3636 sponsored by Ed Markey (D-MA) and Jack Fields (R-TX), finding
opposition to principles of guaranteed universal service, mandatory price breaks to
specialized entities ranging from schools to rural hospitals, and stringent limitations on
the Bells’ entry into long-distance markets.
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Second, the political environment was then dramatically reshaped in 1994 with
the Republican ascendancy in Congress. While raising opposition to numerous Clinton
Administration proposals, their determination to limit the size and scope of government
manifested itself into a push for deregulation aimed at the FCC. Deregulation of the
telecom sector, it was argued, called for the elimination of regulatory distinctions
between local, long-distance, cable, wireless, and data communication. This would allow
the concentration of broadcasting companies in a single media market, as well as permit
telecom providers to begin offering services into alternative markets (such as local phone
companies being able to offer long-distance services) with minimal government
intervention104.
Third, the World Wide Web and the first browsers were simultaneously being
introduced and reaching a critical mass of users within the United States. Other new
digital network technologies were discovered that changed the context of the regulatory
debate. For example, the engineering community had discovered that by sending packets
of digital information, coded in bits in the frequency of the radio waves transmitted over
the air, they could communicate with much more information than in analog broadcast.
The big point of the crucial new discovery was that by digitizing and compressing the
signals, over a single channel’s worth of spectrum the broadcasters could deliver not just
one but a total of six simultaneous programs in standard definition. This meant that cable
television companies could now enter the markets for local and long distance telephony
as well, using a separate network infrastructure, and introducing them as viable
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competitors in the marketplace. Consequently, federal rate regulation could be rescinded,
and competition from these digital broadcasters could keep process costs down.105
The result was a unique policy window created by the confluence of these three
events – the Clinton Administration’s desire to wire the nation’s classrooms, the
Republicans’ push for deregulation, and the rise of network technologies that
fundamentally altered the technical possibilities in the telecom environment. New
solutions and possibilities presented themselves in these digital technologies, and there
was sufficient political will on both sides of the aisle to push for change in a similar
direction.
In order to additionally understand the process of how the Telecommunications
Act came into being, it is also useful to examine the advocacy coalitions participating in
the debate. For several years prior to enactment, the telecom debate centered primarily
on the Bell companies who after nearly a century of regulated monopoly now wanted the
freedom to offer a broad range of services from telecom equipment to local and longdistance service to cable television programming to data delivery geared towards the
Internet.
These Bell companies were opposed by long-distance firms such as AT&T and
Worldcom who shared an interest in being able to rent phone capacity at wholesale
prices, or in other words, to gain access to the Bell’s local networks. Meanwhile, cable
operators wanted an end to price regulation, promising in return to become the “second
wire into the home” that would abolish cross-ownership limitations for telephony and
broadcast. Also, broadcasters wanted to abolish concentration of ownership and cross105
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ownership restrictions, for both television and radio, and argued for free and exclusive
access to the adjoining spectrum for digital uses, especially since the auction model had
become prominent in spectrum management.
Additionally, computing interests joined the anti-Bell forces in wanting to protect
from Bell domination new Internet businesses that use the communications networks, and
opposed classifying Internet services as within the realm of telecommunications. Public
interest groups and non-profit organizations also emerged opposing the concentration of
ownership (of both infrastructure and content), the relaxation of public trusteeship
regulation such as licensing oversight, and the removal of price regulation. It is crucial to
note, however, that while these groups opposed the Bell companies on the various fronts
mentioned, there was a general consensus by all parties that the system should be geared
towards a more deregulated, liberalized environment. They only differed on the extent to
which deregulation should reach106.
All of the aforementioned political and business interests, the Bells included,
collectively created a decidedly pro-liberalization, pro-competition environment within
the telecom sector. It was this alignment of influential actors and groups, both within and
outside of the political system, which ultimately led to policy change within this
particular policy subsystem.
The passage of the Telecommunications Act, then, is most clearly an example in
support of the Advocacy Coalitions framework, as prescribed by Sabatier and Jenkins-
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Smith107, insofar as 1) technical expertise clearly plays an important role concerning the
magnitude and facets of both the causes and probable impacts of various solutions in the
sector, 2) a telecom subsystem clearly exists with public and private actors actively
concerned with the regulatory issue over an extended period of time, and 3) that the
Telecommunications Act incorporates implicit theories on how best to achieve its
objectives of wiring the nation’s classrooms and eliminating artificial legal distinctions
between telecom domains by conceptualizing the issue in much the same way as belief
systems, implementing a theoretical policy shift involving value priorities and
conceptions of various policy instruments, through the Act’s ultimate emphasis on
deregulation and market-based solutions to telecommunications.
The fact that U.S. telecommunications policy went virtually unchanged for 70
years before its dramatic reformulation in 1996 might seemingly support the framework
of Punctuated Equilibrium, which argues that the political system displays institutionallyenforced stability that is punctuated by brief periods of volatile change108. However,
Baumgartner and Jones fail to account for a unique occurrence in the process behind the
Telecommunications Act – that it was actually the beneficiaries of the path dependency
who advocated for change. Rather than witnessing a sudden mobilization of bias109
where the scope of the debate is enlarged to include various new actors in the policy
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process, the telecommunications arena remained primarily influenced by the same large
corporate firms which had been the beneficiaries of the previous natural monopoly and
subsequent highly regulated telecom systems for decades. Instead, the dramatic policy
change was primarily the result of innovative technologies and the new possibilities they
offered to entrenched firms in the subsystem, leading to those same firms, acting in their
rational self-interest, to demand the elimination of protective regulations because
technology offered more promising benefits.
Multiple Streams theory might also seemingly be used to explain the passage of
the Telecommunications Act, in that it was the convergence of the policy and political
streams – or, in other words, the existence of reasonable proposals and alternatives
coupled with strong political will on behalf of top influential actors – which made policy
change possible110. However Kingdon fails to account for the fact that, in formulating
this telecom policy, there was a complete absence of any viable problem stream. No
pressing problem found on the national agenda was demanding attention in
telecommunications, and surely there was no public outcry with the previously existing
system. Rather, once again, it was technology which provided, not a problem to be dealt
with, but new possibilities which policy entrepreneurs sought to deliver to various
advocacy groups.

In contrast to the case of the network’s physical infrastructure, the pattern of
policymaking over the wireless spectrum suggests a slightly different governing dynamic,
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where an epistemic communities approach, specifically regarding engineers, is
paramount.
In concrete policymaking terms, decisions over how the government allocates
wireless frequencies are illustrative of how policies get made at this area of the
infrastructure layer. Ever since it was determined that the public owns the airwaves,
efforts have been made to determine how best to allocate frequencies – to whom, and
based on what criteria.
The Radio Act of 1927 was passed to provide temporary regulation to correct an
immediate problem of broadcasters failing to respect the frequencies used by their rivals.
It established the five member FRC (Federal Radio Commission) and granted it broad
powers to bring order to the airwaves by reducing the total number of broadcasters so that
the remaining stations would be able to broadcast more effectively, in other words to
solve the technical dilemma of multiple broadcasters sharing the same frequency. The
Radio Act further did not provide specific guidelines for the FRC to use in selecting
broadcasters for the limited number of frequencies, but rather called for the allocation of
licenses on the basis of who best served the “public interest, convenience, or necessity”,
a phrase adopted from public utilities law111.
It was at this stage where the epistemic community of scientific engineers would
play the central role in the creating the future structure of the U.S. broadcasting system.
The FRC immediately convened hearings in March and April 1927 to listen to
suggestions from broadcasters on how the FRC could best regulate the medium. By all
accounts, the agenda for the hearings was structured around engineering concerns and the
111
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sessions were dominated by the testimony of corporate-affiliated radio engineers112.
Given the emphasis on engineering and technical criteria for reallocating the broadcast
spectrum, the hearings were largely devoid of controversy, in spite of the press and
members of Congress being invited to attend113.
The FRC announced its reallocation plan in August 1928 called General Order 40.
In this, the FRC acknowledged that Congress had given it no indication as to how best to
determine the meaning of what best served the “public interest, convenience, or
necessity”, and so the statement asserted that the FRC would interpret the phrase as
meaning that the FRC should strive “to bring about the best possible broadcasting
reception conditions throughout the United States”114. Consequently, the FRC would rely
on engineers to provide technical expertise in bringing about optimal reception
conditions.
Ultimately, the FRC’s actions were defended by committee members such as
Orestes H. Caldwell as being made in the best interests of the listeners. Caldwell, a
trained electrical engineer, openly espoused his view that it would undoubtedly be in the
public interest to “extend the number of radio listeners until we put a set in every home”
115

.

112

McChesney.

113

Memorandum: Allocation Broadcasting Channels to Zones and States, FCC General Correspondence,
March 30, 1928.
114

“FRC Interpretation of Public Interest,” Documents of American Broadcasting, ed. Frank J. Kahn
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984).
115

McChesney.

88
Engineers acted as vital agents in the policy process outlined above, insofar as
they were the primary consultants and advisors in establishing the technical criteria by
which the allocation of broadcasting frequencies would depend. They were an outsider,
nongovernmental group who greatly influenced the executive branch of the federal
government.
The central idea that acted as the episteme in this case would be the engineers’
continued assertion that the public interest would be best served by bringing about the
best possible broadcasting reception conditions throughout the United States, and this
would be most effectively accomplished by assigning frequency rights to those
broadcasters with the capability to provide the best technical equipment and the
capitalization to maintain and upgrade that equipment.
Epistemic communities tend to have a shared set of symbols, references, and
mutual expectations, and in the scientific community, these tend to be any policies,
events, or actions that help to further the advancement of science. Ruggie’s notion of
implementing standards of “normal” behavior116 is evident in the engineers’ unchallenged
analysis of using technical standards to determine which broadcasting stations would be
deemed worthy of frequency rights.
After the passage of the Radio Act in 1927, there was, as Secretary Herbert
Hoover remarked, a pressing need to “clear up the chaos of interference and howls in
radio reception”117. Such a problem was technical by nature, as it was caused by a
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limited number of frequencies on the radio wave spectrum comparable to the number of
prospective broadcasters. The FRC hearings that occurred in March and April 1927
which would form the consequent policy of General Order 40 were themselves structured
around engineering concerns and the sessions dominated by the testimony of radio
engineers. This is a clear case of policymakers deferring to the expertise of
nongovernmental actors, whose knowledge of the technical subject they were not
qualified to challenge.
The FRC allocating committee led by commissioners Caldwell and Sam Pickard
was explicitly mandated by Congress to “consult with experts”, and would later regard
reallocation as “strictly an engineering problem”. In fact, the FRC allocating committee
met repeatedly with a group of radio engineers to establish frequency rights criteria
because the FRC did not have its own staff engineer until the autumn of 1928, when the
reallocation was already put into effect118. Additionally, the development of clear
channels was solely based on the recommendation of the engineering group advising the
FRC, as the epistemic community wanted to advance its mutual expectation for better
telecommunications infrastructure on a national level. The influence that engineers held
over the entire policy process was tremendous, as policymakers, recognizing a highly
technical environment where they had little understanding of how things worked, to a
large extent took it for granted the need to defer to the expertise of the epistemic
community.
As a result, the eventual broadcasting policy, that being the Communications Act
of 1934, was a policy outcome clearly consistent with those ideas espoused by the
118
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epistemic community. Even beginning with General Order 40, the idea that the broadcast
spectrum should be distributed according to applicant stations’ relative ability to provide
high quality reception conditions on a national level became from the early stages of the
policy process the guiding doctrine of how to define “the public interest, convenience, or
necessity”. The Communications Act of 1934 codified this still guiding principle of U.S.
broadcasting policy and also laid the foundation for the process by which stations
compete for frequencies based on their technical capacity, not necessarily their
broadcasted content, and the standard resting on the epistemic community’s underlying
belief in the best and most modern telecommunications equipment which forms the entire
system’s infrastructure. The most direct result evident from this episteme in policy is the
decades-long entrenchment of the commercial, national networks dominating the medium
with effectively unchallenged status.
The same pattern of policymaking exists today as it applies to the governance of
the wireless spectrum for Internet usage. The basic principle of the public owning the
airwaves remains in place, and the federal government, through the FCC, continues to
allocate broadcast frequencies on the basis of recommendations made by the epistemic
community of engineers.
For example, in March 2008, the FCC held an auction for the rights to the muchcoveted 700 Mhz band of the wireless spectrum. The auction for these licenses raised
over $19 billion, and the major participants included the likes of traditional telecom firms
like AT&T and Verizon, as well as Internet service companies like Google. During the
process of this auction, and at the urging of the engineering community, the FCC forced
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the major telecom firms to open their wireless networks to a broader array of telephone
equipment and Internet applications.119
Aside from the issue of allocating licenses on the 700 Mhz band, the FCC has also
taken on the role of deciding how to govern the so-called “white spaces” – unused
portions of the wireless spectrum that exist between UHF channels. Despite the protests
of traditional telecom firms like AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast, on November 4, 2008,
the FCC voted 5-0 to approve the unlicensed use of white space.120 This decision came
about as the result of a strong movement among the engineering community calling for
free, unregulated spectrum that could be used, like WiFi Internet access, to create new
technologies and new markets.121
This demonstrates, yet again, how the federal government, and particularly the
FCC, play the primary role in governing the wireless spectrum, while the epistemic
community of engineers, due to their technical expertise, maintain a strong authoritative
role in guiding the government’s policymaking process.

In summary, as the Internet and digital telecommunications continue to become
more integrated into the nation’s economy and culture, the physical infrastructure that
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makes it possible only gains in relevance, and its problems of vulnerability only become
more consequential. The Internet’s infrastructure can be conceptually divided up into
two components: 1) its physical infrastructure, which is governed by the private telecom
firms and cable companies who own it, and the national governments that regulate them,
and where an advocacy coalitions framework best describes its pattern of policymaking;
and 2) its wireless spectrum, which is governed by the federal government through the
FCC, and where an epistemic communities approach best characterizes how policy
decisions are made governing the allocation of frequencies.
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Chapter 4 – Who Governs the Technical Protocols?

The reason why the Internet has often proved challenging to govern, regulate, or
control is that the network itself is “dumb”.122 The technical protocols that allow digital
communication to occur over it were intentionally designed to ignore the content of
transmissions and instead focus only on the engineering goal of efficient routing. To be
sure, this was the result of an explicit policy decision, and it is why content, to such a
large degree, still proliferates so freely in cyberspace. Thus, the point needs to be
emphasized: The extent to which Internet content is regulable or not regulable is largely
determined by decisions which are built into the code of the network itself.
In this chapter, we will examine how technical decisions over protocols have
inherently political consequences. A study of the Internet’s TCP/IP suite as well as other
prominent protocols that ensure the very functionality of the Web itself will demonstrate
that decision-making authority is held by a small handful of international engineering
consortium groups - primarily, the Internet Society (ISOC), its Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) – and we will then analyze
the constitutional makeup of these organizations. By considering cases such as the
Internet-OSI Standards War and, more recently, the implementation of IPv6, we will
argue that the decision-making process within these institutions is best characterized by
the “rough consensus principle”, which is fundamentally open and transparent. Finally,
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we assert that the decisions over which technical protocols to adopt, and how they are to
be designed, are, in themselves, an important form of policy that constrain and enable
behavior on the Internet.

I. WHY ARE THE PROTOCOLS IMPORTANT?
The technical standards and protocols underlying the Internet are the languages by
which digital communication occurs between different devices. While an infrastructure
is first required to physically connect separate devices, once that connection is in place,
the machines require a common language in order to communicate with one another.
The basic TCP/IP suite of protocols forms the basis of the modern Internet.
TCP/IP allows for the sending and receiving of packets of data. Two pieces of
information are required for an exchange of data to be successful – the IP address of the
machine from where the data is being sent, and the IP address of the machine which is its
destination.
The protocols, however, do not reveal much information about the nature of the
data being sent – and this is a crucial point. Because IP addresses are virtual, TCP/IP
does not actually reveal who is sending the data, nor where they are sending it from in a
geographical sense. The system has been designed not to care about what type of data it
is, nor its purpose, but rather simply to include the minimum information necessary to
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successfully exchange the data from one machine to another. From the perspective of the
network, any additional information is considered “an unnecessary surplus”.123
Thus, TCP/IP was designed according to the principle of minimalism, with the
goal being optimal network efficiency. The protocols are the result of a decision-making
process which was characteristically focused on engineering concerns.
However, in being designed as such, the protocols inevitably led to a wide
assortment of political, social, and economic consequences. As described by legal
scholar Laura Denardis, "protocols, while often established primarily by private actors,
are intertwined with socioeconomic and political order"124. While the adoption of
TCP/IP, and its non-inclusion of any information other than what was minimally
necessary for successful transmission, may have led to efficient engineering, it also
simultaneously was a decision to disable other potential forms of control. For example,
because TCP/IP neglects to collect any information on the sender other than the sending
machine’s IP address, this makes it exceedingly more difficult for governments to
identify the human sources of criminal behavior online. Various other forms of control
or regulatory oversight are similarly rendered difficult, if not impossible, based on the
relative anonymity that TCP/IP fosters.
This is why we argue that technical decisions have political consequences. The
open design of TCP/IP, HTTP, CGI, and other standards and protocols as well, directly
affect governments’ capabilities when it comes to the regulation of speech, the protection
of privacy, the distribution of copyrighted material, the identification and prosecution of
123

Lessig, Code 32.

124

Denardis 5.

96
criminals, and much more. The relative openness and anonymity that cyberspace
provides is built into the code of the Internet itself, through the design of its protocols. If
protocols were designed and adopted to, conversely, limit that openness, which is
certainly a technical possibility, it would have dramatic consequences on all of the
political issues just mentioned. Ultimately, since the design of these protocols has such
significant effects, it is crucial to remember that they have been designed and adopted by
actual people, making intentional decisions to do so, and thus determining who these
people are and what guides their decision-making is of paramount importance.
There are many other technical standards and protocols that enable to Internet and
the World Wide Web to function aside from TCP/IP. Most prominent among these
include HTML – which is the elemental markup language by which all web pages are
displayed through a browser. Additionally, XML, CSS, SMIL, XSLT, CGI, DOM,
SOAP, and hundreds of others all play a role in shaping the Internet environment in
technical terms. Again, as with TCP/IP, decisions over which protocols to adopt, and
their final form, directly determine the content of what is available, as well as the
behavior of people, online. These standards and protocols directly enable certain forms
of action, while making others technically impossible.
The protocols are important, then, because they are, indeed, a binding form of
policy. Technical decisions over which protocols to adopt set the rules for behavior, and
thus lead to inherently political consequences. The protocols are what shape the network
to be either more regulable, or less regulable, and their ultimate effect is that they
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determine both what types of behaviors are possible online, as well as what types of
policies seeking to influence those behaviors will be meaningful and, or, effective.
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II. WHO GOVERNS THE PROTOCOLS?
The major Internet technical standards and protocols are governed directly by
several international engineering consortium groups. Primarily, these are the Internet
Society (ISOC), its Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C).
The Internet Society (ISOC) is the organizational home of the Internet
Architecture Board (IAB) and the IETF, which handles much of the open development of
the Internet’s behind-the-scenes architectural issues. It is an international nonprofit
organization founded in 1992 to provide leadership in Internet-related standards,
education, and policy. It also has more than 90 organizational members and more than
26,000 individual members in over 80 chapters around the world, with its main offices in
Washington D.C. and Geneva, Switzerland. The membership is comprised of
commercial companies, government agencies, and foundations that have historically been
at the forefront of developing the Internet and its technologies, as well as new innovative
and entrepreneurial organizations contributing to maintain that dynamic.125
ISOC’s members are distributed throughout the world. Fully 27% come from
North America, another 27% from Asia, 23% from Europe, 12% from Africa, 6% from
Latin America and the Caribbean, and 5% from Oceania.126
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ISOC Membership by Geographic Region
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Furthermore, the distribution of ISOC members can be classified by industry type.
Currently, there are 6 members that are “educational institutions”, 28 “product
providers”, 17 “NICs, Registrars, and IP Registries”, 2 “financial institutions”, 18
“network access providers”, 16 “organizations for research, professions, industries, and
standards”, 5 “government agencies”, and 5 “uncategorized”.127
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ISOC Membership by Organizational Type
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As with any formal institution, the organizational structure significantly affects
processes and outcomes. ISOC has 6 membership levels; each of which has its own
financial requirements to join, and grants corresponding powers to its members. There
are currently 6 Platinum members (the highest ranking level), 6 Gold members, 6 Silver
members 39 Executive members, 23 Professional members, and 12 Small Business
members. The amount required for an organization to join ISOC ranges from $100,000
annually for Platinum members to $1,250 annually for non-profit Small Business
members. In exchange, the powers granted to members according to level involve having
greater influence over designating funds for specific Internet activities and projects, as
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well as rights to use the ISOC logo and gain more prominent acknowledgements in ISOC
web pages and publications.128
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is responsible for overseeing how
TCP/IP protocols evolve. It is an open international community of network designers,
operators, vendors, and researchers. As such, it has no formal membership or
membership requirements, relying instead completely on volunteers and “open to any
interested individual” 129, though their work is usually funded by their employers or
sponsors; for example, the current chairperson, Russ Housley, is funded by VeriSign and
the U.S. government's National Security Agency.130 Its first meeting took place in
January 1986 and consisted of 21 government-funded researchers. As of 2008, meetings
now attain attendance of approximately 1100 people per meeting.131 However, in the
early 1990s, the IETF changed its institutional form from an activity of the U.S.
government to an independent, international activity associated with the Internet Society
(ISOC). Because the IETF has no formal members, funding, as well as the legal
framework for the activities of the IETF, also comes from ISOC.
For clarification, while the IETF pre-dates the establishment of ISOC, and indeed
ISOC grew out of the IETF in order to support those functions that require a corporate
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form rather than the IETF’s simple ad-hoc approach, ISOC nevertheless is now the parent
corporation of the IETF. For example, all IETF “Request for Comments” (RFC)
documents are copyrighted by ISOC.
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) develops standards for the evolution of
the most popular part of the Internet, the World Wide Web. It is an industry consortium
run by MIT’s Laboratory for Computer Science and its director is Tim Berners-Lee – the
inventor of the World Wide Web.132 Its list of standards for which it can take credit
include most prominently HTML, XML, and CSS, but include over 100 others as well
which form the technical basis for the Web that people interact with every day. It is a
consortium with over 400 member organizations, many of which maintain full-time staffs
of technical experts dedicated to the standardization process133. W3C members include
businesses, nonprofit organizations, universities, and governmental entities, however,
there is no provision for individual membership134. It has headquarters in the United
States, France, and Japan, as well as regional offices in Australia, the Netherlands,
Luxemburg, Belgium, China, Finland, Germany, Austria, Greece, Hungary, India,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Morocco, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. W3C operations are financially supported by a combination of
member dues, research grants, and other sources of public and private funding135.
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Membership in the W3C is contingent on fees paid. In their stated attempt to
“promote a diverse membership that represents the interests of organizations around the
world”, W3C fees vary for each member and are determined by a “Membership Fee
Calculator” based on an algorithm that takes into account the applicant organization’s
annual revenues, type, and location of headquarters. Thus, for example, a small company
in India would pay $953 annually, while a non-profit in the United States would pay
$6,350, and a large company in France would pay 65,000 euros.136
Certainly, other standards-setting organizations play significant roles in governing
the Protocol layer as well. For instance, the Institute for Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) is responsible for the 802.11 standard, commonly known as WiFi,
which carries out wireless local area network (WLAN) computer communications in the
2.4, 3.6 and 5 GHz frequency bands, and has rapidly become adopted by the mainstream
public.
When it comes to who has decision-making authority over technical protocols –
and, thus, make decisions that will affect what content is ultimately available as well as
how people may behaviorally interact with it – these three organizations – ISOC, the
IETF, and the W3C – play the most direct and prominent role in governing the
development and implementation of policies.
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HOW ARE POLICIES MADE AT THE PROTOCOLS LAYER?
Policies regarding the development and implementation of technical standards
and protocols are made by the aforementioned organizations primarily through a process
known as the “rough consensus principle”.
Rough consensus has been the guiding governance principle throughout the
Internet’s developmental history. It has been the de-facto method of generating norms
and usable standards in an environment where there has been a historical lack of central
regulatory agencies. Rough consensus overcomes initial problems of legitimacy and
fragmented levels of adoption and acceptance through a process of continuous testing and
refinement of proposals that are ultimately measured by responsive models of
compliance. This framework has even been applied in academic circles to such fields as
transnational law-making, where the public and private activities of transnational actors
often takes place in the absence of traditional enforcement mechanisms.137
The origin of the phrase stems from the now-infamous quote by one of the
Internet’s pioneers, David Clark, at an IETF meeting in 1992: “We reject: kings,
presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code”.138
The IETF describes its process of achieving rough consensus as the following:
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Working groups make decisions through a "rough
consensus" process. IETF consensus does not require that
all participants agree although this is, of course, preferred.
In general, the dominant view of the working group shall
prevail. (However, it must be noted that "dominance" is not
to be determined on the basis of volume or persistence, but
rather a more general sense of agreement). Consensus can
be determined by a show of hands, humming, or any other
means on which the WG agrees (by rough consensus, of
course). Note that 51% of the working group does not
qualify as "rough consensus" and 99% is better than rough.
It is up to the Chair to determine if rough consensus has
been reached.139

To clarify, because the IETF and similar groups never had members, only
volunteer participants, having a formal voting structure was viewed as problematic. The
rough consensus principle includes the ideas that newcomers are encouraged to
contribute their expertise, and working group leaders ought to approve proposals that
enjoy broad support within the group. An acceptable level of agreement can usually be
placed at around 80% - 90% - “a level high enough to demonstrate strong support, but
flexible enough to work in the absence of unanimity”. In short, rough consensus is “an
informal process in which a proposal must answer to criticisms, but need not be held up if
supported by a vast majority of the group”.140
“Rough Consensus and Running Code” is a phrase that, as Andrew Russell has
argued, captures both the technical and the political values of Internet engineers - during
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its early history leading up to, and including, the present day141. It has been additionally
been described as, “a manifesto that will define our generation”142.
The reason for such hyperbole is the consideration of alternative methods that
may have come to define the Internet standardization process if the rough consensus
principle had not come about. In other words, it is crucial to note that rough consensus
was not inevitable, nor was it deterministic. During the 1970s, it seemed quite likely that
formal standards-setting institutions, such as the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), would ultimately
create the Internet’s standards just as they had for those of telecommunications; that is, in
a top-down manner, and stemming from a centralized authority.
In fact, a rival process for setting standardization policies had been introduced in
1977. The long-established ISO attempted to define its own vision of a network
architecture known as Open Systems Interconnection (OSI). Despite the OSI seven-layer
model being endorsed by national governments and computer science departments
around the world, it failed to adjust to the rapidly changing technological environment in
network computing. Rival systems like TCP/IP, which were being developed by
volunteer researchers in newly formed groups such as the IETF and IAB, proved more
quick to adapt. Rough consensus became the guiding principle for these groups out of
practical necessity; the groups were volunteer-based and did not have formal members,
they were open to anyone willing to participate, and meeting attendance was not required
for a collection of individuals loosely scattered across the globe. Thus, the malleable
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nature of the participants in the decision-making process brought about a system of
policymaking whereby rough consensus became the only effective means of
collaboration.143
As a result, the informal process of achieving rough consensus, used by the IETF
in developing TCP/IP, stood in stark contrast to the bureaucratic-political approach that
characterized OSI. This is why the rough consensus principle aptly describes not only
the technical process of standardization, but also, significantly, the institutional system
that governed it.
This so-called Internet-OSI Standards War was framed in terms of everything
from a “constitutional crisis” to a “religious war”. William Drake summarized the issue
as follows:

The debate is not merely about the efficacy of two sets of
standards, but it is rather between two competing visions of
how international standardization processes and network
development should be organized and controlled.144
Eventually, TCP/IP pushed the OSI model into the background. The IETF’s
protocols were practical and, because they were the result of intense implementation
discussion and testing, they actually worked, whereas ISO committees produced what
came to be viewed as theoretical models that were difficult to alter or fully implement.145
One expression at the time encapsulated the situation, “OSI is a beautiful dream, and
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TCP/IP is living it.”146 Rough consensus had proven to be a more effective method for
creating standardization policies than had a traditional top-down approach.
Thus, rough consensus became the mechanism by which policies are made
regarding Internet standards and protocols, and it has maintained that status through the
present day in all of the aforementioned dominant governing institutions – ISOC, the
IETF, and the W3C.
Achieving rough consensus in decision-making is often a heavily politicized
process as well, as demonstrated with the case of the IPv6 protocol. Recognizing that the
finite supply of Internet addresses would eventually reach its limit, the IETF designed a
new system - IPv6 - to replace the existing system - IPv4 - expanding the pool of
potential IP addresses from 4.3 billion to 340 undecillion. Here, too, the process that
ultimately led to the adoption of IPv6 was ripe with conflict and competing interests. As
Laura Denardis described, it "involved complex technical choices, controversial
decisions, competition among information technology companies, resistance from large
American companies... and an institutional choice between a protocol developed within
the prevailing Internet governance institutions and one promoted by a more international
institution".147 Over a decade since its design, IPv6 deployment remains largely
unadopted.
How does the rough consensus principle drive the decision-making processes
within the major standards-setting institutions? This is achieved primarily through
146
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working groups, and it is in these working groups where the policymaking process
formally occurs.
At ISOC, the formal process for a proposed specification to become an official
Internet standard is as follows. The process includes evolving through a set of maturity
levels known as the “standards-track”; from at least 6 months as a Proposed Standard, to
at least 4 months as a Draft Standard, and finally to an Internet Standard.148
Central to this process of graduating from one level to the next is one particular
group within ISOC known as the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Any
“standards action”, which includes entering a specification into, advancing it within, or
removing it from, the standards track, must be approved by the IESG. If a specification
has remained at the same maturity level for 24 months, the IESG can review the viability
of the standardization effort and approve either the termination or continuation of the
development effort.149
The standards-track process begins when a technical specification is posted in the
“Internet-Drafts” directory where it will undergo two weeks of community review. At
that point, a recommendation is made by the appropriate IETF Working Group, and it is
up to the working group chairperson to decide if a rough consensus has been achieved.
Based on that recommendation, the IESG determines if the proposed specification
satisfies the requirements for graduating to the next level in the process.150
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As the specification nears final approval, the IESG issues a Last-Call Notification
for final comments and community review that typically lasts no shorter than two weeks.
This Last-Call Notification is sent via email to the IETF Announce mailing list to permit
a final review by “the general Internet community”. Comments are accepted from
anyone. The IESG then makes its final determination whether or not the specification
will become a formal Internet Standard. Interestingly, the IESG is not bound by the
action recommended when the specification was submitted.151
Upon approval, the standard is officially formalized via publication in the ISOC
newsletter. A notification is sent to the RFC editor to publish the specification as an
RFC. The specification is then removed from the “Internet Drafts” directory. 152
Because technical standards and protocols are essentially a form of policy, in
the context previously discussed, this process of creating such standards and
protocols is the Internet’s version of a policymaking process. Many of the same
elements can be found in ISOC’s standards-track as are recognized in the political
science literature. A focusing event in the form of a technological innovation, seized
upon by a policy entrepreneur, initiates the movement. A proposal is submitted to the
formal institution responsible for creating such policies, at which point it is designated to
an appropriate working group, or committee. After repeated efforts at community review
and requests for comments, the committee chairperson decides if the proposal ought to go
before the rest of the institutional body. After another period of community review by
the larger body, the IESG makes its final determination whether to legitimize the policy.
151
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If so, a formalization process occurs as the proposal becomes an official standard.
Finally, implementation of the standard is expected to occur – mainly in the private sector
– and a period of continuous evaluation commences.153
A similar pattern of policymaking emerges at the W3C. A “Recommendation”
proceeds through 5 maturity levels: Working Draft, Last-Call Working Draft, Candidate
Recommendation, Proposed Recommendation, and finally an official W3C
Recommendation. 154 Any such W3C “Process Documents” undergo a similar process of
building rough consensus in working groups, with an Advisory Board acting as the
sponsoring working group by putting out a request for comments, then calling for an
Advisory Committee Review lasting at least 4 weeks, and finally, if a consensus has been
reached, announcing the W3C decision.155
The W3C, like ISOC, also leaves implementation of its Recommendations up to
private-sector manufacturers. Additionally, many of its standards define levels of
conformance, which the developers must follow if they wish to label their product W3Ccompliant.156
Policies are thus being made at the Protocol layer by the working groups within
these institutions using the rough consensus principle. However, what are the similarities
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and differences between this rough consensus model and other forms of policymaking?
What lessons about governance and policymaking can be drawn?
To a large extent, the rough consensus model reflects elements of what Charles
Lindblom classically referred to as “muddling through” the policy process. The ongoing
processes that the major consortium groups use to design and formalize technical
protocols, as previously described, clearly foster a method of Successive Limited
Comparisons, in contrast to a Rational Comprehensive approach, insofar as they
encourage adjustments at the margin. This is often brought on by new technological
innovations. The example of IPv6 supports this notion as its design signaled an
incremental change from its technical predecessor, IPv4, rather than a complete shift in
values. Lindblom’s assessment of muddling through is applicable to how the working
groups within ISOC, the IETF, and the W3C function: They do not “find general
formulations of objectives very helpful and in fact make specific marginal or incremental
comparisons… The only values that are relevant to [their] choice are these increments by
which the two policies differ”.157
According to the model of Successive Limited Comparisons, in fact, the test of a
“good” policy is not one that can be shown as the most appropriate means to a desired
end, as the Rational Comprehensive model would suggest, but rather is one where
various analysts find themselves in direct agreement.158 This is practically the very
definition of rough consensus.

157

Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’,” Public Administration Review 19.2
(Spring 1959): 79-88.
158

Lindblom 81.

113
However, the rough consensus principle is not, by any means, a perfect reflection
of muddling through. Lindblom downplays the role of values in decision-making, and
asserts that administrators “need not try to analyze any values except the values by which
alternative policies differ”.159 This “value problem” stands in direct contrast to the idea
of the major consortium groups constituting an epistemic community. As described in
the previous chapter, policies are being either influenced (at the Infrastructure layer) or
outright designed and adopted (at the Protocol layer) by an international community of
scientists and engineers who hold a core central value – optimum technical efficiency –
as their common episteme. Whichever issues at these two layers are analyzed - whether
U.S. telecommunications policy or the deployment of the TCP/IP protocol – this shared
value is clearly the driver of policy design. While the working groups within ISOC, the
IETF, and W3C all operate under a system of Successive Limited Comparisons, and have
developed open processes that foster such a system, they are only muddling through to a
certain extent. The larger epistemic community of which they are a part remains very
value-centric.
Two important things stand out about the rough consensus model for
policymaking. First, these standards-setting institutions governing the Internet’s
protocols typically have open membership and open and transparent processes,
constituting an epistemic community, and thus are fundamentally different types of
institutions than, for example, the U.S. Congress. They are international in scope,
virtually anyone can design, submit, and vote on policy proposals, there is no veto on
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policy outcomes, the role of technical expertise is paramount, and engineering efficiency
is the prevailing ideology. Second, technological innovation plays a major role in
driving, what is referred to in Institutional Rational Choice theory as, new “action
arenas”.160 It is a policy catalyst that goes beyond problem definition to redefining new
participants, outcome possibilities, and action-outcome linkages.
As a result, the utility of the rough consensus model to policymaking in other
non-technical arenas is greatly limited. As the governance of the Internet’s protocols
have demonstrated, rough consensus works best when institutional membership is fluid
and when interests, though not the guiding larger ideologies, are frequently realigned - in
this case, on the basis of rapid change in the technological landscape. The technical
decisions over protocols are a major cause of cascaded effects on how software
developers constrain or enable end-users’ interaction with the Internet. This is what we
shall explore in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5 – Who Governs the Applications?

Cyberspace is a virtual environment that only exists through software. As such,
who creates that software is, fundamentally, engaged in a type of policymaking.
Software applications are what enable human beings to interact with the digital network,
and therefore determining who is developing that software, and what political values the
end-products come to embody, are vitally important.
In this chapter, we will examine the ways in which the code underlying both
desktop and web applications is a form of policy itself. These software applications
enable and constrain the actions of every Internet user on a technical basis, and thus we
will demonstrate how code constitutes a unique type of policy, one in which the
environment itself is designed to deny the user even a capability to act in defiance.
While any individual with the requisite computer programming skills can reasonably be
said to take part in the governance equation insofar as they set the rules for their own
private cyberspaces, we will analyze certain Internet usability metrics and argue that,
while individual non-affiliated programmers hold a significant, often disruptive
influence, that has yet to translate into governing authority when looking at the Web in
aggregate. As a result, we will argue that a relatively small handful of the most wellcapitalized private commercial software firms govern the Internet’s applications the most
- again, based on usability metrics. Ultimately, we will explain how Lessig’s “code is
law” argument best explains how code constrains and enables Internet behavior, only, we
will argue, that the code written by private commercial firms often indicates an implicit
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recognition of the sovereign authority that traditional governmental institutions retain
over them.
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I. WHY ARE THE APPLICATIONS IMPORTANT?

Software applications are the tools which allow people to make use of the
Internet. Once an infrastructure connects disparate devices, and once technical standards
and protocols facilitate communication between those devices, individual people then
require an interface, or method of interacting, with the digital network. Software
applications perform this function.
In Yochai Benkler’s original layer model, the “code” layer encompassed both the
technical protocols as well as software applications. While this may have been
appropriate from his more narrow scope of media regulation, when the model is applied
to Internet governance more generally, it leaves too much unanswered. From a
policymaking perspective, there is a tremendous difference between how policies are
made when it comes to technical protocols versus software applications; as well as a
crucial distinction between who is making those decisions. Protocols and applications, in
the context being discussed, are entities of fundamentally different types, and thus
Benkler’s “code” umbrella used to encompass them both needs to be revised in order to
account for those differences.
The software applications at the heart of the debate refer to Internet- and Webspecific software applications. For example, web browsers like Microsoft’s Internet
Explorer, Apple’s Safari, Google’s Chrome, and the Mozilla Foundation’s Firefox are
software programs that play a major role in determining how people interact with the
Internet. How those browsers are programmed ultimately translates into enabling certain
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forms of cyberspatial behavior while simultaneously limiting others. Therefore, power
over the software is the power over people’s actions in cyberspace.
This holds true not only for web browsers but also for other types of software
people use to interact online including operating systems like Microsoft Windows, standalone applications like Adobe Acrobat, and server-side programs like the Apache Web
Server. Corresponding programming languages behind these applications, such as C++,
Java, PHP, and others, are similarly tools whose design either constrains or enables
different types of behavior.
The Applications layer encompasses not only proprietary pieces of software that
are purchased and installed on a device, but also those that are classified as Web
Services. As people’s digital activities have migrated increasingly from the desktop to
the Web, the applications and services delivered by websites have become equally
important as the programs installed locally on one’s computing device. For example, the
shopping cart technology used by Amazon.com, the blogging services provided by
Blogger or Wordpress, the web-based email services offered by Yahoo or Hotmail, the
content-sharing features of Facebook or YouTube, or the participatory editing features of
Wikipedia, are all characteristically software applications, written in code and
programmed by people, that also either constrain or enable different types of behavior for
their users. This is, undeniably, a form of governance.
Ultimately, software applications are important because, whereas the
infrastructure and protocols dictate how data is transported over the network, it is the
software which sets the rules for how people will participate in online activities.
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II. WHO GOVERNS THE APPLICATIONS?

The software applications and web services that allow people to interact with the
Internet are governed directly by the computer programmers who write their underlying
code. While this can theoretically encompass virtually everyone, in practice, based on
usability metrics, it translates into private commercial software firms being the primary
agents of governance and policymaking at the Applications layer.
Determining governance at the Applications layer is problematic. Based on the
assumption that the code underlying software is the central mechanism that constrains
and enables different types of behavior, it follows that any individual, private entity, or
public agency who writes code can, therefore, be said to govern, or at least to take part in
the governing process.
However, this notion, while true in theory, doesn’t help us understand the
complex power arrangements in the software development community. Because this
community, like the Internet itself, is highly decentralized, attempts by national
governments to regulate it are inherently limited. To reference an established First
Amendment principle, there is no “prior restraint” when it comes to government
intervention in the production of code. At most, there is only attempted regulation of the
finished software product.
However, while any programmer can certainly be said to govern the specific
private cyberspaces that their code creates, when it comes to analyzing the Web in
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aggregate, more definitive and demonstrable patterns of governance do emerge. Some
actors, indeed, can be accurately said to govern more than others.
So in this decentralized scenario where virtually anyone with programming
knowledge can write code and create software, potentially distributed and used by
millions of people throughout the world, what methodology can we employ to come to a
more concrete understanding of who, exactly, is governing at the Applications layer?
In actual practice, a relative few private commercial firms hold considerable
authority in setting the rules for behavior. Evidence of this can be traced back to our
original definition of what it means to govern: to have the ability to both constrain and
enable different types of behavior with intentional effects. Thus, we can determine who
exactly has governing power by examining how code grants authority to programmers to
shape cyber environments and, subsequently, by examining the two primary constraints
that act over them.
Fundamentally, code grants computer programmers the ability to shape the virtual
environments in which the average user interacts. This is the “code is law” principle
which will be explained more thoroughly in the following section. For example, the
programmers behind the social-networking site Facebook have made the decision to
allow anybody to create groups, on any topic, without requiring any prior editorial
approval. Conversely, Facebook has also made the decision not to permit people to
stream audio clips from their profiles, as some of its rivals do, for fear of copyright
concerns. In either case, these decisions, whether to enable or constrain people’s
behavior, are accomplished by programmers primarily through code.
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As opposed to real-space, these policies are not simply a matter of establishing a
law and enforcing it by creating penalties for people who break the law; rather, it is an
altogether different type of law, one in which the environment itself is designed to
deny the user even a capability to act in defiance.
Not only is it through code that programmers are empowered with such
significant governing power insofar as they shape their virtual environments, but code
also dictates the actions of those very same programmers and places constraints on them.
Using the above example, while it’s true that Facebook’s programmers can code the
policies of their own private virtual environment as it affects the end-user, it is also true
that those programmers must still adhere to sets of rules that have previously been
established. In other words, someone else has authority over them, and that too is an
authority derived from code.
The first constraint that acts over programmers is language. While it may be
something of blasphemy within certain circles of the programming community to make
this assertion, it nevertheless holds true. A C++ or .NET programmer may believe he can
write code to do whatever he wants on a technical level, however that is only true within
the confines of what Microsoft decided C++ as a language would allow. The designs of
all computer programming languages are the result of explicit decision-making processes,
often by formal institutions, and those decisions ultimately have consequences on the
resulting decisions of those who implement them. In other words, the capabilities and
limitations of programming languages act as inherent checks on the behavior of
programmers.
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This principle also raises the second constraint on programmers – the computing
platform. Many programmers might reluctantly concede to the above assertion, but they
will then undoubtedly point to alternatives that are not controlled by private commercial
firms. For example, a web programmer might argue that if he contributes to the
development of a non-proprietary open-source language like PHP, Perl, or Python, then
language becomes less of a restriction because he can have a hand in shaping it.
However, the programming language is not the only constraint on the programmer. Even
if one created an entire programming language from scratch, the behavior of the
programmer would still be determined by the platform on which the resulting software
would be used. The code behind such platforms, whether an operating system like
Microsoft Windows, non-OS-dependent platforms like Sun’s Java, or various
“application programming interfaces” like the Google API, also either constrains or
enables the behavior of programmers. In other words, a programmer’s code, no matter
how independent, must still be written within the confines of rules established by the
platform if it wants to achieve a reasonable level of operability.
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The Hierarchy for Rule-Making through Code

Programming languages and the code behind the
computing platform dictate the rules for programmers.

The code that those programmers write dictates the rules
for how the average user interacts with the software.

The evidence for how private commercial software firms are the primary agents
of governance at the Applications layer lies in usability. While it’s true that, in theory,
anyone can create a piece of software and set the rules for behavior, in actual practice the
overwhelming majority of Internet users only use a relatively small number of software
applications and web services – and of these, the vast majority tend to be operated by
private commercial firms.
To measure usability, it is first necessary to conceptually differentiate between the
two types of applications that are our focus – desktop applications vs. web applications.
Both are critical in understanding how code governs.
Desktop applications refer to any software that can be installed on a single
computer and used to perform specific tasks. Some desktop applications can also be used
by multiple users in a networked environment, but, by definition, it is software that is
installed and then resides on one’s computer, and follows the traditional business model

124
of consumers purchasing a disk or CD in a shrink-wrapped box and “owning” their
copy.161 Common examples include the Microsoft Office Suite.
In contrast, web applications often form a desirable alternative to desktop
applications for reasons of portability. Web applications are usually based on a clientserver architecture and use a web browser as the client interface. The software exists, not
on a user’s hard drive, but in cyberspace. It is a software-as-service model that functions
either through the client’s web browser or through “cloud computing”, where examples
like shopping cart applications, online video archives, remote file storage services, photo
managers, calendars, accounting programs, and more have become ubiquitous.162
It is next necessary to establish a set of metrics by which we can accurately
assess, using quantitative data, which specific desktop and web applications are used the
most - and also assess qualitative factors, such as the weighted impact of that software.
The most important types of desktop applications, as it relates to affecting
people’s interaction with the Internet, are the operating system and the web browser. The
reasoning for this is that, returning to the two main constraints that act on programmers,
operating system software is the primary computing platform on which web applications
consequently run, and, additionally, web browsers are functionally the most common
interface used for interacting with the Web. An analysis of each indicates that private
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commercial firms clearly dominate their respective markets, despite the existence of
viable non-proprietary alternatives:

Operating Systems: 163
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Web Browsers: 164

Clearly, when it comes to operating systems, Microsoft, as the owner of
Windows, has a tremendous governing power over the space with over a 90% market
share, and all but Linux on this list are controlled by private commercial firms. Similarly,
as far as web browser software is concerned, Microsoft again has a clear dominance in
the space in terms of usability; and once again, private commercial firms in general
clearly dominate the list of most-used browser software; this despite the growing trend of
Firefox in recent years, notable because it is controlled by a non-profit organization, the
Mozilla Foundation.
What this data demonstrates is that, insofar as they control the computing
platform on which web applications are designed to operate, and on which the user most
typically uses to interact with the Web, Microsoft and other private commercial firms
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have a substantial power to set the terms by which computer programmers must
subsequently adhere to when creating their code.
Furthermore, as to the constraint of languages, the TIOBE Programming
Community Index ranks the most popular programming languages used by software
engineers as follows165:

Most Popular Programming Languages:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Java
C
C++
PHP
(Visual) Basic
C#
Python
Perl
Javascript
Ruby

It is a familiar pattern. Just as private commercial firms have demonstrable
governing authority via their control over the computing platform, so do they also have
governing authority when it comes to the constraint of programming languages. Five of
the top 6 languages were created and are maintained by private commercial firms – with
Sun Microsystems in control of Java, and Microsoft controlling C, C++, Visual Basic,
and C#. This is clear evidence that, because languages can both constrain and enable
different types of behavior among programmers, private commercial firms have
substantial governing power insofar as they maintain control over those languages.
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Web applications paint something of a different picture. Once a user has booted
their operating system and opened their web browser, the web applications they then
interact with are exponentially greater in number and far more diverse in type than are the
different desktop applications available to them.
Such diversity is still measurable, however. A set of metrics designed to gauge
the quantitative aspects of usability in cyberspace must include the number of page hits
measuring direct web traffic and the number of unique users of a web application.
The most essential type of web application is the search engine – the main portal,
or jumping-off point, for cyberspatial activities.

Search Engines:166
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Google is the premier actor in the search engine space, and again, the list of top
applications is dominated by private commercial firms.
When it comes to websites specifically, a similar usability pattern emerges. For
example, let us examine the top 100 websites based on Alexa rankings. Of the top 100
most visited websites, over 90% are operated by private commercial firms. Using only
the quantitative metric of number of page hits, the most-used websites in cyberspace are
the following167:

Most Used Websites (by number of page hits)
1. Google
2. Facebook
3. YouTube
4. Yahoo
5. Baidu
6. Wikipedia
7. Windows Live
8. Amazon
9. QQ.com
10. Twitter
11. Blogspot
12. LinkedIn
13. TaoBao.com

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Google India
Yahoo Japan
Bing
MSN
Google Japan
EBay
Yandex.ru
Sina.com.cn
Wordpress
Google Germany
Google Hong Kong
VK.com

However, the proportionate leap in the impact from one of these sites to the next
is not always of equal dimension – thus warranting a qualitative analysis to be performed.
According to Nielsen/NetRatings, while the average Internet user visits 1,669 web pages
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each month, those pages reside on only 72 different domains.168 What this means is that
a relatively few number of sites have a far greater impact and reach than others in
terms of usage because, while users may visit an average of 1,669 web pages per month,
many of those different pages are actually owned or operated by the same parent
organizations.
For example, a look at the top 10 parent organizations of the most popular
websites reveals that they are all private commercial firms:169

Parent Company
Google
Microsoft
Yahoo
AOL
News Corp. Online
Facebook
InterActive Corp.
EBay
Amazon
Apple Computer

Unique Audience (000)
116,770
106,170
98,658
65,939
60,504
51,370
46,775
45,993
42,588
40,133

Reach (%)
75.32
68.48
63.64
42.53
39.03
33.13
30.17
29.67
27.47
25.89

In the above data, “Reach” is the “percentage of all active unique visitors who
visited the site or used the application during the month. Active is defined as anyone who
used an Internet-enabled computer during the month.”170
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These parent organizations have tremendous power, through code, to both enable
and constrain different types of people’s behavior in cyberspace; and because people use
these organizations’ websites the most - by a substantial amount in some cases - their
governing authority is very real, despite the fact that any programmer can independently
write code and be said to govern their own private sites. By looking at usability, some
entities clearly govern far more than others.
Furthermore, when we look at these metrics that show how people are actually
using the Internet, it is clear that they are using it almost completely in a way that
gives private commercial firms authority over their behavior. Based on the Internet’s
decentralized architecture, as well as the decentralization of computer programmers
writing code, this need not necessarily have to be the case, but, based on usage, it is
nevertheless.
This conclusion confirming the dominance of private commercial firms in web
applications, however, is complicated when analyzed through the lens of the constraint of
programming languages. Unlike with desktop applications, where the most commonly
used languages of Java and the C-family are controlled by private commercial firms, such
is not the case with web applications. Reviewing the aforementioned list, the remaining
top-10 languages of PHP, Python, Perl, Javascript, and Ruby – not to mention standardsbased languages like HTML and XML – are all non-proprietary. No single company or
group of companies controls web-based languages or singularly guides their
development. Rather, these languages are continually developed by volunteer
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programmers and software engineers, often without any institutional affiliation or
compensation.171
Throughout the history of computing, programming languages from Fortran,
Basic, and Cobol to C++, Java, and PHP have enabled, and, in fact, encouraged, a
decentralized approach to the generation of new software. For example, one does not
need to be a Microsoft employee in order to write code in C++. In fact, Microsoft created
the C++ language with the express intent of empowering outsiders to create software on
their own, and to do so with no lingering association back to the company. As a result,
computer programmers do not necessarily write their code as part of any formal hierarchy
or within any institution that can be accurately said to have oversight capabilities – other
than, perhaps, the organizations which employ some of them, however, even those
organizations, whether public or private, may not have any direct associations with each
other. This decentralization and empowerment of individual, non-affiliated programmers
eventually led to the Open Source movement in computing, whereby programmers are
encouraged to openly share their source code for the sake of collaboration and peer
production of software – forming a viable alternative to the closed, proprietary model
administered by most private commercial firms.172
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This nebulous Open Source community is extremely significant and can stake
claim to numerous highly successful software applications.173 For instance, it is
responsible for highly used web applications such as the Apache Web Server, which
hosts approximately 52 percent of all websites on the Internet. By comparison,
Microsoft's IIS, the next most used web server, can claim approximately 33 percent. 174
It is in this web application context where many voices in the programming
community firmly assert that private commercial firms do not have authority over their
actions; and to a certain extent, they’re correct. When considering how many of the most
popular web programming languages are non-proprietary, and considering how similarly
open source web software like the Apache Web Server is actually used to host more
websites than its commercial rivals, it would be intellectually dishonest to simply write
off these phenomena as an inconvenient sideshow. In fact, such non-proprietary
languages and open source web applications form the basis of what ought to be construed
as a very significant component in the governance formula – or at the very least a great
mitigator on the powers that private commercial software firms retain.
To clarify this point, there are specific programmers who have had serious
disruptive influences throughout the Internet’s history – programmers such as Shawn
Fanning (creator of the original Napster program, which introduced millions to illegal
downloading of copyrighted music files), Phil Zimmerman (creator of the PGP
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application, which enhances people's digital privacy but makes law enforcement and
investigation far more difficult), and Linus Torvalds (creator of Linux, the open-source
operating system). The characteristics that this group of individual non-affiliated
programmers share in common is that each worked independently, outside of any public
or private institution, utilizing nothing more than their programming skills and a personal
computer to develop software for other people to use that was then disseminated online to
the public for free. This proved disruptive in that the software they created and released
either 1) facilitated the outright subversion of U.S. law (Napster), 2) was legal but ran
counter to local, state, and federal objectives (PGP working against certain countercyberterrorist tactics of the Department of Homeland Security), or 3) was legal but ran
counter to the financial interests of private commercial firms (Linux and open-source
programs undermining firms like Microsoft and Apple).
In response to the effects wrought by these individual non-affiliated programmers,
firms such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, and others have adopted new policies
and implemented new technologies that grant them more centralized control. For
example, YouTube has implemented specialized software to filter and remove clips that
potentially violate copyright law. Meanwhile, other commercial institutions such as the
RIAA and MPAA have litigated cases and lobbied in Washington to pass federal laws
that enhance protections of their commercial interests, while still others have sought to
limit their own legal liability, as was the case with Internet Service Providers like AOL in
the policy process leading to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.175
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As a result, in their various responses to the disruptive power of individual nonaffiliated programmers – whether those responses take the form of preventative,
reactionary, or coordinative actions - private commercial firms prove to be the primary
governing authority. Ultimately, individual non-affiliated programmers have significant,
and often disruptive, influence, even in creating Internet policies (in their capacity to
write the code underlying much of the software). However, that has failed to translate
into governing authority.
When looking at usability from the perspective of the average user’s Internet
experience, it remains true that, despite the widespread prevalence of non-proprietary
programming languages and open source web applications, their cyberspatial behavior is
still primarily determined by the code written by private commercial firms. This is not to
say that private commercial firms govern all of the activities of all users on the front-end,
or even the development of all web technologies on the back-end, for that is certainly not
the case. Numerous alternatives do indeed exist and some are even highly successful in
their deployment rates. But what the data does undeniably indicate is that the majority of
what the average Internet user does, and is capable of doing, in the websites they visit,
the applications they encounter, and the services they use, still falls under the authority of
private commercial software firms. These firms do, in fact, govern more.
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III. HOW ARE POLICIES BEING MADE AT THE APPLICATIONS LAYER?

Policies are being made at the Applications layer primarily by private commercial
firms through the writing of code. The fundamental question is what political values that
code represents. At the center of the debate over governance at the Applications layer is
Lawrence Lessig’s argument that “code is law”.
To clarify, the focus of governance at the Applications layer is how cyberspace, in
particular, is governed; not the Internet as a whole. Cyberspace refers specifically to the
virtual environments where people’s online behavior takes place. It does not refer to the
infrastructure or hardware elements that make up the Internet. Rather, cyberspace, in the
context being addressed, is the software component of the Web.
As such, this software component is created exclusively by code. Computer
programming languages are used to generate a particular software environment,
essentially establishing the laws of nature – what is technically possible and what is not
possible – within a particular realm. In real-space, governments may enact certain types
of laws for its citizens to follow, however, other laws – such as the laws of gravity and
physics – remain in place, and indeed trump those of governments. For instance,
Congress cannot legislate away gravity; its policies must conform to it.
The fundamental difference between real-space and cyberspace is that, in
cyberspace, the so-called environmental laws can be programmed as well. In other
words, gravity actually can be legislated away in cyberspace. Virtual environments, for
example, the avatar-community website Second Life, written entirely in code, are
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designed upon a far more malleable foundation than the physical laws of real-space.
Problems don’t necessarily have to be solved; they can be programmed away. Rather
than resolve conflicts between two people by making one of them change their behavior,
it’s possible to simply change the laws of nature to eliminate the conflict altogether.176
For example, Lessig raises a case in Second Life where a woman named Martha
grew and sold poisonous flowers. One of her “neighbors” named Dank owned a dog that
ate one of the flower petals and died. The two engaged in a heated argument placing
blame on each other. Dank didn’t understand why Martha was selling poisonous flowers,
but Martha couldn’t understand why Dank had created a dog that suffered when dying (or
was even susceptible to poison in the first place). Ultimately, their problem could best be
resolved by re-engineering the code, or laws of nature, so that the flower petals would
only be poisonous when in the possession of someone who purchased them as such, but
when they were stolen or blown away, they would lose their poisonous qualities.177
Because the environment of cyberspace is created through software written
entirely in code, Lessig argues that code is the law of cyberspace. “In real space we
recognize how laws regulate – through constitutions, statutes, and other legal codes. In
cyberspace we must understand how code regulates – how the software and hardware that
make cyberspace what is it regulate cyberspace as it is.”178
The types of policies being created through code in Second Life, and in
cyberspace more generally, constraining or enabling the capabilities of the environment
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itself, are illustrative examples of governing authority, according to our definition. Code
is serving not only as a tool for policy implementation, but its underlying decisionmaking processes are where those policies actually originate.
With the “code is law” argument established, the question, then, is which political
values code has come to represent. Policy objectives – or the intents of a particular
software application – are, as in real-space, political decisions that embody different sets
of values and priorities.

This code presents the greatest threat to liberal or
libertarian ideals, as well as their greatest promise. We can
build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that
we believe are fundamental, or we can build, or architect,
or code cyberspace to allow those values to disappear.
There is no middle ground. There is no choice that does
not include some type of building. Code is never found; it
is only ever made, and only ever made by us.179

From an engineering perspective, the policies, or rules, of a particular piece of
software are coded into its architecture. Because that architecture can either be
programmed to make a virtual space more democratic or authoritarian, to be more openly
participatory or editorially controlled, or to allow for anonymous behavior versus
requiring the authentication of identities, Lessig refers to these decision-making outputs
as varying “architectures of control” – and the extent to which control is coded into the
architecture will directly affect people’s behavior. Whether or not a specific virtual
environment can be regulated, and how that regulation is designed and implemented,
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turns on the nature of its code.180 Some architectures are more regulable than others. As
a result, in cyberspace, software design is a form of policymaking, and its
architecture is its politics.181
This idea that software code ought to be considered a meaningful form of policy
is not, however, universally agreed upon. While Lessig's “code is law” argument has
been the evocative center of the academic debate, other scholars like Tim Wu have been
quick to highlight “when code isn't law”.182
Wu takes issue with the “grand speculation” that has resulted in the years since
Lessig's original argument was published, citing broadly interpretive claims ranging from
how code will arise as a type of utopian sovereign, to how code may be used to negate
basic freedoms, to how code shouldn't even be considered a legal novelty at all. Instead,
Wu proposes to study the design of code as an aspect of interest group behavior. Doing
so, he concludes, reveals the need to differentiate between two separate aspects of code's
relationship to law – first, code's ability to act as a regulatory mechanism in substitute for
traditional laws or other forms of regulation; second, code's ability to act as an antiregulatory mechanism, meaning “a tool to minimize the costs of law that certain groups
will use to their advantage”.183
To clarify, Wu's counter-argument to Lessig is that code, rather than being a new
type of law, is actually a mechanism for avoidance from the law. Using peer-to-peer
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(P2P) file-sharing software as his primary example, he argues that code simply allows
specific computer-savvy groups to take advantage of loopholes and legal ambiguities to
afford them a tool for non-compliance. This is hardly the great paradigm shift that many
of Lessig's disciples have suggested.
Furthermore, other counter-arguments to the “code is law” principle have
emerged as well. Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu have together put forth a direct challenge
to the assumption that the Internet liberates us from traditional legal norms imposed by
governments and geographic borders. Territorial governments have re-asserted
themselves in cyberspatial issues over the last decade and, Goldsmith and Wu argue,
rather than code becoming law, or even resisting territorial law, code is now actually
facilitating its enforcement.184
So which is it? Is code the law of cyberspace, or is it just a facilitator, or a
conduit, of the traditional political power of national governments?
It is both. To understand how, let us re-iterate that, based on usability, it is private
commercial software firms who are primarily creating the policies and designing the
software architectures at the Applications layer. This sheds light into exactly how
policies are being made, and it is a question that can, as a result, be re-phrased as follows:
How are private commercial firms making decisions as to how to code their software?
Lessig is right that code is the law of cyberspace in that it unquestionably dictates
the rules for how people can interact with it. However, Goldsmith and Wu are also right.
Because private commercial firms are writing the code and designing the software
architectures that people are overwhelmingly using in cyberspace, and because those
184
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private commercial firms adhere to the jurisdictional laws of territorial governments in
which they are incorporated and in which they operate, they are unquestionably deciding
what form their code will ultimately take based on the territorial laws which apply to
them. To state it plainly, private commercial firms want to gain entry into markets and
will modify their code to comply with local laws in order to do so. Lessig himself, in
fact, writes that the aggregate transformation that cyberspace is experiencing towards
more regulable architectures is not the product of governments – they are the product of
user demand and deployed through commerce. He stipulates that these transformations
are not the product of conspiracy, but rather they are “the consequence of changes made
for purely pragmatic, commercial ends”185.
For example, take the case of Google. The search engine that has an 84% market
share earned in excess of $46 billion in total annual revenues in 2012186, handled
approximately 1.2 trillion queries187, and is the single most-used website in cyberspace,
provides a model case study. Google’s search algorithm itself favors certain values over
others – it is based on a mathematical formula known as the PageRank algorithm which
ranks search results based on the “authority” of websites and their external links. This
algorithm, a form of code, has been criticized for reinforcing the authority of already-
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established entities, and stands in contrast to alternative architectures, such as those
deployed by Digg or Reddit, which rely on voting-based ranking systems.188
Not only does Google’s search algorithm demonstrate how code embodies certain
political values, it also illustrates how commercial market forces and territorial laws
substantially affect their decision-making processes. The company whose official motto
is “Do No Evil” routinely engages in the censorship of search results if they view it in
their commercial interests to do so. Google admits to censoring certain Nazi-related
websites in Germany, child pornography sites in the United States, and a plethora of
websites in China including those of various human rights groups and others covering
politically sensitive subjects such as any relating to Taiwanese independence or the
Tiananmen Square uprising of 1989.189 They have made these decisions to remove or
omit information from its services in order to comply with the laws of the different local
and national governments in which they seek to operate in a commercial capacity.
Thus, code is, indeed, the law of cyberspace; but the code that people encounter
most frequently is overwhelmingly written by private commercial firms whose actions
indicate an explicit recognition of the sovereign authority that traditional governmental
institutions have over them. Therefore, policies are being made at the Applications layer
through decision-making processes that are primarily determined by commercial market
forces, the technological capabilities of code, and territorial laws.
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Chapter 6 – Who Governs the Content?

When most people think of Internet issues their focus is on cyberspatial content.
Whether a particular issue arises over censorship, privacy rights, photos distributed on
social-networking sites, etc., these are all matters that center on the actual material that
end-users see, read, listen to, download, watch, and interact with while online. As a
result, the Content layer is the most highly visible, controversial, and politicized of all the
four conceptual layers.
In this chapter, we will perform a detailed analysis of three Internet issue areas
that have been highly prominent on legislators’ agendas since the 1990s – the regulation
of pornographic material online, the regulation of spam, and the regulation of filesharing. What they will demonstrate is that governmental policies have often proven to
be effective in enabling certain types of Internet content (for example, Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act), while at other times governmental policies have proven
to be inherently limited by the Internet’s global scope (i.e. – court rulings on P2P filesharing) or limited by the technical design of protocols (i.e. - SMTP and the CAN-SPAM
Act). Thus, we will argue that while national governments certainly have governing
authority over Internet content to an extent, ISPs and private website operators (through
their TOS Agreements) also have demonstrated their authority to make policies that
directly constrain or enable behavior with intentional effects, particularly in the
transnational context. Ultimately, we will assert that adopting an Issue Network
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framework is most helpful in understanding the political dynamics over the Internet’s
content.

145
I. WHY IS THE CONTENT IMPORTANT?

Examining the Internet content is important because it is the actual material that
people see, read, listen to, download, watch, and interact with while online. In sum, it is
the end-result of all of the activity at the previous three layers; the finished product that
most directly affects the majority of Internet users.
Most of the debates taking place in the media and in governmental policymaking
circles regarding “Internet issues” are focused on the content that is publicly available in
cyberspace. Such issues that are highly prominent on the legislative agenda in the United
States, for example, include the regulation of pornographic material, the protection of
privacy and personal information, ensuring free speech and First Amendment principles,
cracking down on the piracy of copyrighted works, eliminating spam, and much more.
These are all issues that have little, if anything, to do with the physical infrastructure of
the Internet, its technical standards and protocols, or (to a lesser extent) the software
applications that collectively maintain the Internet’s operational functionality. What
these issues all share in common is that they are far more narrowly concerned with the
substantive nature of the material that users ultimately see.
As a consequence, the majority of public attention and governmental efforts focus
on cyberspatial content as their target. The Content layer is their main battleground. The
average Internet user is not overly concerned with how things technologically function
behind the scenes nor do politicians typically become motivated by software engineering
principles and seek formal resolutions involving the production of PHP code. It is the
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end-result which occupies them. Ultimately, the types of content that are available, and if
and how they ought to be regulated, are the focus of policymaking in this most highly
visible arena.
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II. WHO GOVERNS THE CONTENT?

The content of the material that is available in cyberspace is governed by national
governments, private website operators, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
National governments have taken an increasingly active in role in attempting to
regulate the content of cyberspace. Goldsmith and Wu have argued that since the mid2000s geography and governmental coercion have regained their fundamental importance
as a more bordered Internet has emerged; one that “differs among nations and regions
that are increasingly separated by walls of bandwidth, language, and filters”. They
further argue that such a bordered Internet has many underappreciated values as it reflects
top-down pressures from governments and also reflects “bottom-up pressures from
individuals in different places who demand an Internet that corresponds to local
preferences”.190
Perhaps the most highly prominent example of how national governments have
been decidedly proactive in attempting to regulate Internet content has been over the
issue of protecting minors from indecent and sexually explicit material available online.
Since the very inception of the first web browser, the United States Congress has been
proactive on this front. Its first attempt came in the form of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (a common name for Title V of the Telecommunications Act of
1996), which sought to regulate the content published on websites that allowed unfettered
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access.191 The two provisions that were most contentious included one that would
prohibit the “knowing transmission” of indecent material to any recipient under the age
of eighteen and the other would prohibit the use of any “interactive computer service” to
send or display offensive material in a manner available to a minor – effectively imposing
limits to what material could be published on unrestricted websites. The CDA, however,
was partially struck down by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU (1997) on First
Amendment grounds, ruling that the statute “unduly restricted a large amount of speech
that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another”192.
Congress, still seeking to pass, what Ripley and Franklin have called, some type
of Protective Regulatory legislation193 soon drafted a second effort at regulating indecent
material. The Child Online Protection Act (COPA) was an attempt to respond directly to
the Court’s decision in Reno, making only minor modifications to the CDA which would
sufficiently address its concerns. COPA provided for criminal and civil penalties for
anyone who “in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web makes
any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors”194. However, COPA also faced legal
hurdles based on First Amendment grounds. A federal District Court, and later affirmed
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by the Appellate Court, concluded that COPA was a content-based regulation of speech,
and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. A Court injunction blocked its enforcement
almost immediately after its passage in 1998, and the law was later overturned in the case
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004)195. Both of these pieces of legislation, the CDA and COPA,
were broad attempts to prohibit certain forms of material content to be published on
websites.
The third attempt by Congress to create a federal law that would regulate sexually
explicit material online was designed with an entirely different strategy. Rather than
attempting yet again to directly regulate the content of websites, where prior efforts had
not sufficiently withstood judicial scrutiny, the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA)
was passed in 2003 requiring public institutions which received federal funding to install
Internet filters that would disallow access to websites that contained indecent material.196
In other words, CIPA focused on the demand-side (the access of the end-user) as opposed
to attempting to regulate once again the supply-side (what websites could and could not
publish). The Supreme Court has since upheld CIPA against a constitutional challenge in
United States v. American Library Association (2003)197.
For skeptics of governmental authority in cyberspace, such examples are pointed
to as proof of the limits of such authority. They argue that because these policies have a
difficult time even passing Constitutional muster, let alone proving any actual ability to
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effectively regulate online content, governments have little to no authority. However,
this point is contradicted as proof of governments’ clear authority to shape the Internet
environment in terms of content can be notably demonstrated with the example of
Section 230.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides immunity from
liability for providers and users of an "interactive computer service" who publish
information provided by others.198 What this has effectively come to mean is that private
website operators are not to be held legally liable for the content posted by their users.
While Section 230 may have seemed relatively innocuous at the time of its
creation, its ramifications have been enormous. Social-networking websites like
MySpace and Facebook, that allow users to post their own content, could come into
existence since the website companies did not have to fear a litany of litigation. Blogging
services like Blogger and Wordpress could be created allowing people to publish freely
to mass audiences, video-sharing sites like YouTube and photo-sharing sites like Flickr
and collaborative projects like Wikipedia could all become possibilities, and much more.
This entire phenomenon of websites based on user-generated content has become known
as “Web 2.0” as it characterizes, in the eyes of many, the contemporary cyberspatial
experience for the majority of users – so much so that Time magazine declared its Person
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of the Year award in 2006, “You”; a direct reference to the significant impact that usergenerated Web 2.0 content was having.199
Web 2.0 and all of the websites that are based on user-generated content,
including several of the most popular and commercially successful websites in
cyberspace, would not have been possible without Section 230. The fear of litigation
with no liability protection would have undoubtedly chilled many of the aforementioned
websites from coming into existence, or at the very least would have produced sites
whose content looked far different than the content that is available on the Web today.
For this reason, Section 230 is direct evidence of how national governments continue to
retain a governing authority over cyberspatial content, insofar as they clearly have the
ability to create policies that constrain or enable different types of behavior with
intentional effects – in this case, greatly enabling the widespread proliferation of Web 2.0
sites based on user-generated content.
That said, the limits of governmental authority remain very real. One of the major
challenges that national governments face in their attempts to regulate cyberspatial
content is the jurisdictional dilemma raised by an Internet that is global in scope - and
whose competing laws are not often in harmonization with one another. Data havens
exist that promise potential clients – porn purveyors, tax evaders, online gambling
services, etc. – that data on their servers will be “physically secure against any legal
action”. A famous example is the commercial enterprise known as HavenCo, which
hosts its servers on the “Principality of Sealand”, which is literally a tiny abandoned
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concrete platform located six miles off the coast of the United Kingdom in the North Sea,
linking to the Internet via microwave and satellite connections. HavenCo is generally
pointed to as evidence of the futility of territorial government and is based on “the
commonplace assumption that governments cannot control what happens beyond their
borders, and thus cannot control Internet communications from abroad”.200 While this
may be an extreme example, it nevertheless suggests how issues of jurisdiction severely
complicate regulatory attempts by national governments, particularly when they act
unilaterally.
As a result, many governmental attempts at regulation, even when formalized as
public policy, are often rendered ineffective and little more than symbolic actions. For
example, the CAN-SPAM Act was signed into law in December 2003, establishing the
first national standards for the sending of commercial email in an effort to make spam
(non-solicited pornographic and marketing messages) illegal.201 While initially deemed a
popular success, it has since encountered tremendous obstacles to achieving the policy’s
goals of limiting the amount of spam messages sent over the Internet.
The CAN-SPAM Act was initially introduced as Senate bill S.877 by Conrad
Burns (R-MT) along with 22 co-sponsors in April 2003. Coming on the heels of the
National-Do-Not-Call-Registry, which sought to limit non-solicited telephone marketing
calls and had tremendous popular support, the bill passed through the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Technology by July of that same year with little opposition.
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Within only a few months, the Senate voted in favor of the bill by a vote of 97-0, and the
House subsequently voted in favor by a vote of 392-5. By December 2003, President
Bush signed the CAN-SPAM Act into law amidst an enormous degree of consensus
among legislators.202
The Act permitted email marketers to send unsolicited commercial email as long
as the message contained all of the following four elements: an opt-out mechanism, a
functioning return email address, a valid subject line indicating it is an advertisement, and
the legitimate physical address of the sender. The Act requires the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to enforce its provisions; however other actors involved in the
implementation process also include the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Technology, which is charged with oversight, as well as the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), which must promulgate the specific rules affecting mobile telephone
service messages. Furthermore, the Act sets out both civil and criminal penalties for
failing to include any of the above four mandatory elements, as well as other common
spamming practices such as harvesting, dictionary attacks, Internet Protocol spoofing, or
using open mail relays. It does not allow individuals to sue spammers, but only the FTC,
State Attorneys General or corporate Internet Service Providers (ISPs) may do so. The
Act also pre-empts any existing state anti-spam laws203.
The role of the FTC is paramount in terms of policy implementation. The Act
stipulates that the FTC must submit to Congress an annual report on the effectiveness and
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enforcement of the Act, devise a system of rewarding informants, create a system
requiring spam to be identifiable from its subject line, and provide a specified timetable
for establishing a Do-Not-Email Registry (based on the model set by the National DoNot-Call Registry). Clearly, these provisions are indicative of a strict top-down
approach, as described by Pressman and Wildavsky204, focusing exclusively on the
substantive content of messages sent and received and occurring completely at the federal
level.
Since the CAN-SPAM Act went into effect in January 2004, spam on the Internet
has risen exponentially. In 2003, the average daily volume of spam was 15 billion
messages, as compared to 164 billion in 2008. In 2003, 45% of all email sent was spam,
as compared to 96.5% in 2008. In 2003, the amount of money spent battling spam
annually was $20.5 billion, as compared to $140 billion in 2008. Furthermore, spam has
taken on a more destructive quality in the years since the Act’s passage when the issue
was focused on unsolicited commercial marketing messages, thanks to email attachments
that link to websites that infect computers with malicious code. Spammers have also
become more brazen in attempting to steal data or take control over the infected computer
and join it to botnets for future attacks. 205
Implementation challenges associated with the CAN-SPAM Act have been
evident from the outset of the policy’s adoption. First, it is an immense problem to
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identify and locate spammers, given an assortment of programming techniques such as
automated dictionary attacks and IP spoofing. Second, even once the spammer is located
it can often be extremely difficult to develop sufficient evidence to prove the spammer is
legally responsible for actually sending the spam, again given an assortment of
programming techniques through the use of proxy servers and subnet masking. Lastly,
there is the jurisdictional dilemma posed by the Internet’s global dimension. For
instance, if a small firm sends spam from a computer in the United States, transmitted
through a mail server located on an offshore island nation without any anti-spam laws,
and received by a citizen of a foreign nation outside of U.S. sovereignty, determining
which authority has proper jurisdiction is often highly disputed.206
The example of the CAN-SPAM Act is indicative of the limits of governments
when their legislative policy solutions fail to address the technology itself. Email
operates through a technical protocol called SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol),
created by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). SMTP specifies that a minimum
of four logical computing components must be used in the email process – the sender’s,
the recipient’s, and most crucially, a mail server located at the ISP of both the sender and
recipient. When a mail server transmits a message to another mail server over the
Internet, the message must have a “header” which contains lines of information that
provide details about the message, the sender, and the transmission. It is through
manipulation of these headers that spammers are able to conceal their location and
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identity by falsifying the information contained in the headers. The SMTP protocol
facilitates spam because it does not require accurate routing information except for the
intended recipient of the email, and performs no authentication207.
Thus, the FTC’s final report to Congress in 2004208 concluded that due to the
technical nature of SMTP and other concerns regarding proposed policy alternatives209,
the creation of a National Do-Not-Email Registry “in any form would not have any
beneficial impact on the spam problem”. The FTC further stated that a viable
authentication standard is not only required to make such a registry effective, but “may
even substantially address the underlying [spam] problem” itself.
However, the problem of spam has, in fact, been partially mitigated in recent
years from the end-user’s perspective; not because of direct government intervention or
as the result of formal policymaking, but through private-sector initiatives. It has been
private website operators, acting in their own private commercial interests, who have
greatly reduced the amount of spam that ultimately reaches their users’ inboxes. Today’s
antispam tools catch anywhere from 95% to 98% of spam before it enters ISP or
corporate networks, and 71% of Internet users are now protected by spam filters210. They
have accomplished this feat through technological innovations such as improved filtering
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algorithms, Zero-Hour systems, and features that allow users to flag spam messages as a
form of notification.211
What CAN-SPAM demonstrates is that policies aimed at addressing technological
problems ought to seek technological solutions to work in conjunction with purely
legislative ones. Is it possible to better regulate spam? Many experts within the scientific
and engineering community generally agree the answer is yes212. Public policies which
aim at regulating the content of cyberspace would be most effective if they were designed
to address the other various Internet layers that have been described. In this example,
spam could be best mitigated by seeking to influence the structural design of the SMTP
protocol, while simultaneously encouraging the private sector to innovate better filters
and other software solutions, and by governments establishing strict criminal and civil
penalties for offenders. As the FTC concluded, an authentication mechanism, most easily
built into the header specifications of the protocol, would facilitate an effective means of
locating the origin of spam messages213. Similar types of efforts have already proven
successful at accomplishing this, such as the deployment of digital certificates providing
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developers with a means of authenticating commercial sales transactions over the web,
thereby contributing to the rapid expansion of e-commerce services in the late 1990s.
Thus, national governments certainly play an active and significant role in
regulating the content of cyberspace, as demonstrated by Section 230, as do private
website operators who often, in their own private interest, implement their own policies
in the form of technological solutions to technological problems. As was the case with
spam, this approach often succeeds where governmental policymaking, on its own, fails.
However, there is another major actor in the governance equation when it comes
to content. Increasingly, ISPs are demonstrating their own authority to constrain and
enable different types of cyberspatial behavior with intentional effects.
How ISPs have authority over cyberspatial content is illustrated by the case of
peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing. In 1999, a college student named Shawn Fanning wrote a
software application, called Napster, which posed an immediate challenge to both the
business model of the music industry as well as national copyright law. Using Napster,
people could easily search for and download music files from people’s hard drives
around the world, with Napster simply providing a centralized list of what content was
available. Soon, 26.4 million verified users were on Napster trading billions of songs at
its peak in February 2001.214
It wasn’t long before federal courts in California concluded that Napster was a
“contributory infringer” of copyright in the case A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
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(2001)215, and consequently ordered it to be shut down. This shutdown was possible on a
technical level for two reasons. First, its directory of music files was centrally located,
meaning that shutting down the central server would effectively lead to a total system
collapse. Second, it was geographically located exclusively within the United States.216
When Napster shut down in 2001, file-sharing users sought alternatives. Gnutella
networks were the most obvious successor, and were able to maintain their functionality
because, unlike Napster, they had a radically decentralized “peer-to-peer” architecture
with no central directory of files. Other successful file-sharing alternatives soon arose,
like LimeWire and Kazaa, based on a similar type of decentralization and were
headquartered strategically overseas. By early 2004, Kazaa became the most
downloaded piece of software in history, having been downloaded 319 million times. By
2005, over 57 million Americans were using file-sharing software – more than voted for
President George W. Bush.217
While new legal challenges were brought by the Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) against
these peer-to-peer software vendors in the courts, the industry began pursuing a new
tactic of suing individual users of the software. By January 2009, lawsuits had been
brought against nearly 35,000 Americans218; however their relative level of effectiveness
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is in doubt. The number of lawsuits paled in comparison to the number of actual filesharers, the number of file-sharers soon rose exponentially and the software became more
popular than before the lawsuits began219, and the courts soon took issue with the legality
of the lawsuits themselves citing the industry’s very fallible method of identifying
possible copyright infringers based on IP addresses, which is not necessarily a reliable
means of identification in cyberspace. The strategy was repeatedly justified by the
RIAA, however, claiming “the real point of the suits was not to eliminate filesharing but
to marginalize it and thus prevent companies like Kazaa from becoming mainstream,
legitimate businesses, and real competitors to the labels”.220
The next central legal challenge came in the case of MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. (2005).221 Although Kazaa representatives and others did not show up for
the lawsuit in order to avoid the enforcement powers of U.S. authorities, remaining
defendants based their argument on the Supreme Court’s ruling in the famous Sony
Betamax case of 1984.222 In it, the Court ruled that it is indeed legal to create
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standardized technologies (like a VCR or photocopier) that may be potentially used for
copyright infringement so long as they also were capable of “substantial noninfringing
uses”. In April 2003, a federal District Court dismissed the Grokster case citing the Sony
Betamax decision, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later upheld that decision
acknowledging the legitimate and legal uses of peer-to-peer software. However, when
the Supreme Court ruled on the case in 2005, it unanimously reversed the lower courts in
Grokster and declared the business model of the file-sharing firms illegal because they
had, with obvious intent, “induced” users to break the law.
The Court’s decision sparked the next phase in the file-sharing narrative. Once
again, new adapted technologies quickly arose to succeed Kazaa and its commercial
brethren, the most prominent among them called BitTorrent. BitTorrent was another
peer-to-peer communications protocol used for distributing large amounts of data and by
some estimates accounted for as much as 55% of all Internet traffic, as of February
2009.223 Thus, despite the efforts of governmental institutions and the music industry,
file-sharing remains a significant challenge to established real-space authorities.
This brings us back to the increasing role of ISPs in the governance debate. In
2007, investigations revealed that Comcast was looking at its users' web traffic and
secretly blocking BitTorrent uploads to users outside Comcast's network. The Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) alleged that Comcast blocked BitTorrent with a classic hacker
technique known as ‘spoofing,’ where the hacker poses as someone he isn't, in this case
another user. It is “as if he and I were having a phone conversation, and then halfway
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through Comcast interrupts us and in my voice tells him to hang up, and in his voice tells
me the same thing.” 224 Comcast and other ISPs were revealed to have started sniffing
out peer-to-peer traffic on their networks and curbing it, either slowing file-sharing to a
trickle or bringing it to a halt.225
The FCC ultimately intervened and ruled with a bipartisan majority to require
Comcast to stop this ongoing practice and also disclose all of its network management
practices.226 The case proved to be a focusing event sparking a debate over the issue of
Net Neutrality – the principle that all data on the Internet ought to be treated equal
regardless of content, at least in terms of transmission speeds and pricing.227
However, ISPs are nevertheless increasingly being turned to as agents of
policymaking and implementation in matters of regulating Internet content. Some ISPs,
such as Sprint, Time Warner, and Verizon, agreed to block websites that contain child
pornography after forming a deal with New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo.228
Several bills have been introduced in the House and Senate that call for ISPs to keep logs
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about their users’ Internet activities for two years to aid police investigations.229 Also, as
it relates specifically to file-sharing, the RIAA announced its intention in late 2008 to
shift its strategic focus away from bringing lawsuits against individual file-sharers and
instead use ISPs as their official conduits. Placing a notable emphasis on college
campuses, their efforts have since been geared towards altering the policy environment so
that when illegal file-sharing or downloading is detected, the ISP, not the RIAA, “will
contact the culprit via e-mail, requesting they stop after the first of two warnings. If the
user does not stop after the second warning, the ISP will slow down service or cut it off
all together”.230 ISPs are warranting this renewed attention because they have
demonstrated their ability, through policymaking, to both constrain and enable different
types of cyberspatial behavior due to their unique position as being the gatekeeper for
people’s access to the Internet.
Thus, national governments, private website operators, and ISPs all play a
significant role in governing the content of the Internet, despite their respective
limitations.
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III. HOW ARE POLICIES BEING MADE AT THE CONTENT LAYER?

Terms of Service (TOS) Agreements are the rules that users must agree to abide
by in order to use a service, and are the de facto law of, what scholars like Jonathan
Zittrain refer to as, the Web's various “walled gardens”.231 These TOS Agreements have
become an important form of policy themselves that often have dramatic effects on
constraining or enabling different types of cyberspatial behavior.
Considering the triumvirate of governing actors established in the previous
section – national governments, private website operators, and ISPs – it is TOS
agreements that clearly are the policies of record for the latter two. Private website
operators, particularly of those that are commercial in nature, rely on TOS agreements to
establish behavioral norms for its users’ activities such as what content is acceptable to
publish, post copyright notices, and lay out the company’s marketing policies. TOS
agreements also stipulate the penalties for violating the website’s rules, which includes
the criteria for total expulsion.
Because each website is administered by its own private operator, and is therefore
a private space despite its often public accessibility, the private operators can create the
terms of service for their sites however they choose so long as it does not violate the
territorial laws in which the company is incorporated, or in which their servers are
geographically located. Private website operators are increasingly using TOS agreements
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as a form of policymaking which sometimes even supersedes the policymaking
capabilities of governments, particularly in the transnational context.
For example, in February 2009, Facebook made a subtle change to its TOS
agreement – the type that ordinarily goes unnoticed. The new TOS included the
following phrase:

You hereby grant Facebook an irrevocable, perpetual, nonexclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide license (with
the right to sublicense) to (a) use, copy, publish, stream,
store, retain, publicly perform or display, transmit, scan,
reformat, modify, edit, frame, translate, excerpt, adapt,
create derivative works and distribute (through multiple
tiers), any User Content you (i) Post on or in connection
with the Facebook Service or the promotion thereof subject
only to your privacy settings or (ii) enable a user to Post,
including by offering a Share Link on your website and (b)
to use your name, likeness and image for any purpose,
including commercial or advertising, each of (a) and (b) on
or in connection with the Facebook Service or the
promotion thereof.232

This particular change to the TOS did not go unnoticed. A popular blog, The
Consumerist, informed the world about it, running a headline, "Facebook's New Terms of
Service: 'We Can Do Anything We Want With Your Content. Forever.'"233
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Facebook's terms of service (TOS) used to say that when
you closed an account on their network, any rights they
claimed to the original content you uploaded would expire.
Not anymore.
Now, anything you upload to Facebook can be used by
Facebook in any way they deem fit, forever, no matter what
you do later. Want to close your account? Good for you,
but Facebook still has the right to do whatever it wants with
your old content. They can even sublicense it if they want.

The story snowballed and spread in a classically viral manner. The Consumerist
post received hundreds of comments, thousands of Diggs, and half a million page views.
Meanwhile, outraged Facebook users created several groups on the site itself with names
like "People Against the New Terms of Service (TOS)", each one quickly recruiting tens
of thousands of members.234 Finally, the mainstream media caught on, with the story
reported on Fox News and in the New York Times, among others, ultimately pressuring
the company to revert to its previous policy.235
While this is a case of Facebook giving in to pressure and ultimately altering the
terms of their TOS Agreement, what this story truly illustrates is that, although its users
and the mainstream media mobilized to influence Facebook’s policy, it was still entirely
up to Facebook whether or not to do so. The company had a clear authority to create the
policies that would govern its own private website, and this power was embodied through
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their TOS agreement. Again, the distinction between who has influence versus who has
authority is paramount in determining governance.
Of course, the use of TOS agreements to regulate customer or member behavior is
not unique to cyberspace. It is a long-established practice that has been followed by
various member-based communities and private commercial firms that provide assorted
services - for example, credit card companies. What is notable, however, is that TOS
agreements on the Web may have a larger impact on affecting behavior than their realspace counterparts insofar as they actually create the virtual environments in which
interactions are occurring. Particularly when the regulatory limits of traditional
governmental institutions are evident in the transnational context, TOS agreements that
govern the specific private spaces of the Web are, in effect, the de facto law.
This point is further supported by examining how it is not only private website
operators that use TOS agreements as a form of policymaking, but ISPs as well. As the
gatekeepers to Internet access, ISPs have repeatedly used TOS agreements to regulate
what activities are, and are not, possible for their users. For example, as already cited,
commercial ISPs have altered their TOS agreements to enable them to manage their
network traffic in ways which disallow file-sharing and put bandwidth caps in place that
make private website hosting problematic for residential users. Non-commercial ISPs,
such as public universities, have also used TOS agreements to cover issues including
protection from security threats, setting up wireless hotspots for sharing connections, and
emulating commercial environments for testing software applications.236
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When it comes to how governments are creating policies at the Content layer, the
answer can best be explained using Heclo’s theory of Issue Networks237. Based on the
premise that closed Iron Triangles are “disastrously incomplete” because they miss the
fairly open networks of people that also interact in important ways with government
officials, issue networks include many disparate actors whose webs of influence guide the
exercise of power. Participants move in and out of the networks constantly and operate
on many levels. Powerful interest groups and knowledgeable individuals alike are often
represented, and the true experts in the networks are those who are “issue-skilled”
regardless of formal professional training. As Heclo described, an issue network is a
“shared-knowledge group” having to do with some aspect of public policy.

[Issue networks are] therefore more well-defined than, first,
a shared-attention group or “public”; those in the networks
are likely to have a common base of information and
understanding of how one knows about policy and
identifies its problems.
But knowledge does not
necessarily produce agreement. Issue networks may or
may not, therefore, be mobilized into, second, a sharedaction group (creating a coalition) or, third, a shared-belief
group (becoming a conventional interest organization).
Increasingly, it is through networks of people who regard
each other as knowledgeable, or at least as needing to be
answered, that public policy issues tend to be refined,
evidence debated, and alternative options worked out –
though rarely in any controlled, well-organized way.238
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Because of the diversity of policy debates occurring at the Internet’s Content
layer, issue networks help explain the fluid range of participants. Each individual issue,
whether the regulation of pornographic material, spam, file-sharing, or others, has an
identifiable subgroup of actors significantly affecting the policy debate – and those
groups, and their dynamics, are particular to each issue. For instance, the issue network
involved in the regulation of spam is heavily dominated by interests such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, who seek to maintain the legitimacy of certain types of
commercial solicitations by email, software companies like Microsoft and Yahoo, whose
mail servers must handle the flood of spam messages, Congress, who creates the
affecting legislation, and the FTC, who is charged with enforcement. Contrast this with
the issue of file-sharing which is dominated by a largely different set of actors and
comprising of a different power dynamic – the file-sharing software firms are not notably
influential on the domestic front since they operate primarily overseas, however advocacy
groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation influence the debate through
mobilization efforts and litigation, ISPs attempt to do so through TOS agreements and
bandwidth caps at a more technical level, the RIAA represents the music industry, and
the U.S. federal court system has been the primary arena for resolving disputes and
guiding governmental policy, more so than Congress.
What this demonstrates is that, because the Web consists of so much content, and
content of such diverse types, to attempt to define a single model for policymaking would
be to oversimplify the power dynamics that actually occur at the Content layer. Issue
networks explain the manner in which governments are creating policies in that they
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account for the enormous range of activities occurring in public policy as it relates to
cyberspatial content. How policies are being made regarding the regulation of
pornographic material is inevitably going to be different than the manner in which
policies are being made regarding bandwidth caps and Net Neutrality. Different issues
involve different debates and different interests, and understanding that the policy
networks will not always be homogenous is critical in understanding how policies are
being made by governments at the Content layer, in general.
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Chapter 7 – Analysis of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

In Part I, we developed a new four-layer conceptual model and determined
governance of the Internet based on the political architecture that it produced. Our
argument is that this layers-based approach can be a helpful tool for conceptualizing
Internet issues – both their problem and solution streams.
Now, let’s put that argument to the test. In order to demonstrate how our fourlayer model can be helpful in understanding complicated and often misunderstood
Internet issues, let us apply the model to a detailed case study on U.S. national
cybersecurity policy. Specifically, we will apply the four-layer model in order to test the
following hypothesis – the commonly cited view that cybersecurity policy’s failures are
the result of a flawed policy design that focuses almost exclusively on voluntary publicprivate partnerships.
Cybersecurity serves as a meaningful test case for several reasons. First, it is an
issue of vital importance with rapidly growing consequences to national and global
economies. As the U.S. Director of National Intelligence told the Senate Intelligence
Committee in February 2013, the threat of cyberattacks was more pressing than the risk
of an attack by global terrorist networks.239 It is an issue that highlights both the
challenges that policymakers face in a global jurisdictionally-challenged cyber
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environment as well as one that serves as a model example for how the unique dynamics
of all four Internet layers may, or may not, be formally addressed through public policy
in the pursuit of political objectives.
Second, it is highly complex both in technical and political terms. Its technical
dimension focuses on enhancing security primarily through code, the details of which are
often incomprehensible to government legislators, and this is coupled with a political
calculus that must account for numerous governing actors, each with a level of authority
that is relative to the particular Internet layer in question, and where competing interests
are structurally decentralized. This complexity involving all the associated variables that
must be taken into account means that lessons about how technical solutions can achieve
political outcomes on the Internet might be applicable to other policy issue areas as well.
Third, it’s relatively new. Like the Internet itself, national cybersecurity policy, at
least in some form, can trace its early origins back several decades, however U.S.
national cybersecurity policy as it exists today really took shape following the terrorist
attacks of September 11th, 2001. Therefore, it is still in its nascent stages and we can, as
scholars, observe its evolutionary development practically from its inception, and that is
something we hope will prove instructive.
Fourth, and most importantly from a research perspective, there is an actual
concrete policy to examine. There are many possible case studies of Internet issues that
can be considered for analysis, however, the goal of this project from the outset has been
to draw conclusions, not about specific issue areas, but about governance – and
governance, according to our stated definition, is demonstrated through the creation of
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policies that can constrain or enable behavior with intentional effects. Thus, in order to
test the applicability of our four-layer conceptual model, we need to utilize a policy-based
approach, which makes it crucially necessary to have a concrete policy – and underlying
policymaking process - to examine. Cybersecurity serves this purpose with its central
guiding policy – the Bush Administration’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
Our goal in the following section is to test our four-layer conceptual model by
analyzing U.S. national cybersecurity policy in terms of the Internet's four layers. As the
following pages will demonstrate, even with an issue as comprehensive as cybersecurity,
both the problem stream and the solution stream can be framed in terms of how policy
affects, and is affected by, the Internet's Infrastructure, its Technical Protocols, its
Software Applications, and its Content. Furthermore, our map of the Internet’s political
architecture, where we identified the primary holders of governing authority at each
layer, also proves valuable in understanding existing U.S. cybersecurity policy's focus on
specific actors and industries.
By applying the lens of our four-layer model, we will argue that governance over
the cybersecurity issue in the United States consists of the following:
At the Infrastructure layer, civilian and military agencies at the federal level of
government take the lead in protecting the Internet’s physical infrastructure. This
includes preventing attacks on core industrial systems, single controlling points like the
One Wilshire Building in Los Angeles, the severing of overland, underground, and
undersea cables, and the disabling of the digital wireless spectrum240.
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At the Protocol layer, the international engineering consortium groups already
discussed – namely, the IETF, IEEE, and W3C – retain their supreme authority in
designing technical standards and protocols, effectively building enhanced security into
the network’s technology itself. Examples of such security protocols include HTTPS,
SSL, and IPv6 (expressly mentioned in the National Strategy document itself).
At the Applications layer, private network administrators and software developers
are the primary agents for cybersecurity, responsible for shoring up their private
networks’ defenses against viruses, worms, botnets, and denial-of-service attacks, and
protecting users from security vulnerabilities in their software and web applications more
generally. When taken together in the aggregate, these private stakeholders form the
frontline of national cyberdefense, with the federal government adopting a coordinationbased role.
At the Content layer, private website operators and ISPs are paramount in
regulating Web content. By setting their Terms of Service policies to dictate what type of
material can be distributed on their site, and, conversely, under what conditions it can be
removed, these private actors monitor users’ activities by flagging potentially disturbing
patterns, ensure that enemy propaganda does not get widely disseminated, and take
measures so that their own content and web services remains publicly available.
Ultimately, the narrative of U.S. cybersecurity policy can be thought of in two
parts. First, in the initial years following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the
story is about the policymaking process that eventually led to the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace policy document. Second, in the years since, the story is about the
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formation of a new bureaucratic regime headed by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
We will begin, first, by applying the four-layer model to conceptualizing the
problem definition. The generalized problem which U.S. cybersecurity policy is
designed to address – namely, digital threats to the nation’s critical cyber assets – can be
made more specific by deconstructing the problem using a layers-based approach. What
we will find is that the major threats to national cybersecurity occur primarily at the
Infrastructure and Application layers. Furthermore, we will analyze the categorical and
specific mechanisms by which threat agents pursue their goals at each of the
aforementioned layers. This will be accomplished by introducing a new typology that
draws important distinctions between cyberterrorism, hacktivism, cracktivism, and
cyberwarfare, and place specific deployment mechanisms like viruses, worms, botnets,
and distributed denial-of-service attacks in this context. After framing the problem
definition in this manner, we will seek to determine its consequences within the
framework of our political architecture and ascertain the extent to which the U.S.
government has the governing authority to create effective cybersecurity policies.
Second, we will examine the policymaking process that led to the primary
document currently guiding U.S. national cybersecurity policy - the Bush
Administration’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (NSSC). This process will be
characterized as open, but flawed. Under the Bush Administration, and with Richard
Clarke as the central guiding figure, a Presidential advisory board was established and
released 53 questions to the public for comment. The Board then drafted an initial
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proposal which was discussed in numerous town hall meetings across the country,
ultimately leading to the final draft version of the policy. This process, while open to the
public, was heavily influenced at every stage by large private corporations.
Third, we will perform a detailed analysis of the policy design behind the
National Strategy. The policy design of this document is important in its implicit
recognition of all four layers in our conceptual framework. It calls for enhancing the
protection of the nation’s critical cyber assets by bolstering the defenses of the physical
infrastructure, and directly references how this can be achieved through designing more
secure technical standards and protocols, promoting more secure software application
development in the private commercial sector, and by patrolling Web content. It is here
where we will also test the hypothesis that the policy’s failures are attributable to a design
which relies too heavily on voluntary public-private partnerships.
Fourth, we will study the policy’s implementation. From the outset, the federal
government came under heavy criticism for failing to allocate enough resources to the
problem and for not going beyond the voluntary public-private measures prescribed by
the National Strategy. Implementation was clearly hindered by, initially, this lack of
adequate resources as well as by a high turnover rate at the top levels of the newlycreated Executive bureaucracy - the Department of Homeland Security's National Cyber
Security Division (NCSD). Subsequently, implementation was made even more
problematic by confusion stemming from organizational conflict among numerous
federal agencies, competing vigorously for authority.
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This characterization remains largely in place, thus we will next seek to clarify the
current bureaucratic regime governing U.S. national cybersecurity policy in the Obama
Administration. As will be explained, this regime, which had been headed by the NCSD
division within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), first experienced a
weakening of its authority when its primary role came into conflict with that of the
newly-created National Cyber Security Center (NCSC). Under the Obama
Administration, the National Strategy has remained the seminal policy document on the
issue and has already exhibited signs of becoming path dependent. The NCSD has found
itself competing intensely to retain its governing authority with the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the National Security Agency (NSA), and particularly the military’s
CYBERCOM command center. Meanwhile, in Congress, the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the House Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the House Homeland Security Committee have become leading actors
on the issue.
Finally, after applying our four-layer model to the analyzing the problem
definition, policymaking process, policy design, and policy implementation, we will then
attempt to tie all of this together by examining cybersecurity policy in action – namely,
what actually happens in the face of a cyberattack. This analysis will provide evidence of
three key points that, we argue, can be applied to other Internet issue areas as well: first,
the centrality of the private sector, particularly in preventing attacks; second, the reliance
on software applications and technical protocols both in prevention and response,
particularly network-monitoring tools and specific anti-virus (and other software)
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products; and third, that the federal government’s role is relegated primarily to being a
coordinator among the numerous private actors identified in our political architecture of
the Internet, each possessing a level of governing authority in their own right.
In this manner, as we shall see, the four-layer model assists in conceptualizing
both the problems associated with cybersecurity threats as well as the policies that have
been designed and implemented to face them. Our argument is that U.S. national
cybersecurity policy’s overriding design and policymaking process are indeed reflective
of how all four conceptual layers are important in their own right, and that this confirms
the utility of the four-layer model in general. Additionally, in refuting the hypothesis
under examination, we will argue that the acknowledged failures of U.S. cybersecurity
policy have more to do with an implementation process characterized by organizational
turmoil within the Executive Branch of the federal government than with a flawed policy
design or policymaking process – and, in fact, this only serves to reinforce our argument
that government alone does not have adequate governing authority to achieve their
desired outcomes. Finally, in addressing this common critique of the policy – that it
relies too heavily on public-private partnerships – we will assert that this is not so much a
policy preference or design choice, but a matter of necessity; a recognition of the
Internet’s decentralized reality where numerous governing actors have authority at
different layers. Thus, the lessons of U.S. national cybersecurity policy reaffirm that, on
the Internet, political objectives are most attainable by targeting policies at the layer most
appropriate for specific problems, or by targeting one layer in order to intentionally
produce cascading effects at another layer entirely.

181
Part I. Problem Definition: How to Defend the Nation’s Critical Cyber Assets from
Attack?

What problem is U.S. cybersecurity policy meant to address? To use John W.
Kingdon’s vocabulary, public policy is created in response to a specific need, or a
“problem stream”.241 In the case of cybersecurity policy, the problem stream exists in the
form of digital threats to the nation's critical cyber assets – and in the context of our fourlayer model, this means threats to the Internet’s physical infrastructure, security
vulnerabilities in widely used web software applications, and destructive attacks on the
Web’s content.
There is a litany of terms referring to cybersecurity threats like hacking, cracking,
cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare that are often thrown around and used interchangeably.
From a security perspective, that is a mistake. There are fundamental differences
between the various forms of online threats and activities that have emerged, and these
distinctions must be made explicit if public policies are to address their associated
security challenges.
In practical terms, the greatest cybersecurity threat, or nightmare scenario, facing
Homeland Security officials is one where core industrial systems are infiltrated and taken
over. The attacker could then wreak havoc over the systems being managed, like a city's
water supply, or sensitive data could be stolen. These are Infrastructure-layer threats,
deployed by code.
The dangers of this type of threat became clearly apparent when, in 2009, a
teenage computer programmer named John Matherly launched a search engine called
Shodan that mapped and captured the technical specifications of devices linked to the
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Internet. Shodan unexpectedly revealed countless numbers of industrial control
computers - the systems that automate such things as water plants and power grids - and
many were found to be wide open to exploitation by even moderately talented hackers.
In various examples, one hacker broke into a water plant south of Houston using a default
password he found in a user manual, another Shodan user accessed the cyclotron - a
nuclear particle accelerator - at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and another
discovered thousands of unsecured Cisco routers across the Internet which direct data
traffic on the networks.242
Disabling core infrastructural components like water supply systems, electrical
power grids, or air traffic control systems are deemed as perhaps the single greatest
cybersecurity threat. However, the threat of cyberwarfare does indeed work both ways.
In 2010, the Stuxnet computer worm managed to infiltrate a number of Iranian nuclear
facilities, ultimately destroying nearly 1,000 out of Iran's 6,000 centrifuges. In 2012,
U.S. officials admitted that Stuxnet was the product of U.S. and Israeli experts, and that
the attack proceeded as the result of the secret orders issued by President Obama.243
Beyond the Infrastructure, there is a significant threat occurring at the
Applications layer as well. There are security vulnerabilities in widely used web
application software on both the client- and server-sides. For example, information
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security training firm SANS issues regular reports on existing vulnerabilities in
everything from web browsers, office software, and email clients to Content Management
Systems (CMS) and custom-built web application software for businesses. In one
analysis, from November 2006 through October 2007, it discovered 4396 security
vulnerabilities identified in web application software alone.244
Finally, there also exists a threat at the Content layer. Destructive attacks on Web
content often occur which either deface websites or take them offline completely. For
instance, in August 2011, the Hong Kong stock exchange, the fifth-largest in the world,
was the victim of a cyberattack as its web page that publishes important announcements
from the market's largest players was taken offline. As a result, trading in the shares of
seven companies, including HSBC, Cathay Pacific, China Power International and
associated derivatives, had to be suspended. The site stayed offline for a further day, and
trading in the dependent positions was also suspended. Another example occurred in
2011 when the hacker collective known as Anonymous, as a show of support for the
Occupy Wall Street Movement, launched a coordinated attack that shut down the
Oakland Police Department's website the same day that organized protests in Oakland
were set to occur, and confidential police data was published on the Web.245
These are the main substantive threats that U.S. national cybersecurity policy is
designed to address. Our four-layer model not only assists in clarifying the nature of
these threats, but also provides insight as to who are the best positioned actors with
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governing authority at each layer that can create and implement meaningful cyber
defenses.
In order to more clearly conceptualize the various types of cybersecurity threats, it
is necessary to break down the categorical mechanisms that occur at each layer.
Understanding these mechanisms is a process that is again aided by use of our four-layer
model: cyberterrorism relates primarily to the Infrastructure layer, cracktivism and
cyberwarfare to the Applications layer, and hacktivism, being only sometimes
threatening, and even then, viewed as far less critical, relating to the Content layer.
Cyberterrorism refers to the use of the Internet in assisting terrorist attacks
occurring in the physical world. These attacks are directed at targets in real-space, and
thus should be appropriately classified as Internet-enhanced, rather-than Internet-based.
Cyberterrorism typically targets the Internet’s Infrastructure layer and makes use of its
costless global communication capacity, coupled with the relative ease of ensuring
anonymity and providing difficulty in locating the origin of messages delivered, in
facilitating terrorist actions that have outright destruction of their targets as their primary
objective.
Examples of how cyberterrorists utilize the Internet for such activities include the
recruitment of new members, collaboration with fellow conspirators in planning terrorist
actions, and penetrating electronic systems to destroy real-space targets, such as breaking
into an air traffic control system in order to make two planes collide, or to shut down
emergency 911 services246. The Al-Qaeda terrorists who launched the September 11th
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attacks used the Internet to collect information on flight times, to share information and
coordinate their attacks amongst numerous terrorist cells, and to steal Social Security
numbers and obtain fake driver’s licenses. The terrorists accomplished much of this by
using the Internet in public places and sent messages via public email.247
The Internet certainly provides cyberterrorists with several advantages over their
counterparts who are not Internet-enabled. Such advantages include a greater chance of
ensuring anonymity through the use of proxy servers and IP/subnet masking, and, in fact,
software is readily available to assist in providing anonymity to users. The Anonymizer
and the Freedom Internet Security package are examples of software products sold to the
general public along with a litany of rival packages including Anonymous Surfing, Net
Shield, Total Privacy Suite, the Digital Shredder, and Freedom WebSecure.
There are tremendous difficulties for governments seeking to regulate such
anonymity software when examined through the lens of our four-layer model. Such
software exists at the Applications layer, meaning that virtually any computer
programmer can write the code for such anonymity software, and governments’ only
authority stems from their territorial jurisdiction over the software developers’ physical
location. However, even when that location is established, governments still encounter
difficulties in regulation due to that fact that most of this software is primarily geared
towards ensuring privacy from commercial spyware and from the potentially prying eyes
of network administrators or Internet Service Providers (ISPs) engaging in undesired, and
perhaps even unlawful, surveillance – thus the software often has very legitimate and
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legal uses. Regulation of anonymity software also encounters vast opposition from civil
libertarian groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) who argue that the right
to individual privacy cannot be abridged without just cause and after proceeding through
the proper legal channels – a process which may often require court orders, subpoenas,
and other legal devices, considered vital to preventing unwarranted corporate or
government intrusion.
In addition to anonymity, cyberterrorists have the added advantage of global
instantaneous reach; and again, determining the physical locations where messages
originate makes policing cyberterrorist communications highly problematic.248 The
Internet as a global communications medium enables the costless mass dissemination of
such communications, and the forums being utilized, even when discovered and shut
down, are typically mirrored on servers that reside in multiple countries around the
world. Mirrored forums create a whack-a-mole regulatory environment where, even
when law enforcement succeeds in discovery, the total shutdown of a cyberterrorist
communications network is virtually impossible because immediately after a forum is
taken offline, users simply redirect to one of its mirrored sites.
Cyberterrorists also have an advantage in their use of steganography – the practice
of disguising messages within digital images. For instance, a digital image of a sailboat
might contain a micro-image of a map that would only be visible if someone knew to
look for it, or a digital song file might contain blueprints of a targeted building.249 Such
steganographical measures not only render the secretive content of messages largely
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undetectable by data mining software filters, but also are easily accessible through
common commercial software applications – meaning that having a working knowledge
of computer programming is not a prerequisite.
Meanwhile, hacktivism refers to computer hacking for political purposes.
Narrowly defined, this refers to using programming and inter-networking technologies to
disrupt the electronic activities of its targets which exist primarily in cyberspace. As a
result, it is most appropriately classified as occurring at the Internet’s Application and
Content layers.
Hacktivism is based on the original meaning of the term “hacking”, made famous
during the 1970s in the context of telephony, which is to create a clever or quick solution
to a problem which works outside of the generally accepted norms of the environment.
To hack something is not necessarily nefarious; it is simply to use a technology for a
purpose other than for which it was originally intended. The common use of the term in
popular parlance, such as “My computer was hacked and my credit card number was
stolen”, is mislabeled as hacktivism. As will soon be explained, the destructive act of
breaking into a computer or network for criminal purposes is actually computer cracking,
not hacking. Hacktivism does not actually seek to steal from or destroy its cybertarget.
In a political context, disruption, not destruction, is its primary motive with its ultimate
goal being to attract attention to specific issues.
For example, hacktivists have launched “Google bombs” in every presidential
election cycle since 2004. This refers to computer programmers gaming Google’s search
algorithm so that, for instance, when a user searched for the phrase “miserable failure”,
the top result displayed a link to President George W. Bush. Hacktivists were able to
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accomplish this, not by cracking into Google’s servers and stealing or destroying content,
but simply by learning how Google’s search algorithm functioned - ranking its results in
a certain order based on the number of external links to a website. As a result, hacktivists
were able to recruit enough links to selected pages about President Bush, all
incorporating the phrase “miserable failure”, so that once enough external links were
created, Google’s algorithm ranked it accordingly and directed users to the biography of
the President on the official White House website.250
Other examples of Google bombs include when, in 2008, a search for either
“failure” or “cheerful achievement” both produced results to Barack Obama251, while a
search for “John McCain” produced stories about the Senator’s filibustering of a
minimum-wage hike.252 Also, in 2012, another Google bomb was launched directing
searches for “completely wrong” to multiple photos of Mitt Romney.253
Using the same logic, “Twitter bombs” have developed more recently where
hacktivists seek to hijack the hashtags of their political adversaries. For example, in
2008, a Republican-leaning organization calling itself the "Don't Go Movement", whose
mission was to persuade Congress to stay in Washington, and not go on summer recess,
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until a solution for the U.S. energy crisis was found, called on Twitter supporters to
include the "#DontGo" hashtag in all of their posts. Overnight, "#DontGo" became the
top trending topic on the entire site. However, not to be outdone, Democratic-leaning
hacktivists, dismayed at #DontGo's success, began an organized effort to pollute the
Twitter stream. In other words, critics of the #DontGo Movement were being encouraged
to also include the #DontGo hashtag in their own posts, that way when people searched
Twitter, more critical posts would be displayed.254
Another example of hacktivism is an “edit war” that occurs between competing
parties when they publicly use open comment-based systems to disseminate their views.
One such example of an edit war occurred in 2008 when members of the group selflabeled “Anonymous” launched a campaign to write reviews of L. Ron Hubbard’s book,
“Dianetics” – the foundation of the Church of Scientology – on its Amazon.com website.
Most of the reviews were decidedly negative and many did not even address the book,
but rather criticized the Scientology movement in general. Scientologists responded by
using the same comment-space to rebuke those criticisms, and this back-and-forth edit
war ensued until Amazon was forced to remove nearly all of the comments for an
indefinite amount of time255.
There was also the edit war that occurred on Wikipedia over its entry on the 1948
Arab-Israeli War. A pro-Israel group, the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East
Reporting in America (CAMERA) publicly called for volunteers to edit Wikipedia
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entries that displayed “notable bias” on the subjects of the 1948 war and Israeli
Independence. In response, a Palestinian aggregator called the Electronic Intifada
exposed the initiative, encouraging its supporters to also volunteer as editors to “ensure
that these articles are free of bias and error”. The result was that the published entries
displayed very different information based solely on who was the last editor to revise
them.256
Additional examples of hacktivism include the reporting of liberal or conservative
blogs to various ISPs and website operators as spam; also, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation’s development of its Tor network, and the setting up of proxy servers in
general, to remotely assist democratic activists in China or Iran.
There are other, more classic examples of hacktivism with relatively established
and long-standing histories. These include various forms of electronic civil disobedience,
notably website black-outs and virtual sit-ins.
One of the earliest cases of hacktivism was the “Turn the Web Black” protest,
also termed “Black Thursday”, which occurred on February 1, 1996 when a large number
of websites changed their background color to black for 48 hours in an effort to raise
public awareness about the Communications Decency Act, and to what participants
argued was the Act’s infringement on free speech. 257 An electronic alert was circulated
via email distribution lists and electronic discussion boards to spread by word-of-mouth
the plan for this blackout. While certainly the group known as the Voters
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Telecommunications Watch played a crucial initial role in formulating the planned action
and drafting the electronic alert, what occurred thereafter was a decentralized method of
bringing about collective action, achieved at the grassroots level. This might
appropriately be described as a digital viral marketing strategy applied to protest
coordination. Thousands of websites participated, and the event captured the attention of
such traditional news media outlets as the New York Times and CNN258.
The case of the “Turn the Web Black” protest also holds immense significance in
that it represents hacktivism where the principle recruitment target was not the mass
public, but rather a narrow base of computer programmers and website operators.
Confirming our political architecture at the Applications layer, this was an
acknowledgement that only website operators would have, first, the authority to alter the
design of their websites, and second, the technological capability to do so. Thus, the
protest’s call for participants was not necessarily directed at all individuals making up the
mass public to contribute, but rather only to the select group of website operators in
control of the code behind websites – a relatively small percentage of the public,
particularly in 1996.
A more recent example of hacktivism involved the website Wikileaks. In
November 2010, approximately 250,000 classified documents from the U.S. State
Department were posted on Wikileaks – a website self-described to be a safe haven for
whistle-blowers with its stated purpose being to expose corruption in both the
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government and the private sector259. Immediately upon these documents being released,
it became clear that the individual who leaked them committed a criminal act according
to U.S. law, however what was less clear was whether Wikileaks, the website, had
actually broken the law, playing no role other than hosting the materials, acting solely as
a forum where someone else posted content - a characterization which U.S. courts have
often recognized as within the legal realm260. Wikileaks, in this way, is an example of a
hacktivist website, pursuing political aims (the exposition of corruption) by utilizing
Internet technology in a novel way - its legal status being hazy, at best, and disruption
being the primary motivator rather than destruction.
Electronic civil disobedience has occurred as both a stand-alone activity and also
a joint venture with real-space protests. Stand-alone hacktivism occurs when a collection
of individuals in cyberspace perpetuate some action against a target which also resides in
cyberspace. An early prominent example of such stand-alone hacktivism would be the
virtual sit-in organized by the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) in support of the
Zapatista movement in Chiapas against the Mexican government261. In order to show
their opposition to the actions of the Mexican government, the EDT created a virtual sitin software tool called FloodNet, whose purpose was to temporarily prevent Internet
users from accessing the Mexican government’s website by means of flooding – in this
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case, directing thousands of “hits” by protest participants at the website until the web
server would be unable to handle any more.
While certainly the Zapatista rebels exist in real-space, it is of great significance
that the EDT acted independently and did not consult with either the Mexican
government or the Zapatistas themselves. The EDT’s virtual sit-in was a cyberaction
directed exclusively at a cybertarget. In fact, if you had no Internet access, then there
would have been no way to ascertain that a protest even occurred.
Electronic civil disobedience has also taken the form of being part of a joint
venture with real-space protests - in other words, hacktivism coordinated in conjunction
with real-space activism. Perhaps the most famous early example is the 1999 virtual sitin that coincided with the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle.
Organized by the Electrohippies Collective, it was intended to flood the WTO’s web
servers simultaneously with the massive street protests262. This joint-venture style of
hacktivism, where cyberaction is only one element in a larger, more coordinated protest
strategy, is designed to allow supporters of a cause who physically cannot attend a streetbased protest to still contribute and make their presence felt through alternative means.
In this sense, hacktivism enables mass mobilization and collective action, overcoming the
traditional barrier of geography.
While this joint-venture approach to hacktivism contextualizes it as having a
noticeable impact towards a larger social protest, it fails to adequately address hacktivism
as the social movement. Its proponents argue that technology and the Internet are more
than simply new tools for protest movements; they are fundamentally a new type of
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movement. Contrary to a cyberactivist model, whereby the Internet is simply a means of
better organizing collective actions through interactive communication technologies, the
true power of hacktivism lies in the fact that, in cyberspace, mass mobilization need not
even be vitally necessary for the furthering of protest movement objectives, so long as
electronic disruption can be achieved through programmed automation.
That aside, again, the overriding goal of hacktivism is to temporarily disrupt - not
destroy - the digital activities of its target in order to disseminate one’s views and bring
attention to an issue. It is ultimately a form of protest, and, as such, hacktivism is not a
primary threat to national cybersecurity, and, as we shall see, the National Strategy policy
document bears that out, except in cases when the hacktivist is disrupting online activities
that are deemed “critical” to national security or in a manner deemed threatening enough
to warrant a strong defense.
While hacktivism is not necessarily a primary threat to national cybersecurity,
cracktivism most certainly is. Cracktivism refers to activities which seek the willful
destruction of cybertargets. This can be any unauthorized intrusion, defacement, or act of
causing intentional damage using internetworked technologies and other electronic
means. Furthermore, cracktivist activities are generally illegal. Many acts of cracktivism
are often mistaken as hacktivism, such as the releasing of viruses or worms, however
these actions are not so much seeking to further the political goals of a broader movement
as they are to destroying their targets altogether. Cracktivism is clearly one of the largest
threats that national cybersecurity policy is meant to address.
The most common forms of cracktivism come in the form of computer viruses,
worms, trojan horses and other malicious code attacks. It is through computer cracking

195
that some also aim to break into secure systems with the intent of stealing vital
information or outright destroying it, and these unauthorized intrusions are particularly
problematic in an Internet environment where attacks can more easily be carried out
remotely.
Cracktivism was evident in the 2006 uproar over cartoons published in a Danish
newspaper depicting the Prophet Mohammed. As mass protests in the Arab world took
place over the cartoons, a “cyber-jihad” simultaneously occurred, whereby more than
1,000 Danish, Israeli, and European websites were defaced or completely shut down by
Islamic cracktivists263. In retaliation, several pro-Western and pro-American cracktivist
groups, such as the Freedom Cyber Force Militia, defaced prominent Arabic websites
including al-Jazeera, hijacking their domain name and redirecting users to different
servers264. This quickly escalated into a cyberwar between cracktivists on both sides.
The ongoing cyberwar between Israeli and Arab programmers also holds many
examples of cracktivism. Throughout the conflict, both sides have engaged in willfully
destructive activities, notably website defacements, e-mail bombs, and ping storms. For
example, an Israeli teenage cracktivist successfully spread a virus through an Iraqi
government website during the reign of Saddam Hussein, locating the web server with
the assistance of special software tools, and then including a virus in an email attachment
for Iraqi officials to open265. Additionally, pro-Palestinian attack sites began publicly
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distributing the Melissa and Loveletter viruses, as well as various Word macro viruses,
for use against Israeli sites in 2001. This marked one of the first confirmed uses of
distributed viruses being part of a larger coordinated attack strategy used in a
cyberconflict266.
Another example of cracktivism is the case where three teenagers broke into the
computer systems of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Bombay in
response to the country's nuclear weapons tests. They defaced the research center’s home
page, claimed to have stolen email messages exchanged by the nuclear scientists from the
center’s servers, and actually erased data pertaining to the nation’s nuclear weapons
programs267.
To be clear, this type of activity is not hacktivism, properly defined. When
dealing with disrupting the activity of a cybertarget through electronic means, the
fundamental difference must again be stated – that hacktivism seeks to disrupt its targets’
activities in order to bring attention to the political goals of its broader movement,
affecting changes in policy, whether public or private. Cracktivism, however, while
sometimes motivated by political goals, seeks to destroy its cybertarget and willfully
cause damage through illicit means. As a result, acts of cracktivism often prove
counterproductive (assuming there was a true political motive in the first place) insofar as
the targets respond by denouncing the actions and actors involved as illegitimate,
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soliciting a decidedly negative reaction from observers, and drawing attention away from
any political goals of the cracktivist and instead towards the illegal action itself.
Finally, cyberwarfare refers to the deployment of digital attack technologies by
one governmental entity against another, or against an enemy of that government. Often,
cracktivism makes up the major component in cyberwarfare strategies, however, rather
than the aforementioned examples of cracktivism being on behalf of one group or
individual against another, cyberwarfare involves similar attacks but on behalf of one
government against another, often implemented by formal military units. Clearly, this is
another primary threat that U.S. national cybersecurity policy is designed to address.
Cyberwarfare incidents, like cases of cracktivism, occur mostly at the
Applications and Content layers. Such incidents have strikingly risen and become more
prominent over the past decade. There was a cyberwar between Russia and Estonia in
2007 where the Estonian authorities removed a statue of a World War II-era Soviet
soldier, prompting ethnic Russians - and allegedly the Russian government itself – to
attack Estonian cybertargets including nearly "shutting down the country’s digital
infrastructure, clogging the Web sites of the president, the prime minister, Parliament and
other government agencies, staggering Estonia’s biggest bank and overwhelming the sites
of several daily newspapers"268. The Russians did all of this, not by "hacking" into
Estonian computer systems the way the mainstream public often misuses the term, but by
launching distributed-denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks. Basically, software bots turned
computers around the world into "zombies" that sent and requested so much data from
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Estonian servers that they became overloaded and shut down from not being able to
handle all of the traffic.
Another cyberwar is ongoing between the U.S. and Al-Qaeda. The New York
Times reported in 2008 that “to counter efforts by terrorists to plot attacks, raise money
and recruit new members on the Internet, the government has mounted a secret campaign
to plant bogus e-mail messages and website postings, with the intent to sow confusion,
dissent and distrust among militant organizations, officials confirm."269
Meanwhile, there is much evidence to suggest that China is actively engaged in a
cyberwar with the U.S. as well. In 2008, the Defense Department cited numerous
successful attacks in the previous year originating in China, including shutting down
Homeland Security networks and hacking into the Pentagon email system used by the
offices of Defense Secretary Robert Gates270. Additionally, in December 2009, reports
surfaced that a sophisticated cyberattack against Google and 30 other U.S. companies
was traced back to “a single foreign entity consisting either of agents of the Chinese state
or proxies thereof"271. More recently, in February 2013, evidence was gathered linking
an “overwhelming percentage” of attacks on American corporations, organizations, and
government agencies from originating within a single 12-story office tower on Datong
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Road off the outskirts of Shanghai - which is the headquarters of the People’s Liberation
Army’s Unit 61398.272
There is a related security challenge that cyberwarfare highlights: that a continual
build-up in ever-more effective cyberattacks and cyberdefensive countermeasures
inevitably leads to, what can best be conceptualized as, a cyber arms race. Escalating
cyber arms races, occurring at the Applications layer, shift the balance of power heavily
towards computer programmers, as the cyberwar becomes truly a conflict between
competing software tools and programming expertise on the two sides.
In response to the acknowledged threats posed by the digital arms races stemming
from cyberwarfare, the U.S. and Russian governments have held discussions on
mitigating potential effects. In 2009, it was reported that Russia favored an international
treaty along the lines of those negotiated for chemical weapons, essentially looking to ban
offensive weapons and tactics. On the other hand, the U.S. instead advocated for
improved cooperation among international law enforcement groups, basically trying to
formalize the criminalization of such acts through legal channels273.
In summary, there are three primary threats which U.S national cybersecurity
policy is designed to address: cyberterrorism, cracktivism, and cyberwarfare - with a
fourth, hacktivism, only sometimes threatening, and even then, viewed as far less critical.
As with all typologies, these categories of cybersecurity threats are not always mutually
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exclusive. Cases will inevitably arise with certain characteristics which may fall into
more than one category or none at all. Denial-of-Service attacks, for example, are
sometimes relatively harmless cases of hacktivism, and sometimes immensely damaging
cases of cracktivism – depending on the level of disruption or destruction they intend to
produce. This typology is, therefore, not intended to be mutually exclusive, but rather to
serve as a general categorization of the cyber threats that national policy is intended to
defend against, in an attempt to conceptualize the cybersecurity problem stream within
the context of our four-layer model.
With that typology established, we can further break down specific cybersecurity
threats according to their particular attack mechanisms. Cyberterrorists, cracktivists, and
agents of cyberwarfare all seek to achieve their objectives through three primary means:
Malicious Code, Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks, and Unauthorized Access.
National cybersecurity policy is geared towards defending critical assets against these
potentially destructive forces.
Malicious code attacks refer to viruses, worms, trojan horses, or other code-based
malicious entities that infect a host. This is a threat almost completely occurring at the
two code layers of the Internet – the Protocols and Applications layers. As such,
prevention and response policies are also heavily geared towards technical solutions.
Viruses are the best known type of malicious code attack, and they come in many
forms: file infector viruses, boot sector viruses, and macro viruses. All are designed to
infect a host computer by inserting itself into another program with the intention to
“destroy data, run destructive or intrusive programs, or otherwise compromise the
security or the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the victim’s data, applications,
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or operating system”. All of this is generally executed without the system user's
knowledge.274
Worms are another form of malicious code attack. Similar to viruses, they are
self-replicating and self-propagating, with the major difference being that they do not
require a host program to infect a victim, but rather they are self-contained. They can
execute themselves without the trigger of a user intervention.
Trojan horses are non-self-replicating programs that appear to be benign but
actually have a hidden malicious purpose like replacing existing files or else adding new
applications without altering existing files. Because of their benign appearance, trojan
horses are often very difficult to detect.
Mobile code attacks are those that are transmitted from a remote system to be
executed on a local system, and have become popularized because web browsers and
email clients often grant default privileges to legitimate mobile code applications, thus
making their exploitation fairly simple. Mobile code attacks can be carried out through
such benign programming languages as Java, ActiveX, Javascript, and Vbscript – all of
which are common and accepted technologies permitted on the most pervasive web
browsers.
Botnets refer to a collection of compromised computers (also known as “zombie
computers”) running software that a botnet's originator (a.k.a. - the “bot herder” or "bot
master") can control remotely, usually for nefarious purposes. These botnet armies can
lie dormant for extended periods of time, constantly growing in number, until
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programmed to carry out an action simultaneously and with all machines working in
conjunction with one another.
Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks refer to remote attempts to prevent or impair the
use of networks, systems, or applications by exhausting computing resources. Reflector
attacks, Amplifier attacks, and Synfloods are all types of DOS attacks. The central idea
is that by sending too much traffic to a specific website or other target, their resources
will be overwhelmed and thus become unavailable, if not shut down entirely. DOS
attacks have become increasingly severe, threatening significant network disruptions and
major financial loss. No organization can completely protect itself from DOS attacks
insofar as they can't necessarily limit how many people attempt to visit their public
website (nor do they typically want to).
Finally, unauthorized access is what occurs when a person gains logical or
physical access without permission to a network, system, application, data, or other
resource. It is usually acquired through exploiting software code vulnerabilities,
obtaining passwords, or social engineering. Different from the other threat types,
attackers will typically engage in multiple stages of reconnaissance activities in order to
map networks, identify hosts, determine what software is running, and discover what
vulnerabilities exist; and only then will the most damaging actions be attempted.
Thus, defining the problem which national cybersecurity policy is meant to
address can be broken down accordingly. The single generalized problem is protecting
the nation’s critical cyber assets from attack. However, as we have demonstrated, that
broad definition encompasses numerous categories of attacks, often with different goals
underlying them, and occurring at different layers. Hence, we have developed a typology
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whereby the categorical threats of cyberterrorism, hacktivism, cracktivism, and
cyberwarfare are all made distinct, and their corresponding specific attack mechanisms
are placed in this context. With the problem stream established, it is now possible to
more effectively analyze the actual policy at the heart of the U.S. cybersecurity – the
Bush Administration’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
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The Policy Problem Stream
Layer-specific Threats

Categorical Mechanisms Specific Mechanisms

Infrastructure
 Destruction of physical
infrastructure; Hijacking of
industrial control systems

Cyberterrorism
Hacktivism
Cracktivism

Applications
 Stolen data; Network devices
being disabled or hijacked
Content
 Defacement of websites;
Websites being taken offline
completely

Cyberwarfare

Malicious Code
 Viruses
◦ File infector viruses
◦ Boot sector viruses
◦ Macro viruses
 Worms
 Trojan horses
 Mobile code
 Botnets
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks
 Reflector attacks
 Amplifier attacks
 Synfloods
Unauthorized Access
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Part II. The Policymaking Process and Policy Design Behind the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace (NSSC)








Pre-9/11 History
Executive Order creating the CIPB
53 Questions
Public Comments
Draft version of the Policy
Town Hall Meetings
Final version of the Policy
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, President George

W. Bush initiated the process for formulating what would eventually become known as
the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the most comprehensive and ambitious
federal policy to-date in addressing the challenge of protecting the nation’s critical cyber
assets from attack.
The policy was ambitious, and considered by the Administration to be an
expansive evolution of “the first attempt by any national government to design a way to
protect its cyberspace”. The policymaking process can be characterized as open, but
flawed. A presidential advisory board released 53 questions to the public for comment,
then drafted an initial proposal which was discussed in several town hall meetings across
the country, ultimately leading to the final version of the policy - the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace document.
This policymaking process was heavily influenced at every stage by large private
corporations and, from the outset, its policy design came under heavy criticism for
relying on a strictly voluntary public-private approach We will argue that its
implementation was greatly hindered by the federal government’s failure to allocate
enough resources to the problem, by a high turnover rate of top officials within the newly
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created Executive bureaucracy in its early years, and by organizational conflict between
competing federal agencies in subsequent years. Ultimately, by analyzing the policy
through the lens of our four-layer model, we will argue that its central problem lies, not
with its policy design, but with its implementation.
The following is the story behind the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.

As we previously detailed in our historical narrative, while the Internet dates back
to the 1950s as a Cold War product of the U.S. Defense Department, it wasn’t until the
popularization of the World Wide Web in 1993 that scholars mark a turning point in the
Internet’s significance to the global culture and economy. Similarly, while U.S.
cybersecurity policy has origins that span several decades, it wasn’t until the focusing
event of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 that the issue of a national
cybersecurity policy proportionally grew in relevance and visibility.
Certainly, it is instructive to briefly examine the federal government’s history of
taking protective cybersecurity measures that precede the main focusing event of the
September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, for it illustrates the policy context in which the
National Strategy ultimately came about; for it certainly was not wrought in a vacuum.
In the aftermath of the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, President Bill Clinton, having heightened concerns over the security of
other important facilities and national landmarks, established the President’s Commission
on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in 1996. The Commission then surprised
many observers by generating a report titled, “Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s
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Infrastructures”275, that “did not focus on the vulnerability of key buildings around the
country but instead on the security problems in the new phenomenon of cyberspace”276.
The PCCIP would lead to Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) in May
1998, which stressed the fundamental importance of cooperation between the government
and the private sector, explicitly noting that this is necessary because “nearly 90% of [the
nation’s vital information networks] are privately owned and operated”277. This is
significant for two reasons – first, it signals the earliest indicator of the federal
government’s acknowledgement that cybersecurity policy be necessarily focused heavily
on private sector cooperation, rather than direct regulation, due to the Internet’s
decentralization of governing authority at different layers; and second, the PCCIP would
later evolve into the Bush Administration’s PCIPB (President’s Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board) which would directly author the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace policy.
In 1997, the Pentagon ran an exercise called Eligible Receiver under joint White
House and Defense Department supervision with the purpose of attempting to probe the
Defense Department’s networks from the Internet, “without the benefit of any insider
knowledge”. The team running the exercise wanted to prove that even the Pentagon was
vulnerable to attack by gaining unauthorized access to their network, only within two
days they gained access all the way into the Joint Chiefs’ command system and they
275

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting
America’s Infrastructures (October 1997). Retrieved on November 11, 2008 from
<http://chnm.gmu.edu/cipdigitalarchive/files/5_CriticalFoundationsPCCIP.pdf>.
276

Richard A. Clarke, Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters
(New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2008) 289.
277

Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63): Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection (May 22,
1998). Retrieved on July 29, 2008 from <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/white_pr.htm>.

208
could alter messages going out from the Pentagon. The exercise was stopped
immediately and military departments were ordered to procure and install new intrusion
detection systems to detect possible intrusions into their networks that were not
authorized. They immediately showed that “thousands of attempted illegal penetrations
of DOD networks were going on every day”.278
In February 1998, amid fears that the “Y2K bug” could potentially cripple cyber
systems at the start of the new millennium, President Clinton appointed former Deputy
Budget Director John Koskinen to chair his Year 2000 Conversion Council. This council
centralized executive branch efforts to prepare government agencies for the Y2K date
rollover, but perhaps more significantly, the council also became the template for later
Executive branch efforts to centralize oversight of cybersecurity threats.279
In a case that the FBI named Solar Sunrise, the logistics systems at many Air
Force bases were penetrated during the same weekend that President Clinton ordered a
military deployment to the Arab Gulf in response to Iraq’s refusal to allow U.N. weapon
inspectors. While suspicions circulated that Iraq was engaging in cyberwarfare, the
unauthorized activity was actually traced by the FBI, with the help of several private
software firms, to three teenagers – two located in California, the other in Israel.280
In March 1998, another incident known as Moonlight Maze began whereby a
pattern arose of probing computer systems at the Pentagon, NASA, the Energy
Department, private universities, and research labs. Access had been gained to thousands
278

Clarke 292.

279

“Timeline: The U.S. Government and Cybersecurity,” Washington Post May 16, 2003. Retrieved on
June 12, 2008 from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A50606-2002Jun26&notFound=true>.
280

Clarke 292-293.

209
of files including “maps of military installations, troop configurations and military
hardware designs” over the course of two years. The Defense Department traced the
intrusions to a mainframe computer located within Russia, “but the sponsor of the attacks
is unknown and Russia denie[d] any involvement”.281
In May 1998, President Clinton also appointed Richard A. Clarke, a former staffer
at the National Security Council (NSC), as National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism282. Clarke would remain a top
counterterrorism and cybersecurity advisor to both President Clinton and President Bush
until January 2003, and would be the primary individual responsible for drafting the
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace policy.
In 2000, after the world transitioned through Y2K with no major disasters, Rep.
Stephen Horn (R-CA), chairman of a House Government Reform subcommittee,
officially changed the “Y2K Readiness Report Cards” he had been publishing quarterly
for federal agencies since 1996 into “Cybersecurity Readiness Report Cards”. Many
federal agencies continued to receive failing grades. After the Clinton Administration
dismantled the Y2K Center, some members of Congress began calling for the
appointment of a federal chief information officer – or “cybersecurity czar” – to oversee
privacy and security issues.283
Also, in January 2000, the Clinton Administration released a new national
cybersecurity strategy. Titled, The National Plan for Information Systems Protection,
this proposal focused on the federal government serving as a model of information
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security and for building public-private partnerships.284 The document, although billed
by the Administration as “the first attempt by any national government to design a way to
protect its cyberspace”, earned a “cool reception” from the private sector, which was left
out of much of the drafting process.285
The remainder of the year 2000 witnessed numerous Distributed Denial-ofService (DDoS) attacks and the outbreak of the “I Love You” computer virus, which
wrought havoc on government and commercial systems worldwide, even bringing down
several of the world’s largest and most popular portal and e-commerce websites.
Congressional hearings and legislative proposals immediately followed aimed at
enhancing the nation’s cybersecurity – both from public- and private-sector
perspectives.286
While the need for an effective national cybersecurity policy was already finding
its way gradually onto the national political agenda, all of these events would soon be
overshadowed by the central focusing event in American cybersecurity policy: the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush delivered a speech
to a joint-session of Congress that called for the creation of a new Cabinet-level agency
within the federal government – the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The
president charged the new Department with the responsibility of providing “the unifying
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core for the vast national network of organizations and institutions involved in efforts to
secure our nation.” 287
Within months of its creation, DHS, through Executive Order 13231 signed by the
president, set up the Critical Infrastructure Protection Board (CIPB), headed by the
president’s new top cybersecurity advisory Richard A. Clarke, in order to create a draft
version of a national cybersecurity policy. 288 The CIPB would be composed of senior
officials from more than 20 departments and agencies. Original plans called for the final
version to be released on September 19, 2002, complete with a presidential signing
ceremony at Stanford University amid technology icons like Microsoft chairman Bill
Gates, however the White House decided to hold back the final plan and push back the
release date.
Instead, the CIPB decided to release the draft version of the strategy for a fivemonth period of public comment, and ten town hall meetings were held around the nation
to gather further input.
This period of public comment was initiated by the CIPB issuing a document
titled, “53 Questions for Developing the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace”289. The
53 Questions were intended to initiate discussion and act as a jumping-off point for
public comments to be submitted, but they also serve to illustrate the Bush
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Administration’s early policy preferences, which would later appear in the final draft of
the NSSC.
For example, the 53 Questions are explicitly divided into 5 levels, or categories:
“the home user and small business”, “major enterprises”, “sectors of the national
information infrastructure”, “national level institutions and policies”, and “global”.
While each of these categories is provided with a range of issues that ought to be
addressed by the NSSC, the number of questions raised within each category clearly
demonstrates the Administration’s central focus. The home user and small businesses are
provided with a total of 5 questions, while major enterprises received 11, sectors of the
national information infrastructure received 24, national level institutions and policies
received 14, and, finally, the “global” category was addressed with a total of 2 questions.
These numbers are clear evidence of the Administration’s perception of the
cybersecurity dilemma, from the earliest stages of the policy process, as being one to be
handled primarily by major industries in the private sector and federal-level institutions.
Furthermore, the framing of the questions also reveals certain preconceived biases
as to how cybersecurity solutions ought to be formulated. For example, there are
numerous references to using market forces as an alternative to governmental regulation,
as well as a repeated emphasis on the private sector establishing “standards and best
practices”, and engaging in self-evaluation, training, reporting, information-sharing, and
outsourcing as a means for safeguarding systems. By contrast, only a relatively small
number of questions relate to governmental regulation or the creation of mandates, and
those that do only apply to the government’s own systems, not those of the private sector
or home user. In other words, the language of the 53 Questions direct the reader, and,
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ultimately, the public comments, in certain directions from the earliest stage of the policy
process.
Another noteworthy element of the 53 Questions is that all of the four conceptual
layers are at least minimally addressed. The Infrastructure layer is clearly the focus of
the document, however there are also questions related to the Protocol layer, – the 802.11
wireless standard, for example, - the distribution of software patches, which go directly to
the heart of the Applications layer, and finally, questions about adjusting liability laws
and criminal justice penalties which address the Content layer. However intentional or
unintentional this may be, the fact that all four of the conceptual layers are at least
somewhat addressed highlights an implicit understanding of their importance in
formulating comprehensive Internet public policies.
The CIPB also released a preliminary draft version of the National Strategy in
September 2002. As with the 53 Questions, this draft version was intended to act as a
jumping-off point and to stimulate public comments. It was signed by the Chair and Vice
Chair of the CIPB, Richard A. Clarke and Howard A. Schmidt.290
The draft version includes many of the elements and key strategies that would
make it into the final version of the NSSC, such as recognizing explicitly “the reality that
the Federal government alone cannot secure cyberspace” and that cybersecurity “depends
on a public-private partnership” where “everyone must act to secure their own parts of
cyberspace”.
The guiding policy principles are listed in the draft version as follows: 1)
embrace public-private partnerships, 2) avoid regulation, 3) safeguard civil liberties and
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privacy, 4) coordinate with Congress, and 5) cooperate with State and local governments.
Out of the over 20 agencies included in Executive Order 13231, the following are
designated as “lead agencies” for the protection of critical infrastructure: the Department
of Homeland Security, Treasury, Health and Human Services, Energy, the Environmental
Protection Agency, Agriculture, and Defense.
Thus, the draft version clearly reveals the Administration’s guiding policy design
principles, making them far more explicit in this draft version than in the 53 Questions,
where those principles were also evident, though unstated.
Additionally, as was also the case with the 53 Questions, a breakdown of its
content helps define the Administration’s central focus. The draft version uses the same
“5 levels” or categories of issues that ought to be addressed. Within each level, the draft
calls for specific recommendations, programs, and discussions, which are suggested in
the following quantities:

C
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s

Recommendations

Programs

Discussions

Home User &
Small Business

5

9

2

Major
Enterprises

7

5

4

19

15

9

Sectors of the
National
Information
Infrastructure
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National Level
Institutions &
Policies

49

0

28

Global

6

6

1

These numbers indicate that the draft version of the NSSC places a clear emphasis
on major sectors and federal-level institutions, with relatively little focus on the
individual home user or on adopting a global approach.
The main purpose of both the 53 Questions and the draft version of the NSSC was
to stimulate discussion and the submission of public comments to gather input for what
would ultimately lead to the final NSSC policy. After being drafted, both were made
accessible by being placed on web pages sponsored by government agencies,
associations, and private organizations.
The public comments themselves were submitted primarily by insiders within the
technology industry. Michael Rasmussen – V.P. for Standards and Public Policy at the
Information Systems Security Association – would later issue this description of DHS
summits:
You have a lot of IT vendors lobbying Capital Hill trying to
convince legislatures that security is completely technical
and what we need is more products… DHS and legislators
need to get more input from the people in the trenches. The
summit did reach out to many, but it was organized by the
high tech sector. I would have liked to have seen more enduser organization involvement. Particularly Chief
Information Security Officers or Chief Risk Officers.”291
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Likewise, another common criticism of the public commentary process was that
business lobbyists had undue influence, embodied in statements such as the following
one from the senior editor of About.com: “Clarke's task force quickly ran into opposition,
mostly from wealthy lobbyists representing communications, software, and security
companies, but also from (surprise!) the White House.”292
The town hall meetings, sponsored by the White House, were held in 10
metropolitan areas, and sought to solicit views from both the public and private sectors.
Individual sectors, such as higher education, state and local government, banking and
finance, etc., formed workgroups to create initial sector-specific cyberspace security
strategies. The town hall meetings occurred in Denver, CO, Portland, OR, Chicago, IL,
Atlanta, GA, and several other cities nationwide.
These town hall meetings often featured Richard Clarke as the principle speaker,
as was the case in San Diego, Denver, Washington DC, and Portland. In other cases,
Howard Schmidt (the CIPB Vice-Chair) was the principle speaker, such as at the
University of Pennsylvania.
Notifications of the town hall meetings were often sent out via email distribution
lists, and a public website was also established to disseminate the details of the meetings.
In addition, the Commerce Department’s Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
(CIAO) sponsored meetings with state and local government officials from several states,
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which included national-level conferences held in Austin, Texas and Princeton, New
Jersey in February 2002 and April 2002, respectively.293
It was at this time that the White House renamed the presidential advisory panel
formerly known as the CIPB as the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC)
which consisted of “leaders from the key sectors of the economy, government, and
academia”. The president’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
also reviewed and commented on the draft294.
Ultimately, after a year of research by businesses, universities, and government
officials, on February 14, 2003 the Department of Homeland Security unceremoniously
released the final version of the draft, titled The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
(NSSC).

In the political science literature, policy designs are characterized as significant
insofar as they create meaningful consequences for democracy.295 They are intentional
and purposive creations296, yet, once the guiding principles are put in place, they become
more acutely defined by accidents, external forces, and a highly iterative bureaucratic
process.297 Context is considered the single most important predictor of what type of
design will result. Policy designs are crafted in ways that are tailored to fit some
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conception of the situation, sometimes reflect multiple and conflicting values, and
typically have consequences for that context from which they emerged.298 As is the case
with the policy design of the NSSC, decision-making is an ongoing contextual process
determined by events “on the ground” as much as it is by one-off rational selections
between alternatives occurring early in the policy process.
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is an Executive report and a
component of the larger national strategy for homeland security. Its policy design calls
for government recommendations - not mandates - to be issued to businesses, individuals,
and government agencies to secure their own respective computer systems and private
networks. It relies on voluntary actions and public-private partnerships for
implementation.
The NSSC’s stated purpose is “to engage and empower Americans to secure the
portions of cyberspace that they own, operate, control, or with which they interact”. The
NSSC has three strategic objectives: first, to prevent cyber attacks against America’s
critical infrastructures; second, to reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks; and
third, to minimize damage and recovery time from cyber attacks that do occur.
Furthermore, the document lays out its six guiding principles: 1) to make
cybersecurity a national effort; 2) to protect the privacy and civil liberties of “consumers
and operators”; 3) that market forces, rather than direct federal regulation, are expected to
provide the major impetus of cybersecurity; 4) to bring these about through the
assignment of responsibilities and accountability to federal, state, and local government
agencies, as well as the private sector; 5) to ensure flexibility in the government’s ability

298

Schneider and Ingram 69.

219
to respond to cyber attacks and manage vulnerability reduction; and 6) to adopt multiyear plans for sustaining cybersecurity into the future.299
The government’s role in cybersecurity is made explicit. Implicitly
acknowledging the political architecture of governing authority that our four-layer model
produced, the policy states that:
“in general, the private sector is best equipped and
structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat…
externally, a government role in cyberspace is warranted in
cases where high transaction costs or legal barriers lead to
significant coordination problems, cases in which
governments operate in the absence of private sector forces,
resolution of incentive problems that lead to under
provisioning of critical shared resources, and raising
awareness.”
As a consequence, the NSSC focuses on public-private partnerships in order to
carry out its five national priorities. The first priority of the NSSC is to create a National
Cyberspace Security Response System which would perform analyses, issue warnings,
and coordinate response efforts. The plan emphasizes the accomplishment of these
objectives through “encouraging the development of private sector capability”, and such
a response system would be implemented through partnerships between government and
industry at the local, state, and federal levels separately to ensure the “health” of
cyberspace.
The second priority of the NSSC is to create a National Cyberspace Security
Threat and Vulnerability Reduction program to address weaknesses in technology and the
improper implementation and oversight of technological products. The power of law
enforcement agencies would be enhanced and a process would be created for
299
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vulnerability assessments. Additionally, the “mechanisms” of the Internet are to be
secured by improving protocols and routing, improving the security of the physical
telecommunications infrastructure, and by fostering the use of new digital control
systems and data acquisition systems – effectively giving more “supervisory control” to
law enforcement agencies over the Internet activities of users. This is a clear recognition
of the importance of both the Infrastructure and Protocol layers as they relate to
cybersecurity.
The third critical priority is to create a National Cyberspace Security Awareness
and Training Program to address security education for individual computer users, system
administrators, technology developers, and business executives. These goals would be
accomplished by empowering “all Americans to secure their own parts of cyberspace”,
the fostering of training and education programs, and the promotion of private sector
support for widely recognized professional cybersecurity certifications. Yet again, the
emphasis is placed on creating a public and private sector more capable of defending its
own cyber assets through voluntary incentives, rather than on direct governmental
defensive actions.
The fourth priority of the NSSC is securing governments’ own cyber spaces and
“leading by example” through various security initiatives in addition to the
encouragement of state and local governments to protect their critical infrastructures. It
recognizes that while governments administer only a miniscule portion of the nation’s
critical infrastructure computer systems, still governments at all levels perform essential
services in the fields of agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, and
many others, and that all rely on cyberspace for their delivery. The plan calls for the
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security of these electronic systems through, first, continuous assessment of threats and
vulnerabilities to federal systems, second, authenticating and maintaining authorized
users of federal systems, and third, improving security in government outsourcing and
procurement. Furthermore, it stipulates that all federal wireless local area (WiFi)
networks be made secure, and encourages state and local governments to take these same
actions, and to participate in information sharing and analysis centers with similar
governments.
The fifth and final priority mentioned in the NSSC is fostering a system of
National Security and International Cyberspace Security Cooperation to promote a
“global culture of security”. The plan acknowledges that because of the Internet’s
decentralized and “borderless” architecture, the only way to safeguard and defend
America’s critical systems and networks is to require “a system of international
cooperation to facilitate information sharing, reduce vulnerabilities, and deter malicious
actors”. The means for accomplishing this international security effort include
strengthening counterintelligence efforts, improving response capabilities to attacks, and
establishing international watch-and-warning networks to detect attacks as soon as they
emerge. Once again, emphasis is placed on working with private industry to facilitate
partnerships among international public and private sectors. Interestingly, the plan also
calls for encouraging other nations to accede to the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime, despite the fact that the United States itself is not a party to it.
Ultimately, the NSSC explicitly recognizes that “the federal government alone
cannot sufficiently defend America’s cyberspace”. It calls for voluntary public-private
partnerships and for “every American who can contribute to securing part of cyberspace
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[being] encouraged to do so”. It also acknowledges that “many issues could not be
addressed in detail, and others are not yet ripe for national policy” 300.
In the immediate weeks following the release of the draft version of the NSSC,
Congress approved the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and assigned to
it many agencies already active in cybersecurity. The final version of the NSSC “reflects
those changes”. Congress also passed, and the President signed, the Cyber Security
Research and Development Act, which authorized $700,000 in new funding for
cybersecurity research and development, primarily to be dispersed in the form of
academic fellowships, grants, and the establishment of a program of assistance to
institutions of higher education that enter into partnerships with for-profit entities301.
Additionally, in June 2003, recognizing the importance of the Protocol layer to
cybersecurity, the U.S. Defense Department formally issued a directive mandating a
transition to the IPv6 protocol, in accordance with an explicit recommendation in the
NSSC, citing the need for more IP addresses being necessary for enhancing national
cybersecurity and for military combat operations in the war on terror.302
In the end, both the policymaking process and the policy design of the NSSC
reflect the importance of our four-layer model. The policymaking process, though
instigated by the federal government, nevertheless incorporated many of the governing
actors revealed in our political architecture of the Internet – the major
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telecommunications providers who own the Infrastructure, the largest private commercial
software development firms operating at the Applications layer, and many of the largest
private ISPs and website operators who hold authority over the Content. Notably absent
from the process: the international engineering consortium groups that govern the
Protocols (however, the importance of the protocols themselves are explicitly recognized
in the NSSC), as well as independent non-affiliated software developers and website
operators. Large private commercial firms were clearly dominant in this policymaking
process.
Likewise, the policy design of the NSSC also reflects the importance of our fourlayer model. It explicitly cites protection of the cyber Infrastructure as its main priority,
and also calls for the widespread utilization of more secure technical Protocols and
patches for software Applications. Its overarching design emphasis on voluntary publicprivate partnerships is extremely significant and is its most controversial element. While,
certainly, it is partially the result of the Bush Administration’s political bias against direct
governmental mandates regulating the private commercial sector, it is also an implicit
acknowledgement that, first, the federal government does not actually have the governing
authority on its own to create policies that constrain and enable behavior on the Internet
with intentional effects; partnerships with private sector actors who hold governing
authority at each layer are not only desirable, but fundamentally required. Second, as a
consequence, that this decentralization of governing authority across layers makes
voluntary measures, as opposed to direct mandates, not merely a design choice, but really
the only option in the context of the Internet’s decentralized political architecture that we
have constructed.
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Part III. Implementation and the Emerging Bureaucratic Regime






Policy Achievements
Inadequate Funding
Critiques of Private-Sector Implementation Efforts
Conflicting organizational roles within DHS
High turnover rate among top cybersecurity officials at DHS

In public policy literature, implementation theory is often broken down into the
categories of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Among the top-down theorists is the
central notion that successful implementation depends upon linkages between different
organizations and departments at the local level, and that the degree of cooperation
between these agencies will determine the “implementation deficit”.303 A policy is
created and its success simply depends on how well local agents carry it out. This is
supported by parallel efforts that seek to measure “outcome performance”304 and to
“structure implementation” by recognizing the existence of a feedback process.305 There
is also an acknowledgment that certain political processes are inevitable and therefore
implementation must include “scenario writing” - structuring the game the right way to
achieve desired outcomes.306
On the other hand, bottom-up theorists focus on the complexity between
organizations, or networks, in ways that do not necessarily privilege any specific actor or
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set of actors.307 Central to this approach is the idea that implementation does not involve
the advancement of public service ideals as much as we'd hope, but rather reflects the
frustrating processes that lead to practices which enable officials to cope with the
pressures they face.308 In response, the notion of “backward-mapping” attempts to focus
on individual actions as a starting point, enabling such actions to be seen as responses to
problems or issues in the form of choices between alternatives.309 Compromises typically
arise between people and organizations during the process, thus politicizing the policyaction relationship.310 It should be noted, however, that some scholars have criticized this
bottom-up emphasis on political processes and compromises during implementation as
obliterating the distinction between policy formulation and implementation.311
What the case study of the NSSC illustrates is a purposive melding of policy
formulation and implementation. Policymaking theories such as “multiple streams”312 or
“punctuated equilibrium”313, while useful in conceptualizing the problems or needs which
sometimes initiate agenda-setting and policy change, prove less reliable as predictive
indicators when analyzing a highly technical and nascent field like cybersecurity which
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lacks a substantial historical record. Instead, incrementalism and the classic notion of
“muddling-through”314 are more accurate descriptions of the policy course that has
transpired. In fact, the cybersecurity case study highlights the manner in which
implementation is actually a form of incremental policymaking within bureaucratic
institutions.
Overall, implementation of the NSSC has been problematic. Since the policy was
created, implementation of some of its tenets has led to positive results - notably the
emergence of numerous private sector initiatives and industry alliances - while others
have encountered various difficulties - namely, a scarcity of resources, confusion and
conflict within the Executive bureaucracy, and a high turnover rate among top
administrative officials.
In terms of policy achievements, numerous private sector initiatives have been
established such as the Internet Security Alliance (ISA), which was established as a
collaborative effort between Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI), its
CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), and the Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA) - a
federation of trade associations which sought to provide a forum for information sharing
on cybersecurity issues.
Additionally, as stated in Microsoft's Chief Security Strategist Scott Charney’s,
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency, Financial
Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, implementation efforts were undertaken
seeking to strengthen law enforcement’s capabilities in deterring cyber crime through
both an expansion of their legal powers as well as increasing their funding for personnel
and training, heightening penalties for cyber crime offences, increased funding for
314
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cybersecurity research-and-development (R&D), enhancing cross-jurisdictional
cooperation among law enforcement agencies for investigating cyber attacks, and
providing more clarity for which governmental agency should take the lead in responding
to a specific attack and what legal authorities will guide an investigation. 315
Furthermore, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce outlined five major private-sector
cybersecurity accomplishments. Notable among these were a National Cyber Security
Summit, after which five participating organizations – the Business Software Alliance
(BSA), the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), TechNet, the
Chamber of Commerce, and DHS – decided to formalize and sustain the National Cyber
Security Partnership (NCSP) which has since grown to include over 30 major
organizations.316 It has also provided training to numerous small businesses, as well as
published a series of articles on “Common Sense Guides to Cyber Security” for large and
small businesses.317
Large-scale testing of security vulnerabilities has also offered positive results in
terms of local, state, federal, and international governmental cooperation. The
Department of Homeland Security’s subdivision - the National Cyber Security Division
(NCSD) – has sponsored and carried out four large-scale national cybersecurity exercises.
Named Cyber Storms I-IV, spanning from 2006-2012, these exercises simulated a large-
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scale national cyber attack in order to assess coordinated federal responses. Participants
included federal, state, local, and international governments, including Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, in addition to private-sector actors from the
Information Technology, Transportation (Rail and Pipe), and Chemical sectors, along
with multiple Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).318
Since the passage of the NSSC, the Department of Homeland Security has also
begun funding numerous research-and-development programs, albeit, not to the extent
that some proponents argue is required. PREDICT - Protected Repository for Defense of
Infrastructure Against Cyber Threats – is a program begun in 2004 aimed at getting large
private-sector infrastructure companies to volunteer real-world incident data that
researchers can use to test prototype security products. The agency also spearheaded a
new vender-neutral cybersecurity test bed, known as DETER, for Cyber Defense
Technology Experimental Research, in order to help develop next-generation security
technologies for the nation's critical infrastructure. DHS also formed an ad hoc
government/industry steering committee to study and develop security pilot projects for
the Internet’s Domain Name (DNS) System. The goal is to develop pilot projects to study
specific threats and vulnerabilities to the DNS System, including loss of service due to a
denial-of-service attack, hijacking, and a loss of coherence due to the existence of
unauthorized root servers and top-level domains. Additionally, with another nod to the
importance of the Protocol layer, its Border Gateway Protocol steering committee
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prepared research-and-development pilot projects to develop secure protocols for the
routing infrastructure that connects Internet service providers and subscriber networks.319
However, the actual funding of the NSSC's proposals has been piecemeal, and
this has greatly hindered its implementation. Despite calling for “federally funded nearterm IT security research and development," grants to universities for the training of
professionals, and other measures that add up to significant costs, Congress has largely
funded associated proposals as parts of larger DHS (and other) bills, rather than as one
comprehensive funding package dedicated specifically to cybersecurity. As a result,
federal funding for cybersecurity has been notably porous in the years since the NSSC’s
creation.

FUNDING FIGURES
Fiscal Year

Federal Budget

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

$2.0 trillion
$2.2 trillion
$2.3 trillion
$2.4 trillion
$2.7 trillion
$2.77 trillion
$2.9 trillion

DHS Budget
(Department of Homeland
Security)320
$19.5 billion
$34.2 billion
$36.2 billion
$40.2 billion
$41.1 billion
$42.7 billion
$46.4 billion

NCSD Budget
(National Cyber
Security Division)
$73 million321
$93 million322
$115 million323
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As a result of inadequate funding, implementation of the cybersecurity measures
called for in the NSSC has been demonstrably impacted. Congress, after passing the
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) in order to supplement the
NSSC, requires all federal civilian agencies to test their systems for cyber-vulnerabilities
and report annually to Congress on their progress.324 The resulting annual FISMA report
cards have revealed the common frequency by which many government agencies receive
extremely poor marks on the official report card - for example, generating an average
grade of 67.3% for 2004, an improvement of only 2.3 percentage points over 2003.325
Such funding inadequacies have not gone unnoticed. In 2007, after a six-month
stretch in which two highly prominent events occurred - a major cyberattack on Estonian
government web sites and intrusions into the Defense Department’s unclassified network
– President Bush requested that Congress “immediately move $152 million into
cybersecurity programs for fiscal 2008”. Out of this money, $115 million would go
towards enhancing DHS’ ability to implement the Einstein program, which monitors
network gateways for traffic patterns that indicate the presence of computer worms or
other unwanted traffic, administered by US-CERT. Jeff Carter, a spokesman at DHS’
Directorate of National Protection and Programs (DNPP), also said that the funding “will
also increase our investigative capabilities [and] reduce multiple access points and points
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of vulnerability while ensuring government cyber centers stay connected and focused on
detecting potential attacks”. The Justice Department, meanwhile, would receive $39
million “to help the FBI investigate incursions into federal networks, increase intelligence
analysis and provide technical tools for investigations”.326
Some have argued that the cause of implementation’s difficulties lies in the policy
design itself or even in the exclusion of certain types of actors from the policy process.
Michael Rasmussen (the aforementioned V.P. for the Information Systems Security
Association) asserted in an interview in December 2003 that what had stalled progress in
implementing national cybersecurity policy was:

the direction the Federal Government is heading with the
Public-Private sector cooperation on information security.
We are only now seeing a direction in this area. A direction
was being clearly laid by Howard Schmidt and Richard
Clarke, but the creation of DHS and integration of this
component into it stalled it big time.327
Some of the critiques that were made during the public commentary phase of the
policy process have subsequently been echoed in the years since the NSSC’s passage. In
December 2003, Robert Vamosi of About.com wrote,

At the National Cyber Security Summit, held last
Wednesday in Santa Clara, Calif., government officials
praised the progress they've made thus far. However, it's
interesting to note that the 300 invited guests at the closeddoor sessions did not include many noted individuals
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within the security community, giving the summit a
distinctly pro-business skew.328

Private-sector implementation efforts have often struggled as well. Leading
technology companies like Microsoft, for example, have established their own enhanced
security programs such as the Trustworthy Computing Initiative in order to certify the
security of its products as well as its partners in the Initiative. However, many such
private-sector efforts are often scrutinized for their potential ulterior motives. For
instance, Microsoft’s insistence that Digital Rights Management (DRM) software is
essential to the Trustworthy Computing Initiative has led many detractors to question the
entire project, since many view DRM as an attempt by Microsoft to not only protect, but
also control, media content on users’ computers. Furthermore, the Open Source
Community has also expressed concern that a trustworthy computing implementation will
require authenticating programs as well as content. Such a system could potentially be
used to hinder the progress of non-Microsoft software and operating systems – leading to
allegations of anti-competitive behavior.
One of the greatest obstacles to the NSSC’s implementation in its early years was
the high turnover rate among top officials and organizational conflict within the
Executive bureaucracy. A brief history of the “Cybersecurity Czar” position illustrates
this point.
On October 12, 2001, only one month after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush
named Richard Clarke to the new position of Special Advisor to the President for
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Cyberspace Security, immediately making him the president’s top advisor on
cybersecurity issues. Clarke had previously been a member of the Clinton and George
H.W. Bush Administrations and a National Security Council (NSC) staffer. He was also
the president’s counter-terrorism coordinator at the time of the 9/11 attacks. In this new
position, Clarke reported directly to Homeland Security Office Director Tom Ridge and
National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice.
Six days later, President Bush issued an Executive Order creating the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board (CIPB) headed by Clarke, comprising 26 federal
agencies. The Board “was formed to protect the information infrastructure controlling
everything from financial systems to the power grid to telephone and internet
communications”. By early November, Clarke made a 10-day trip to Silicon Valley to
solicit suggestions on cybersecurity from 18 top executives, including Cisco CEO John
Chambers and Symantec CEO John Thompson. The Board, working closely with
industry executives, was responsible for drafting the NSSC.
Clarke resigned from his post in January 2003 following damage wreaked by an
Internet worm that struck hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide, slowing email
systems and other cyberspatial activities. The “SQL Slammer Worm” (also known as
Sapphire and Helkern) also crippled 911 emergency centers, prevented many customers
of Bank of America Corp. from withdrawing money from ATM machines, and
Countrywide Financial Corp., Microsoft and American Express Co. also reported
problems. Clarke stated that the Bush Administration was “not taking cybersecurity
seriously”. He also famously told security experts at the RSA Data Security Conference
in 2002, after citing statistics that indicated less than 0.0025 percent of corporate revenue
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on average was being spent on information-technology security, that “If you spend more
on coffee than on IT security, then you will be hacked. What's more, you deserve to be
hacked.”329
Clarke was followed by Howard Schmidt, the Vice-Chair of the CIPB and a
former chief of security at Microsoft, who then resigned after only three months in the
position. In an email sent to his staff and other industry officials immediately following
his resignation, Schmidt stated that many of his responsibilities had been shifted to the
Department of Homeland Security, and following Richard Clarke’s precedent, also
warned of future cyberattacks in calling for officials to ensure that cybersecurity not be
reduced to a “second-tier issue”.330
Succeeding Schmidt was then Rand Beers, who quit after only one month on the
job in order to join the presidential campaign of Senator John Kerry. Beers, who served
on the National Security Council (NSC) under four presidents, charged the Bush
Administration with underfunding and taking little action to improve cybersecurity. This,
he claimed, led to a situation of “policy constipation” where “nothing gets done”.331
Following Beers was Amit Yoran, a former software executive from Symantec
Corp., who then, in October 2004 “informed the White House about his plans to quit as
director of the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) and made his resignation
effective at the end of Thursday, effectively giving a single's day notice of his intentions
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to leave”. After one year in office, Yoran cited frustration with cybersecurity’s “low
priority” at DHS, and “privately described [those] frustrations in recent months to
colleagues in the technology industry, according to lobbyists who recounted these
conversations on condition they not be identified because the talks were personal. As
cybersecurity chief, Yoran and his division had an $80 million budget and 60 employees
to carry out the dozens of recommendations in the NSSC”.332
That made for four resignations within a year and a half.
In February 2005, the President’s own Information Technology and Advisory
Committee (PITAC) issued a highly critical report titled, “Cyber Security: A Crisis of
Prioritization”, in which it described the short-term, and severely flawed, strategies that
had thus far been pursued in cybersecurity in accordance with the NSSC. The report
urged several changes be made to the policy such as significant increases in funding for
research, recruitment and retention of cybersecurity researchers and professionals, and
providing a “rapid transfer” of federally-developed cutting-edge cybersecurity
technologies to the private sector.333
As a result, in July 2005, the more powerful post of “cybersecurity czar” was
officially created as a part of a broad reorganization at the Department of Homeland
Security. In his “six-point agenda”, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff elevated the
position of “cybersecurity chief” several levels up the agency’s organizational chart by
creating this new position officially titled, “Assistant Secretary for Cyber and
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Telecommunications Security”. This new assistant secretary would report directly to the
Undersecretary for National Protection and Programs Directorate, one of three top-level
officials who answer directly to Chertoff. Several tech-oriented trade groups, including
the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) and the Cyber Security
Industry Alliance (CSIA), founded in 2004 by security firms such as Symantec, McAfee,
RSA Security, Check Point, and Internet Security Systems, had repeatedly called for the
creation of an assistant secretary position “in order to raise the profile of cybersecurity
issues at DHS”.
However, the new position of cybersecurity czar would remain vacant for over a
year. This prolonged vacancy drew criticism from politicians and technology industry
groups alike.
The Cyber Security Industry Alliance’s (CSIA) Executive Director Paul Kurtz
made regular appearances before House and Senate subcommittees to submit testimony
stressing the need for a private sector approach to improving cybersecurity without major
government intervention, and was integral in calling for the appointment of an Assistant
Secretary for Cybersecurity and for Congressional enactment of data security legislation
in 2006.334
The Business Software Alliance, whose members include Apple Computer, Cisco
Systems, Dell and Microsoft, submitted a three-paragraph letter to Chertoff in July 2006
pressing for an appointment to the position “in the near future”.335
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Shortly thereafter in the summer of 2006, DHS finally appointed a new
cybersecurity czar. Gregory Garcia, formerly a vice president of the aforementioned
Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), was named to the post with a
background in both computer security and business.
Then, in a move that surprised many observers, in March 2008, President Bush
signed a new directive to expand the intelligence community’s role in monitoring Internet
traffic following a surge in the number of attacks on federal agencies’ computer systems.
The directive, whose content details were classified, authorized the National Security
Agency (NSA) to monitor the computer networks of all federal agencies. This directive
was part of a new strategic initiative calling for a task force headed by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to coordinate efforts to identify the sources of
cyberattacks, while DHS would work to protect the computer systems, and the Pentagon
would devise strategies for counterattacks.
In this strategic initiative known as the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative (CNCI), the creation of a new multi-agency, multi-year plan was set forth,
engendered by “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23” – whose details are also
classified - which lays out 12 steps to securing the federal government’s cyber networks,
and establishes the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC).336
The CNCI initiative immediately raised a number of questions regarding the
cybersecurity czar. To head the new inter-agency, the President appointed Rod A.
Beckstrom, a Silicon Valley entrepreneur who started Twiki.net, a company which
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provides collaboration software for businesses, and author of The Spider and the Starfish:
The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations, as his new top-level advisor based
within DHS, reporting directly to Secretary Chertoff. Beckstrom’s appointment raised
new questions as to what was then the role of the official cybersecurity czar, Gregory
Garcia.
The CNCI had been cloaked in secrecy, as DHS initially withheld all information
about the new agency, the NCSC. It was signed by President Bush in January 2008, and
“there are rumors that Congress will be asked to come up with as much as $30 billion
over coming years”. Senators and Congressional Representatives were only informed
behind closed doors after DHS officials were called to testify or make budget requests,
and DHS officials claimed the entire program was classified. There were also additional
reports that the NSA, CIA, FBI would cooperate on monitoring and share information via
the new NCSC, the aim of which was also classified.337
This secrecy ultimately prompted Senators Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Susan
Collins (R-ME), the Chair and ranking Republican of the Senate’s Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee, to send a letter to DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff raising no less than 17 questions about the NCSC and its activities. The
Senators’ questions centered on issues ranging from the project’s secrecy to its heavy
reliance on contractors to the lack of involvement by the private sector.338
As it turned out, Rod Beckstrom did not last long as director of the NCSC either.
In March 2009, he resigned his position in part as a show of resistance to the NSA's
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interest in taking a dominant role in cybersecurity. Beckstrom said in an interview that
he believed an intelligence service that is supposed to focus on foreign targets should not
be given so much control over the flow of information within the United States
government. He was quoted as having "very serious concerns about the concentration of
too much power in one agency," and that he feared that the NSA’s push for a greater role
could "give it the power to collect and analyze every email message, text message and
Google search conducted by every employee in every federal agency". 339
Beckstrom’s resignation illustrated, first, just how divisive the cybersecurity issue
had become among federal agencies, as demonstrated by the conflicting roles between
the NCSD and the NCSC, and, second, that the high turnover rate among top bureaucratic
officials remained ongoing.
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Part IV. Cybersecurity Policy and Politics in the Obama Administration

With the ushering in to power of the Obama Administration, the policy course set forth
by the Bush Administration - characterized by public-private partnerships and strictly voluntary
measures being promoted to enhance cybersecurity - was largely kept intact. This was a case of
path dependency having already taken hold.
It wasn't until April 2012 that a notable change in policy direction was even expressed.
President Obama's chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, publicly made the case that the
strictly voluntary approach had become “a risk that the American people cannot afford to
take”.340
His public opposition to the entrenched voluntary approach echoed the principles set
forth in the Senate's newly released Cybersecurity Act of 2012. This plan called for the Federal
Government to set minimum cybersecurity performance standards - after garnering industry
input - and companies who worked on or operated the nation's critical cyber assets would be
required to meet them. Those companies who fell short would be “directed” to tighten up their
cybersecurity practices. Exactly how they would do so — for example, behind a firewall or a
stand-alone network — would be up to the company.341
Despite this bill being introduced in the Senate, neither it nor any other significant piece
of cybersecurity legislation was actually passed by Congress during the first term of the Obama
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Administration. As a result, the status quo remains in place - meaning that the Bush
Administration's policy course based on public-private partnerships and strictly voluntary
measures being adopted continues to define U.S. national cybersecurity policy to-date.
However, under the Obama Administration, the politics of cybersecurity have become
more crystallized. Partially in response to years of frustration stemming from organizational
conflict within DHS, several other governmental actors have become highly prominent in
framing the issue and setting the agenda.
As already stated, the leading Senate Committee dealing with cybersecurity policy is the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Chaired by Sen. Joe
Lieberman with Republican ranking member Sen. Susan Collins, this committee has a history of
introducing bills like 2010's the Protecting Cyber Space as a National Asset Act (S. 3480), which
passed out of Committee but was never debated on the Senate floor.342
It was this committee that was also responsible for producing the Cybersecurity Act of
2012 (S. 2105) which was introduced by Senators Lieberman, Collins, Jay Rockefeller, and
Diane Feinstein. The Act was the result of months of negotiations with other committees of
jurisdiction - namely, the energy, financial services, and chemical industries; national security
and privacy and civil liberties groups; and a number of other government agencies.343
Meanwhile, by its own admission, in the House of Representatives, at least nine
committees have some significant jurisdictional claim on cyber issues. These include
Appropriations, Oversight and Government Reform, Armed Services, Judiciary, Financial
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Services, Homeland Security, Science, Space, and Technology, Energy and Commerce, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.344
In order to determine, not only which among these House committees are most important
to cybersecurity policy, but also the Executive Branch turf wars involved, it is instructive to
follow the action in the House's counterpart to the Cybersecurity Act of 2012.
Two competing bills were introduced in the House. The Rogers-Ruppersberger bill (H.R.
3523)345 was the product of the Select Committee on Intelligence and was passed out of that
committee by a 17-1 vote. It would give a leading role to the Director of National Intelligence,
making him responsible for establishing procedures to broadly share cyber threat information
with the private sector.
The other, H.R. 3674, is known as the PRECISE Act (Promoting and Enhancing
Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Effectiveness Act). 346 It was authored by Congressman
Dan Lungren (R-CA), has bipartisan support in the Homeland Security Committee, and would
give a leading role to the Secretary for Homeland Security. DHS would be responsible for
maintaining a clearinghouse of cyber threat information and disseminating that information
broadly within the federal government and to the private sector.
This effort at revamping U.S. national cybersecurity policy in 2012 clearly illustrated that
the principal Congressional actors are, in the Senate, the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs committee, and in the House, the Select Committee on Intelligence as well as the
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Homeland Security Committee. Furthermore, the two competing bills in the House highlight the
ongoing tension between DHS and DOD/NSA as to who will be the primary intermediary
between the federal government and the private sector.
Certainly, there remain other subsidiary yet highly important cybersecurity actors as well.
The military plays an extremely active role in formulating cybersecurity strategies, engaging in
research and development of cyber technologies, and running scheduled exercises that simulate
attacks and test vulnerabilities.
Foremost, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) was established in 2010 and is
headed by General Keith Alexander, who is also NSA director, and reports to the U.S. Strategic
Command. Service elements of CYBERCOM include the Army Cyber Command, the 24th
Air Force, the Navy’s 10th Fleet Cyber Command, and the Marine Forces Cyber
Command.347
In part as a consequence of its relationship with CYBERCOM (although not limited to
it), the NSA also plays a highly prominent role. In addition to various other duties, the NSA
chief is in command of CYBERCOM, as well as those aforementioned subsidiary single-service
cyberwar units such as the 24th Air Force, Navy 10th Fleet, etc.348
One example of NSA activity on the cybersecurity front was when news emerged in 2010
that the agency had set established a secret program called "Perfect Citizen" that was intended to
set up monitoring equipment on networks deemed to be of national security importance, perhaps
including those of utility companies. In theory, this would allow the NSA to know when attacks
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were happening, rather than relying on private companies to report it. However, the NSA denied
that there was any monitoring involved.349 Nevertheless, it is clear that the NSA plays a key role
both in developing and deploying cyberdefense mechanisms.
Finally, as we have discussed, DHS has been central to U.S. cybersecurity policy since its
inception, and remains so. It has been charged with being the primary coordinator of
information related to cyberattacks, and is still considered the first liason between the public- and
private- sectors. As we have explored in great detail, conflicts between different DHS
departments - the NCSD and the NCSC - coupled with a high-turnover rate among top officials
have defined the Department's early years, at least in the context of cybersecurity.
In March 2013, the Obama Administration began publicly staking out a more proactive
(or aggressive) cybersecurity strategy. The President issued a new Executive Order on the
matter, although it merely encouraged greater information-sharing with the private sector – an
extension of the existing policy. Also, Administration officials communicated to China’s new
president, Xi Jinping, that “the volume and sophistication of Chinese cyberattacks ha[d] become
so intense that they threaten[ed] the relationship between Washington and Beijing”. Their
solution, though, was more timid, suggesting that Chinese diplomats help establish “acceptable
norms of behavior in cyberspace”. However, in a marked contrast to previous policy, General
Keith Alexander, head of both the NSA and CYBERCOM, testified before the House Armed
Services Committee about the Administration’s intention to establish 13 teams that could launch
offensive cyberattacks in retaliation if the U.S. were ever hit with a major attack.
In the meantime, the aforementioned Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which proposed
replacing the strictly voluntary measures in the NSSC with government mandates for companies
349
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who worked on or operated the nation's critical cyber assets, was defeated in the Senate by a vote
of 52-46.
The extent to which these new strategies of offensive cyberwarfare and governmental
mandates will actually be become adopted, as of this writing, remains uncertain.
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Part V. Cybersecurity Policy In Action: What Actually Happens in the Face of a
Cyberattack?

To see how the National Strategy policy, its implementation, and the political
architecture surrounding the entire issue all come together in terms of our four-layer
model, it is instructive to trace the process of what happens when there is an actual
computer virus outbreak.
As set forth in the NSSC, U.S. cybersecurity policy is based on two main
principles which parallel broader national security objectives: 1) prevention and 2)
response.
As a direct result of the policy design of the NSSC relying foremost on publicprivate partnerships, both prevention and response strategies rely first on the private
sector to voluntarily implement measures to protect their own cyber assets, and only after
such private measures have run their course does the federal government take direct
action.
Computer viruses have existed in some form since the early 1970s when the
“Creeper” virus was first detected on the ARPANET, and they have been a recognized
threat to information systems since Len Eidelmen first coined the term 'virus' in
connection with self-replicating computer programs in 1983.350
A notable turning point as to how viruses relate directly to national cybersecurity
policy came in 1999 when the “Melissa” virus wreaked havoc on computer systems
around the world. Melissa exploited the macro programming language used by Microsoft
software applications to disable certain features within Microsoft Word, then sent copies
350
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of the infected document to up to 50 other addresses using compatible versions of
Microsoft's Outlook e-mail program. Finally, the virus modified the Word software so
that it would subsequently infect any document that the user might open and close. If
these documents were shared, the virus would be spread further.
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) shortly thereafter published the
testimony of Technical Director Keith Rhodes before the Congressional Subcommittee
on Technology, Committee on Science. In his testimony, Rhodes highlighted that the
Melissa virus was important because it demonstrated 1) how quickly viruses can
proliferate “due to the intricate and extensive connectivity of today's networks”, and how
difficult it was to launch effective countermeasures, 2) how hard it is to trace a virus back
to its source, 3) how vulnerabilities in commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software
products could be exploited to affect vital federal control systems which increasingly had
grown dependent on such software, 4) the lack of an effective agency or governmentwide processes for reporting and analyzing the effects of computer attacks, and 5) how
individual computer users do a good job of protecting their systems when they are made
aware of computing risks and attacks.351
Furthermore, Rhodes outlined the federal government's role in mitigating the
effects of computer virus outbreaks as assuming leadership in coordinating informationsharing with the private sector:

It is imperative, therefore, that federal agencies and the
government as whole swiftly implement long-term solutions
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to protect systems and sensitive data. It is also critical that
the federal government establish reporting mechanisms that
facilitate analyses of viruses and other forms of computer
attacks and their impact. Our Information Security Best
Practices guide offers a good framework for agencies to
follow, but sustained government-wide leadership is needed
to ensure that executives understand their risks, monitor
agency performance, and resolve issues affecting multiple
agencies.352

Institutionally, when a virus hits, the primary federal agency responsible for
mitigating its effects is US-CERT. US-CERT is the operational arm of the National
Cyber Security Division (NCSD) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It is a
public-private partnership charged with providing “response support and defense against
cyber attacks for the Federal Civil Executive Branch and information sharing and
collaboration with state and local government, industry and international partners”. One
of its main roles is also to “disseminate reasoned and actionable cyber security
information to the public”.353
Worldwide, there are more than 250 organizations dealing with cybersecurity
response that use the name "CERT”. Although there is some level of coordination with
these groups, US-CERT is independent of them. When DHS created US-CERT, it called
upon the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) established at Carnegie Mellon
University to contribute their expertise, and it is through US-CERT that DHS and the
CERT/CC continue to work jointly on cybersecurity activities.354
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In order to enhance response systems, the Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information (PCII) Program was established as a result of the Critical Infrastructure
Information Act of 2002355. Its purpose is to encourage members of the private sector to
voluntarily submit security information about vulnerabilities to DHS by enabling them to
submit such information confidentially with the assurance that it will be protected from
public disclosure.356
The other important institutions, aside from US-CERT, include the Multi-State
Information-Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) which focuses on states and local
governments357, CERT/CC at Carnegie Mellon University, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) - Computer Security Division which focuses on
standards and technology-based approaches358, and the Forum of International Response
Security Teams which is global in scope359. There is also within the U.S. House of
Representatives the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and
Technology.360 It is a part of the Committee on Homeland Security.
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In substantive terms, when it comes to computer virus outbreaks, organizations
are expected to take certain steps before an outbreak occurs. Clearly, this path pursues
the objective of prevention.
According to the NIST Incident Handling Guide361, organizations, both public and
private, need to create formal incident response capabilities. These can vary greatly in
terms of both type and scale, depending on the characteristics of who is implementing
them.
Federal agencies are required by law to report incidents to the Federal Computer
Incident Response Center (FedCIRC) office within DHS’s Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP).
The private sector is encouraged to take several preventative steps as well,
although these measures are voluntary and considered best-practices. NIST recommends
that institutions create formal policies and procedures to be well-prepared to handle
incidents when they occur. Examples include internal policies that explicitly state when
to share information with outside parties, creating team models and selecting the best
personnel, and listing dependencies within organizations.
Additionally, organizations need to take steps to effectively secure their networks,
systems, and applications. From a procedural perspective, this means implementing
technical measures for detection and analysis, and pre-selecting strategies for
containment, eradication, and recovery – typically accomplished through software
applications and network management.
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Organizations are further instructed to document their guidelines for interactions
with other organizations, emphasize the importance of incident detection and analysis to
their employees, and create written guidelines for prioritizing incidents. These priorities
ought to be determined by the 1) criticality of the affected resources (e.g., public web
servers, user workstations), and 2) the current and potential technical effect of the
incident (e.g., root compromise, data destruction).362
It is important to stress that the overwhelming majority of such preventative
techniques are expected to occur in the private sector, including among individual home
users, and are completely voluntary in nature. While government agencies are required
to take such steps, U.S. cybersecurity policy, when it comes to the prevention of
widespread security incidents, essentially is a statement of encouragement and advice for
private network operators and individual PC-users to protect themselves, and it is this
upon which the stability of the system depends.
It follows, then, that organizations are also expected to take specific steps after an
outbreak occurs. This path pursues the complementary objective of response.
The steps that organizations should take in response vary depending on the type
of security breach that has occurred. While the potential courses of action are immensely
numerous, the intention is that the decision-making processes for containing a security
incident will be far easier if recommended actions are predetermined.
For Denial-of-Service attacks, contact should be made with one’s ISP as well as
their second-tier service providers. Because the issue with DOS attacks is an overload of
network-based traffic, ISPs are critical for filtering or limiting that traffic, and they have
several means for doing so such as blocking source IP addresses or setting a maximum
362
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limit for incoming traffic. Relocating the target of the attack by moving it to another IP
address is another viable option if a particular host is being targeted.
For malicious code incidents, the priority is to prevent the malicious code from
spreading any further. If the infected device or system is not critical, it should be
disconnected from the rest of the network immediately. Towards the same end, all
preventative measures should be re-executed on devices that may not yet be infected, like
running anti-virus software, configuring email servers to block suspicious files, limiting
the use of software applications with file transfer capabilities such as IRC and instant
messenger clients, etc. In response, contact should then be made with anti-virus software
vendors to alert them of the unknown malicious code that their software isn’t able to
identify.
For unauthorized access incidents, the key is to develop a strong layered defense
with multiple security layers existing between unauthorized users and critical resources.
Since unauthorized access typically depends on initial reconnaissance missions,
organizations are recommended to use network-based monitoring software (such as file
integrity checkers) and centralized log servers to detect intrusions before they gain
administrator-level access. If that occurs, however, the response procedure ought to
isolate and then disable the affected system, eliminate the attacker's route into the
environment (whether by changing passwords or altering database privileges, most
commonly), and finally disabling any user accounts that may have been compromised in
the attack. Since attackers often install rootkits, handlers ought to reinstall the operating
systems themselves from scratch. Administrators need to also be aware of various laws
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that require disclosure of security breaches, particularly pertaining to personally
identifiable information.
For inappropriate usage incidents, preventative measures to be taken include
deploying content-filtering software and logging certain user activities such as FTP
commands, Web requests, and email headers. While legal mechanisms (such as nondisclosure agreements, cease-and-desist orders, and laws protecting trade secrets) are
central to the response of such an incident, because many inappropriate usage security
threats come from within an organization, technical measures can be most effective in
governing one's own network. Examples include configuring firewalls, URL filters,
email servers, and outbound connections that use encryption protocols.
The common denominator in all of these cases is that, when a security incident
occurs, an organization or individual user ought to, first, follow predetermined internal
procedures to try to contain and eradicate the problem (usually by deploying software and
specialized network tools), second, notify their ISPs and second-tier service providers of
the incident, and, third, contact US-CERT if the incident meets predetermined criteria of
criticality.
When analyzed through the lens of our four-layer model, what this process
illustrates about cybersecurity policy is that the private commercial sector is the
“frontline” of national cyberdefense. Protecting the infrastructure from the threat of
cyberterrorism is paramount, and it is the private owners of those critical infrastructural
assets who have the authority to adopt certain cybersecurity measures, or not. As we
have discussed, the federal government does have established regulatory authority at the
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Infrastructure layer to mandate those firms to meet minimal cybersecurity requirements,
but has thus far failed to act upon it.
Also, by tracing the responses of organizations to a cyberattack, it is clear that
cybersecurity deployment mechanisms are fundamentally reliant on software applications
and technical protocols in both prevention and response, particularly network-monitoring
tools and specific anti-virus products. Here, too, at the Protocol and Application layers,
the private commercial sector is paramount, not only in developing the protocols and
software applications that protect digital assets, but also in utilizing such tools to detect
cyberattacks, mitigating their effects once discovered, and notifying others of the threat.
At these layers, the tools and methods of both prevention and response demonstrate the
governing authority of private actors in decision-making.
Finally, this process of what actually occurs in response to a major cyberattack
illustrates that the federal government’s role in cybersecurity policy is relegated primarily
to being a coordinator among numerous private actors who hold governing authority in
their own right, and the specifics of which serve to confirm the validity of our political
architecture. The government’s coordination efforts focus primarily on the large
telecommunications firms identified at the Infrastructure layer, the major private
commercial software developers at the Applications layer, and the private ISPs and
largest website operators at the Content layer. US-CERT is vital to raising awareness
about cyberattacks and for information-sharing, but ultimately, U.S. national
cybersecurity policy thus far limits the federal government from taking more forceful
measures beyond that point. The four-layer conceptual model again proves helpful in
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contextualizing both the problem stream and solution stream surrounding the issue by
framing it in these terms.
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What Happens When a Virus Outbreak Occurs...
1. Organizations follow predetermined internal procedures to try to contain and
eradicate the problem.
2. Notify ISPs and second-tier service providers of the incident.
3. Alert anti-virus (and other) software vendors.
4. Contact US-CERT once the incident meets predetermined criteria of
criticality.
5. US-CERT will then take the lead in coordinating responses with other
important institutions:
a. MS-ISAC: focuses on state and local governments
b. CERT/CC: focuses on the more than 250 CERT-certified security
organizations
c. The Forum of International Response Security Teams: focuses
internationally
d. NIST – Computer Security Division: focuses on standards and
technology-based approaches
6. The private sector is encouraged to voluntarily submit security information
confidentially through the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
(PCII) Program. Federal agencies are required to by law. (This is ongoing
and not only during times of crisis.)
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VI. What This Case Study on U.S. National Cybersecurity Policy Demonstrates: The
Primacy of Private Commercial Firms

So where does all of this leave us? How can we summarize what exactly is the
existing scenario that characterizes U.S. national cybersecurity policy and what are its
implications for our four-layer model and its resulting political architecture?
Our examination of the NSSC’s policymaking process, its policy design, and its
implementation all revealed one commonality – a fundamental dependency on the private
commercial sector.
The policymaking process behind the NSSC was heavily influenced at every stage
by large private corporations – namely, lobbyists representing IT vendors and various
communications, software, and security companies. The policy design that emerged
relies almost exclusively on public-private partnerships and strictly voluntary measures
being adopted by the private sector in securing their own private cyber spaces.
The implementation process has been bureaucratically characterized by a high
turnover rate among top officials and a still-emerging federal regime constituted of
numerous agencies with conflicting or overlapping responsibilities. That being said, the
National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) within the Department of Homeland
Security remains the most central government agency in U.S. cybersecurity policy – both
in evolving policymaking as well as implementation – charged with coordinating
prevention and responses to security challenges among a myriad of private sector actors.
The NCSD has attempted to implement the principles of the NSSC policy
document through four primary means: 1) its US-CERT subdivision, which analyzes
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threats, disseminates warnings, and coordinates incident response activities, and is the
single most critical organization for coordinating responses to security threats like
widespread computer virus outbreaks; 2) its Cybersecurity Preparedness and the
National Cyber Alert System, which assists users to stay prepared by posting current
alerts and information; 3) its National Cyber Response Coordination Group, which is
made up of 13 federal agencies and, in the event of a nationally significant cyber-related
incident, will take the lead in coordinating the federal response, including US-CERT, law
enforcement and the intelligence community; and 4) its Cyber Cop Portal, which assists
law enforcement capture and convict those responsible for cyber attacks through
information-sharing and collaboration with over 5,300 investigators worldwide.363
In terms of street-level implementation – what actually happens in the face of a
cyberattack – the private commercial sector is clearly paramount. The federal
government has some authority in regulating the large telecom firms at the Infrastructure
layer, however, because responses to cyberattacks rely so heavily on anti-virus (and other
security-related) software applications and network management tools, private
commercial firms prove to be most vital at the critical Applications layer. Indeed, in their
governing authority over the creation and deployment of security software, these firms
are the unquestionable “frontline” of national cyber defense.
As we have argued, cybersecurity policy’s heavy dependence on the private sector
is the direct consequence of the diffusion of governing authority that exists on the
Internet between numerous private actors each operating at different layers. It is not so
much a policy preference or design choice, but a matter of necessity; an acknowledgment
363

National Cyber Security Division Website. Retrieved on April 13, 2010 from
<http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0839.shtm>.

260
of the decentralized reality, in terms of governance, that has been set forth in our political
architecture stemming from the four-layer model. As a result, we have refuted the
hypothesis that cybersecurity’s failures are mainly attributable to a flawed policy design,
since such a design focusing on private sector arrangements is fundamentally necessary,
and instead have pointed to the bureaucratic turmoil occurring in the policy’s
implementation process for explaining U.S. cybersecurity’s failures.
How does the four-layer model assist us in understanding U.S. cybersecurity
policy?
Its application to the issue first helps frame the highly complex problem stream
which cybersecurity policy is designed to address. Already residing on the national
political agenda, the problem definition, as we have illustrated, is comprised of the threats
of cyberterrorism, cracktivism, cyberwarfare, and hacktivism to our national economy
and critical infrastructure. These problems occur primarily at the Infrastructure and
Content layers with respect to cyberterrorism, and the Applications layer with respect to
cracktivism and cyberwarfare.
In terms of the policy itself, when viewed through the prism of our four-layer
model, the case of cybersecurity highlights that 1) national governments are most
relevant at the Infrastructure layer, protecting the network’s vital physical hardware, 2)
engineering consortia groups like the IETF and IEEE have foremost authority at the
Protocol layer, designing and implementing better security within the Internet’s
technology itself, 3) private network administrators and software developers, in
conjunction with the federal government acting as coordinator, are fundamental to the
Applications layer, containing the threat of security vulnerabilities becoming more
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widespread, and 4) private website operators, along with ISPs, are vital to the Content
layer, using their governing authority over their own private cyber spaces to monitor,
restrict access, and outright remove Web content, not mention contributing to the
discovery of those users who post such content. This confirms the validity of the political
architecture of the Internet which we have constructed.
Deconstructing this highly complex issue and analyzing it through the lens of our
four-layer model helps to conceptualize its constituent parts in a more meaningful way.
Rather than simply asking, “How can the U.S. enhance national cybersecurity?”, the
question can be broken down into more narrowly targeted questions like “How can the
military help prevent the severing of intercontinental undersea cables?”; “What direction
should the big three international engineering consortia groups – the IETF, IEEE, and
W3C – take on designing the next round of security protocols?”; “What concrete steps
can private software developers and network administrators take to mitigate the effects of
virus outbreaks within their own systems, and how can a better system of notification be
implemented?”; or “What criminal or civil penalties should exist for ISPs or private
website operators who knowingly publish information constituting a national security
threat?”.
The case of cybersecurity is instructive because, as with many other Internet
policy issues previously discussed, what are often vague and over-generalized policy
dilemmas can be transformed, by using the four-layer model, into more manageable
questions with more clearly defined outcome targets. Again, this is still not to suggest
that such outcomes are always attainable, only that, by identifying which layer a policy is
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designed to address, and understanding which actors have authority in it, more effective
results can be achieved.
Thus, U.S. national cybersecurity policy is a textbook example of how the fourlayer conceptual model can, and ought to, be applied in understanding complex Internet
policy issues.
What does this cybersecurity case study teach us about the four-layer model
itself?
First of all, the U.S. national cybersecurity policy does indeed make explicit
attempts at addressing all four Internet layers, and that is an implicit form of recognition
of their importance. While the federal government does not state that these are the steps
it will take to address this layer, and these another, the fact is that, whether consciously or
not, U.S. national cybersecurity policy does address all four Internet layers. Our
argument is that this is because, in order for Internet policies to be truly comprehensive,
as this one attempts to be, there is an inherent understanding that the infrastructure,
technical protocols, software applications, and content all need to be addressed.
Second, policy goals that target certain layers, like influencing the direction of
technical standards and protocols, are often more effectively achieved by street-level
implementation agents. As illustrated by the NCSD and US-CERT, such agents of
implementation are more likely to have the necessary high-level of technical expertise,
and therefore be more capable of acting as knowledgeable intermediaries between the
public and private sectors as well as in maintaining an active presence in the consortia
organizations which direct the technical decision-making of the Internet, in order to
meaningfully put into place substantive measures in securing critical cyber assets.
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Third, outcomes are attainable where policies target the layer most appropriate for
a particular problem. For example, depending on whether the specific type of security
threat being addressed is cracktivism or cyberterrorism, organizations’ internal policies
ought to appropriately call for either technical measures to be deployed (like software
filters and network monitors) or infrastructure-based measures (like notifying ISPs and
telecom operators). By narrowly targeting a threat occurring at a specific layer, rather
than attempting overly broad strokes, more precise defensive measures can be adopted
and, thus, security threats can best be mitigated.
Fourth, policies can be designed to target a specific layer with the specific
intention of causing cascaded effects at another layer. This crucial principle takes
advantage of the fact that the four Internet layers are interdependent and none can
reasonably exist and function on their own; rather, they are merely separate parts of what
is one coherent larger system. For example, cyberterrorist threats at the Content layer,
such as propaganda websites geared towards recruitment, are difficult to shut down due
to their transient nature, however, policies can be designed to effectively do so anyway if
they target, not the Content itself, but the ISPs and hosting services which provide them
their platform. By regulating the service providers, cybersecurity policies can effectively
regulate the content that is available on websites, through email, on P2P networks, and
more. The Content layer is the most problematic for governments to directly regulate,
therefore targeting a different layer is often a better strategic move for generating desired
effects upon it.
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Part IV.

CONCLUSION

265
Chapter 8 – Internet Policymaking Moving Forward

When the Web first became popularized in the early 1990s, there was a profusion
of libertarian sentiment amongst pundits and scholars alike in describing the Internet and
its political culture, almost bordering on anarchism. In the Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace, John Perry Barlow expressed a common sentiment of the
time: “Governments of the Industrial World… you have no sovereignty where we
gather”.364 One of the Internet’s leading architects, David D. Clark, famously
proclaimed, “We reject kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in rough consensus and
running code”.365 Likewise, MIT’s Nicholas Negroponte argued, “It’s not that laws
aren’t relevant, it’s that the nation-state is not relevant… The Internet cannot be
regulated”.366
Following this initial wave of ideological enthusiasm, though, came a period of
counter-revolutionary thought. A well-founded perception emerged that national
governments around the world were aggressively seeking to claim a place at the
regulatory table, asserting their territorial jurisdiction in order to transpose their authority
to the Internet. This government-centric position is illustrated by scholars Goldsmith and
Wu, who claimed, “beneath the fog of modern technology, we have seen the effects of
coercive governmental force on local persons, firms, and equipment… the United States,
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China, and Europe are using their coercive powers to establish different versions of what
the Internet might be”.367 At the heart of their argument that national governments’
authority is vastly underestimated is that the Internet has evolved into a more localized
forum, where geography now trumps the “borderless” early Internet due to users wanting
content presented in their local language and context and, additionally, advertisers
wanting to narrowly target specific audiences that are also more location-specific. This
increased localization has led to governments more frequently pressuring or adjudicating
local intermediaries – typically private firms or organizations based within their
jurisdiction – as a means of controlling Internet content – examples include the French
government prohibiting Yahoo from selling Nazi paraphernalia, or the Chinese
government restricting what websites can be displayed in Google search results. The end
result, they argue, is an Internet far more controlled by territorial governments than is
often acknowledged.
But as we have seen throughout this project, the truth of Internet governance
certainly lies somewhere in between these polar opposite ends of the spectrum.
Anarchism doesn’t rule the day, nor do governments control everything that occurs in
cyberspace. Returning to our original premise, governance of the Internet has indeed
emerged, but it is not necessarily governments that are doing most of the governing.
Policies are continuously being made that constrain or enable people’s behavior on the
Internet with intentional effects. Users cannot engage in any activities they desire with
an expectation of impunity – their actions are constrained or enabled by policies made at
several single controlling points, such as by their ISP, their hosting provider, their
network administrator, the large telecommunications providers whose transcontinental
367
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networks are being used, as well as, not insignificantly, governments who continue in
their attempts to assert their territorial sovereignty.
The anarchist school, including hacker groups and certain elements within the
programming community in general, may take issue with these statements arguing that a
skilled programmer or hacker could nevertheless circumvent such controlling points and
do as they please. In the words of one member of the hacker group Anonymous, “if you
know what you're doing, you can travel through the Internet at your will, with no
restrictions”.368 They point to recent examples like that of Wikileaks, and its creator
Julian Assange, as evidence of how the Internet continues to be “ungovernable” and
fosters anarchism – and scholars like Curran and Gibson have given serious consideration
these claims, identifying the anarchical technologies Wikileaks utilizes to foment dissent
and the anarchical ethos of its radical politics (although they ultimately determine that
Wikileaks is not a “card-carrying doctrinal ‘anarchist’ organization” but rather is merely
in keeping with the contemporary distinction between anarchism per se and the
significant influence of anarchist values in oppositional politics).369
However, when examined closely, even such statements asserting the boundless
abilities of hackers and programmers does not constitute an argument against Internet
governance having emerged. First of all, these anarchist-adherents are failing to
acknowledge the technical restraints placed upon them by the programming languages
and software platforms themselves, which we have explained as implicit controls
occurring at the Applications layer. For instance, advanced C++ or .NET programmers
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might use such languages as highly effective toolkits and be greatly empowered to do
much of what they want in cyberspace, however this is only true within the confines of
what Microsoft decided C++ as a language would allow. We have examined how the
designs of all computer programming languages are the result of explicit decision-making
processes, often made by formal institutions and based on political values as much as on
technical considerations, and those decisions directly determine the actions of those who
deploy them. Thus, the first response to the programmer/hacker critique is that
programming languages themselves act as inherent checks on the behavior of
programmers.
Second, it must be recognized that there is an additional restraint on programmers
- the computing platform. Even if programmers might reluctantly concede to the above
assertion, they will then undoubtedly point to alternatives that are not controlled by
private commercial firms – examples like non-proprietary open-source languages like
PHP, Perl, or Python. If using those languages, wouldn’t programmers then be said to be
unrestricted in their actions? Not quite. The behavior of the programmer would still be
determined by the platform on which the resulting software would be used. The code
behind such platforms, whether an operating system like Microsoft Windows, non-OSdependent platforms like Sun’s Java, or various “application programming interfaces”
like the Google API, also either constrains or enables the behavior of programmers. The
second response to the programmer/hacker critique is that a programmer’s code, no
matter how independent, must still be written within the confines of rules established by
the platform if it wants to achieve a reasonable level of operability.
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These are two primary technical restraints refuting anarchist arguments as applied
even to those with highly advanced skill-sets, but we cannot ignore significant political
restraints as well. Just because laws are circumvented or willfully disobeyed by a relative
few does not mean that no governance exists. After all, just because individuals
frequently break the speed limit in their cars doesn’t mean that governments lack the
authority to formulate the rules of the road. They do. Similarly, just because a relatively
small number of programmers might mask their IP addresses in order to conduct illegal
activities, or a relatively large number of users might engage in file-sharing to download
copyrighted music files without paying for them, doesn’t mean that there is nobody with
authority over their actions. Just ask persons convicted of sharing child pornography
online, or anyone who has received a cease-and-desist letter from their ISP for potential
copyright infringement. In fact, one could reasonably argue that the very notion that
there are measures in place in need of circumvention is proof that a policymaking
institution of some kind has such authority in the first place.
Meanwhile, we anticipate another critique to emerge by some scholars who may
take issue with our constructed political architecture by oversimplifying it merely as
“pluralism”. Indeed, there are numerous actors and numerous types of actors all of
which, we have argued, have governing authority to some extent. However, as Schneider
and Ingram have argued, pluralist theory does not pay sufficient attention to the roles of
science and professionalism in shaping policy design choices nor to the pervasive
influence of social constructions on policy choices.370 Such is clearly the case with our
political architecture, most clearly evident at the Protocol layer, where the roles of
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science and professionalism are extremely significant within the governing epistemic
community.
Furthermore, our examination of governance at each layer provides far more
specificity than a simple blanket label of pluralism, or even the Internet-specific label of
“accelerated pluralism”371, might indicate. For instance, when investigating who governs
the Infrastructure layer, we have argued that the Internet’s wired infrastructure in the U.S.
is governed primarily by the big telecommunication and backbone providers – firms like
AT&T, Verizon, Qwest, Level 3, and Sprint Nextel - in conjunction with the FCC who
regulates them. This is hardly supportive of an accelerated pluralism argument defined as
contributing to the fragmentation of interest-based group politics and leading to less
“institutional coherence”.372 Rather, each layer has its own unique political dynamics, and
in the case of the wired Infrastructure, we have made the case for an Advocacy Coalitions
framework - focusing on the prominent role of technical expertise, having a pre-existing
subsystem of policy actors, and incorporating theoretical shifts in value priorities and
policy instruments – as best characterizing the current governance dynamic.
In terms of governance theory, some scholars may additionally point to our
conclusion of the primacy of private commercial firms as evidence in support of market
governance theory. However, doing so would betray, not only the significant role that
governments retain, but also, as we have explored, the highly significant contributions of,
what Benkler has called, “the economics of non-market social production”.373 The
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tremendous amounts of Internet activity that have governance effects and are based on,
essentially, voluntarism that does not depend on market strategies – from creating open
blog publishing platforms like Wordpress; to helping develop critical open source
software applications like the Apache web server; to contributing time and expertise to
the development of next-generation protocols in the IETF – refutes any notion that purely
market governance forces are in play.
Thus, as we have demonstrated repeatedly, the Internet is not in a state of
anarchy, nor is it controlled by some conspiracy of hidden actors. It is a giant network of
privately owned and operated networks, and this decentralized technical architecture
leads to a decentralized political architecture as well. Governance, according to our
stated definition, occurs primarily in the private sector, but national governments
certainly must be recognized to also govern, though to a lesser extent. Foremost, based
on how people actually use the Internet, private commercial firms, specifically, are most
paramount. Thus, even though every private cyber space is governed separately, in the
aggregate whole some actors clearly govern the Internet more than others.
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Summary of Findings
We began this project with three motivating questions: Who governs the
Internet? How are they making policies? What are the consequences? We have been
especially concerned with distinguishing between those actors who merely have
influence in policymaking versus those who have a demonstrable governing authority to
make decisions and set the rules of the environment.
To begin with, let us re-address any skeptics who have doubts that the Internet is
governed at all. One need look no further than ICANN and the DNS system for
assigning Internet domain names. As we have described, and as other scholars like
Milton Mueller have written about at length, the Internet’s very functionality on a
technical level is completely dependent on this one clearly identifiable institution –
ICANN - which is a semi-public international body, and its control over the Internet’s 13
core root servers constitute indisputable proof that Internet governance does, in fact,
exist.
With that established, by framing the questions of who governs and how are they
governing in terms of the Internet’s four conceptual layers – the Infrastructure, the
Technical Protocols, the Software Applications, and the Content – we were able to
formulate substantive answers by constructing a political architecture for the Internet that
not only identifies the primary holders of governing authority at each layer, but also
provides a descriptive analysis of how those governing actors are actually engaged in
policymaking and implementation.
Who governs the Internet’s infrastructure? Private telecommunications and cable
firms, and the national governments who regulate them. In the United States, for wired
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communication, this equates specifically to the large telecom firms like AT&T, Verizon,
and Qwest, as well as other major backbone players like Level 3 and Sprint Nextel.
Meanwhile, the cable industry’s authority stems not from ownership of the core
infrastructure but from its control over “the last mile” of infrastructure connecting into
homes and buildings.
For wireless networks, the spectrum is governed directly by the federal
government, while private broadcasters can be said to hold some level of authority only
insofar as they have the capacity to make decisions after they have been granted a license
to do so by the federal government; and even at that point, their decisions are subject to
further governmental oversight and regulatory policy. This is in stark contrast to the
governing dynamic of the wired infrastructure, where the private telecoms and cable
companies actually own the infrastructure outright. In the context of wireless spectrum,
there is a long-established principle that “the public owns the airwaves”, thus for nearly a
century, the federal government and the FCC, acting as agents of The People, have a
demonstrable grip on governing authority.
Who governs the Internet’s technical protocols? International consortium groups
comprised mainly of scientists, engineers, and academics – foremost among them, the
Internet Society (ISOC), its Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C). These international bodies are said to govern because they set
all of the rules of the network itself. The developmental processes leading to the
adoption of protocols such as TCP/IP, HTTP, 802.11, and IPv6, as well as historical
examples like the Internet-OSI standards war, demonstrate how the decisions over which
technical protocols to adopt, and how they are to be designed, are, in themselves, an
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important form of policy that constrain and enable Internet behavior – playing a major
role in determining how regulable or non-regulable Web content is going to be. These
consortium groups operate largely outside the regulatory grasp of any national
government and their policy processes are best characterized by the “rough consensus”
principle – an open and transparent process of continuous testing and refinement of
proposals that are ultimately measured by responsive models of compliance. Rough
consensus agreements within these institutions can usually be placed at around 80%-90%
- “a level high enough to demonstrate strong support, but flexible enough to work in the
absence of unanimity”. In short, rough consensus is “an informal process in which a
proposal must answer to criticisms, but need not be held up if supported by a vast
majority of the group”.374
Who governs the Internet’s software applications? We’ve explored how, because
cyberspace is a virtual environment that only exists through software, whoever creates
that software is, fundamentally, engaged in a type of policymaking. This is the heart of
the “code is law” argument, and we have examined how code constitutes a unique type of
policy, one in which the environment itself is designed to deny the user even a capability
to act in defiance. As a result, virtually any computer programmer who writes Web
applications’ underlying code can be said to govern to some extent, setting the rules for
behavior in each of their own private cyber spaces. In practice though, based on usability
metrics, it translates into private commercial websites and software firms being the
primary governing agents because they set the rules for the vast majority of desktop and
web application services that people regularly use and encounter. While fully
acknowledging the significant and disruptive influence that individual non-affiliated
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programmers like Shawn Fanning, Phil Zimmerman, and Linus Torvalds have
demonstrated throughout the Internet’s history, ultimately this influence has failed to
translate into governing authority.
Who governs the Internet’s content? This is the most politicized and
controversial of all four conceptual layers. After examining the three prominent Internet
issue areas of the regulation of pornographic material online, the regulation of spam, and
the regulation of file-sharing, what they have demonstrated is that governmental policies
have often proven to be effective in enabling certain types of Internet content (for
example, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act), while at other times
governmental policies have proven to be inherently limited by the Internet’s global scope
(i.e. – court rulings on P2P file-sharing) or limited by the technical design of protocols
(i.e. - SMTP and the CAN-SPAM Act). Meanwhile, private website operators have
exhibited a demonstrable authority to create policies for behavior through their use of
code and their Terms of Service (TOS) Agreements, and private ISPs, likewise, are said
to govern via their status as gatekeepers of Internet access.
As a result, the governance of Internet content is best characterized by the theory
of “Issue Networks” which accounts for many disparate actors whose webs of influence
guide the exercise of power and where participants move in and out of the networks
constantly and operate on many levels. Powerful interest groups and knowledgeable
individuals alike are often represented, and the “shared-knowledge groups” in the
networks are those who are “issue-skilled” regardless of formal professional training.
Because of the diversity of policy debates occurring at the Internet’s Content layer, issue
networks help explain the fluid range of participants involved in each particular policy
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debate. Furthermore, because the Web consists of so much content, and content of such
diverse types, to attempt to define a single, more specific model for policymaking would
be to oversimplify the power dynamics that actually occur. Issue networks help to
broadly explain the manner in which policies are created in that they account for the
enormous range of activities occurring in public policy as it relates to cyberspatial
content. For example, the policymaking process regarding the regulation of pornographic
material is inevitably going to be different than the process regarding bandwidth caps and
Net Neutrality. Different issues involve different debates and different interests, and
understanding that the policy networks will not always be homogenous is critical in
understanding how policies are being made at the Content layer, in general.
After constructing this political architecture depicting who governs the Internet at
each layer, we set out to apply the four-layer model to the case of U.S. national
cybersecurity policy, post-9/11. Testing the hypothesis – and commonly held opinion –
that the failures of national cybersecurity are the result a flawed policy design based on
public-private partnerships and strictly voluntary measures being adopted, our application
of the four-layer model to both the problem stream and the National Strategy itself
revealed that an implementation process characterized by a lack of funding resources,
conflicting roles within the bureaucratic regime, and a high turnover rate among top
administrative officials - not policy design – has been the main hindrance to the policy’s
success to-date. Thus, the hypothesis has been refuted.
Despite heated criticism, the voluntary public-private approach prevails, and we
have argued that this is because there is no meaningful alternative - a direct consequence
of the Internet’s decentralized political architecture. With governing authority being so
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widely dispersed, the federal government does not have the authority on a technical or
political level to simply impose its will over actors across all four layers. The Internet is
still comprised of millions of independently owned and operated private networks, and
each administrator for each private network still sets the rules for what will occur on their
own specific piece of cyberspace. As a result, blanket mandates have limited effect,
making compliance voluntary by default, and public-private partnerships are an essential
policy course to take because the activity that takes place among private actors is really,
as we have determined, what is paramount.
This decentralized political architecture is the reason, not only for the reliance on
public-private partnerships, but also for the federal government’s primary role being
relegated to that of a coordinator between numerous private actors. As highlighted in our
examination of what actually happens in the face of a widespread cyberattack, private
website operators and network administrators are responsible for securing their own
private cyber spaces and networks, constituting the nation’s “frontline” of cyberdefense,
while the federal government, acting through its US-CERT agency within the Homeland
Security Department, is charged with being the lead coordinator for information-sharing
and response.
By analyzing both the problem stream and policy stream of the cybersecurity
issue through the lens of our four layers, this highly complex issue can be more clearly
understood in political and technical terms. In terms of the problem stream, the main
threat at the Infrastructure layer is the hijacking of core industrial control systems and
outright destruction of the infrastructure itself. The main threat at the Applications layer
is the infiltration, or cracking, of web application software on both the client- and server-

278
sides. Finally, the main threat at the Content layer is the defacement of websites or
taking them offline completely.
In terms of the policy stream, the four-layer model again proves helpful. Current
U.S. national cybersecurity policy, whether codified in the NSSC or implemented
through DHS, directly addresses the Infrastructure layer by encouraging the private sector
to voluntarily submit vulnerability information to DHS and enables them to do so
confidentially. At the Applications layer, the private sector is encouraged to voluntarily
deploy technical measures for detection and analysis – typically through software patches
and applications and network management tools. Finally, at the Content layer, DHS has
set up US-CERT to coordinate information-sharing among the private sector so as to help
not only detect cyberattacks but also to mitigate their effects and notify others of the
threat.
Overall, the case of U.S. national cybersecurity policy serves to validate our fourlayer model and political architecture. Its policy design as well as its implementation
illustrates an implicit recognition of the importance of all four Internet layers.
Furthermore, it reinforces that the relationship between public and private organizations
on the Internet is one of almost total reliance on the private sector in pursuit of public
goals – even one as central as national security. Recognizing which actors have a
demonstrable authority to govern at each Internet layer is vital to protecting the nation’s
critical cyber assets, and the coordination-based actions taken by the federal government
support the notion that this recognition has, indeed, occurred.
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General Conclusions & Application of the Four-Layer Model
The conclusions of this project are five-fold. First, the four-layer conceptual
model serves as a valuable tool for understanding both Internet policies and their
underlying political dynamics. Second, and in conjunction with this first principle, the
Internet’s decentralized technical architecture has led to a decentralized political
architecture as well, where numerous governing actors have demonstrable authority over
different specific aspects of the Internet - or, in the terminology we have employed, at
different layers. It is this political architecture which has occupied much of our focus.
Furthermore, third, and in a prescriptive sense, we have argued that policymakers
would be more capable of achieving their policy objectives by narrowly targeting the
layer most appropriate to the specific problem they are attempting to address. Fourth,
similarly, policy designs ought to, alternatively, target one Internet layer with the express
intention of achieving outcomes at a different layer entirely. This is the principle of
“cascading effects” and further evidence of the importance of venue selection in strategic
policymaking.
Finally, fifth, we strongly affirm the position of Lawrence Lessig and others that
technical decisions have inherently political consequences. Code is programmed to
embody certain core political values at the expense of others, and therefore the act of
creating code has become a very meaningful form of policymaking - and its creators,
policymakers.
For one final summary review, let us see how the four-layer model can lead to a
better general understanding of complex Internet issues and explore the case of Net
Neutrality. Net Neutrality is an issue of tremendous consequence that will directly affect
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most Americans’ online activities for decades to come; yet most people are either
completely unaware of it or have little understanding as to what the debate is even
about.375 Net Neutrality has been touted as “The First Amendment of the Internet” and
what is specifically at issue are the details of bandwidth-capping, network-management
algorithms, and multi-tiered-service arrangements. Such issues are hardly for the faint of
heart.
But despite Net Neutrality’s complexities on a technical level, its politics can be
made far more clear to both layman and legislator alike by applying the four-layer model.
We can start by stating that Net Neutrality is an issue that exists at the
Infrastructure layer. Immediately, this signals that the debate focuses on how Internet
traffic is routed over the infrastructure, and the primary actors with governing authority
are the major telecommunications and backbone providers, the cable companies who
control the “last mile”, and the FCC.
Indeed, the Net Neutrality debate is centered on the actions (or inactions) of the
FCC. Their regulatory dilemma: Should broadband providers be legally required to treat
all data traversing the network equally, as has been the case since the Internet’s inception,
or should those providers be free to charge a premium cost to websites that use more of
the network’s bandwidth for, say, streaming audio and video content?
The pro-neutrality crowd argues that all data must be treated equally in order for
the Internet to remain an open marketplace of ideas and innovation. They claim that
without Net Neutrality the large telecom companies would create a “toll lane” on the
375
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Web, effectively establishing a “tiered Internet” that would grant a structural advantage
for the most well-capitalized firms, and where entrepreneurs, small businesses, and
individuals would all be treated as second-class citizens. Pro-neutrality advocates –
comprised of a coalition of large commercial websites like Google and Yahoo, along with
smaller websites, civil liberties groups, academics, technologists, and others - believe that
FCC guidelines requiring neutrality are necessary in order to guarantee that the Internet
continues to exist in its current form.
Meanwhile, the anti-neutrality crowd argues that the government should avoid
regulating the Internet and the owners of its infrastructure. These corporate infrastructure
owners, they say, will not be blocking access to websites, they will only be making
access faster or slower to websites depending on which ones would be willing to pay
premium fees. Without neutrality regulations in place, companies like Verizon or
Cablevision would be capable of charging a fee to websites like Google (which streams
enormous amounts of video through its YouTube site, and thus uses more of the
network’s bandwidth than sites that are more text-centric), while other service providers
like Comcast could almost completely block entire technologies like Bittorrent, that
similarly use vast amounts of bandwidth (Comcast has already engaged in such
activities).376 Anti-neutrality advocates argue that telecoms invest billions of dollars into
building their network infrastructure, therefore they should be able to make a return on
that investment and price their services accordingly.
Regardless of which side’s argument one might find more convincing, what is
important for our purposes is that, by framing the issue in terms of our four-layer model,
376
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the nature of the problem – managing the Internet’s physical infrastructure – as well as
the governance arrangements surrounding its politics – namely, the roles played by the
FCC and the major telecom and backbone firms – are made more easily understandable.
The politics of the issue are crystallized as to who actually has the governing authority to
make decisions – the FCC and the telecoms - as opposed to who is merely trying to
influence those governing actors – private commercial websites like Google and Yahoo,
advocacy groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, etc.
Thus, our four-layer model leads to the conclusion in the Net Neutrality debate
that the anti-neutrality advocates are better positioned in political terms than their proneutrality counterparts because the telecoms actually have governing authority to set the
policies for their private networks, whereas websites like Google and Yahoo and the
other interests mentioned do not. The pro-neutrality crowd can try to influence the
decision-making of the telecoms and the FCC, but ultimately, it remains their decision to
make.
The four-layer model can not only lead to a better understanding of Internet issues
and their politics, it can also serve as a tool for policymakers to better achieve their
desired outcomes by designing policies to narrowly target the layer most appropriate to
the specific problem they are attempting to address. For example, take the case of DoNot-Track.
For years, a number of public interest groups including the World Privacy
Forum, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation lobbied the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to create a national Do-NotTrack registry that would enable Internet users to opt-out of software that allows third-
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party websites to track their online behaviors – making the assumption that Congress
would be amenable towards extending the popular success of its national Do-Not-Call
registry which allows people to opt-out of telemarketing phone calls.377 Indeed,
Congressional attempts were subsequently pursued that focused on Content layer
measures such as requiring websites to publish what personal information they collect
and with whom they share it, prohibiting the collection or sharing of specific types of
information including personal medical histories, financial records, or precise geolocation
information, and establishing civil penalties of up to $15 million for certain online
privacy violations.378 However, more recently, the strategy of policymakers has shifted
away from the Content layer and, instead, towards targeting the Protocol layer. The
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is currently in the process of standardizing a DNT
(Do Not Track) header field within the HTTP protocol that would universally enable all
Internet users to opt-out of tracking through their browsers.379 The protocol-based
argument, as we have previously examined, is that if the ability for users to opt-out of
tracking was built into the technology of the network itself, policymakers’ desired
outcome of enhancing online privacy could be more effectively achieved. This is
evidence of how targeting the specific layer most appropriate to a given problem is
strategically important to policy designs.

377

“The History of the Do-Not-Track Header,” Slight Paranoia January 21, 2011. Retrieved on March 31,
2013 from <http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/01/history-of-do-not-track-header.html>.
378

These elements were included in, respectively, the Do Not Track Me Online Act of 2011 and the Do Not
Track Online Act of 2011. Retrieved on March 31, 2013 from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr654ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr654ih.pdf> and
<http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=85b45cce-63b3-4241-99f1-0bc57c5c1cff>.
379

“Tracking Preference Expression (DNT),” Tracking Protection Working Group – W3C. Retrieved on
March 31, 2013 from <http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/drafts/tracking-dnt.html>.

284
Finally, our conceptual model can also assist policymakers in achieving their
desired outcomes by using the principle of “cascading effects” to design policies that
target one layer with the express intention of creating effects at another layer entirely.
For example, take the case of filesharing.380
As we have previously detailed, the controversial element in the filesharing
debate is the illegal dissemination of copyrighted material – comprised mainly of digital
music and video. The material in dispute and the legal issues related to copyright
infringement all occur at the Content layer. However, efforts by the media industry to
clamp down on filesharing by targeting individual Internet users engaged in such
activities have had little to no discernible effect in mitigating the filesharing
phenomenon. Instead, the industry has achieved a modest level of success when
strategically targeting the software developers at the Applications layer, bringing lawsuits
against the software developers behind Napster, Kazaa, ISOHunt, and others. In the
example of filesharing, intentionally targeting the Applications layer has had
considerable cascading effects on behavior at the Content layer.
This is a strategy that can, and should be, replicated. Quite often, directly
regulating material at the Content layer is the most problematic, both in technical and
legal terms. As a result, those who nevertheless seek to do so ought to design policies
that target, not only the ISPs and private website operators at the Content layer, but also,
crucially, the software development firms at the Applications layer.
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Further
The study of Internet politics and policymaking is still in its nascent stages.
Future research ought to explore in greater detail what the cybersecurity case has to say
about institution-building and the formation of new bureaucratic regimes. The
Department of Homeland Security itself is an enormous and highly important new
government apparatus still in its infancy, and the formation and nascent evolution of its
cybersecurity division, specifically, offers researchers a window into something new that
can be observed from the ground up. Any path dependencies are still relatively recent or
even in flux, which is not frequently the case with bureaucracies in general, and this one
is sure to grow in prominence for decades to come.
From a prescriptive point of view, working within the existing public-private
framework for cybersecurity, we see an opportunity for the federal government to make
greater headway into enhancing national cybersecurity within the private sector by more
aggressively using its procurement power to issue, what would essentially be,
cybersecurity mandates upon private contractors as a prerequisite for funding, should
such “mandates” be deemed desirable. This tactic would have the political benefit of
historical precedent, as such procurement powers were a main catalyst used for originally
convincing private organizations to connect to the Internet in the early 1970s. The
federal government could also apply the cascading effects principle and target acquiring a
more prominent influence with increased presence in the major engineering consortium
groups at the Protocol layer.
One of our main goals in developing the four-layer conceptual model was to
create a new lens for academics and policymakers alike to analyze Internet-related issues
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that are often highly complex, technical, and frequently misunderstood. Hopefully,
future research will be pursued that utilizes this four-layer model in exploring a great
range of case studies across the policy spectrum. Breaking down the politics of issues
like Net Neutrality, online privacy, or filesharing – already highly politicized, but also
heavily dependent on a large technical decision-making component which is often
overlooked by legislators – would be extremely valuable in raising public consciousness
and bringing about a better general understanding of Internet issues that are increasingly
vital to people’s day-to-day lives. What we have presented with the four-layer model is a
new framework for analysis, and our hope is that it will prove to be a useful tool for
framing a whole range of issues in future research and policymaking.
We have examined how on the Internet, time and again, technical issues have
become political, and vice versa. Rules are continuously being produced, and as
governments have often been limited in their ability to create those rules, a more complex
political architecture of relationships among numerous rule-makers of various different
types explains how and why those rules are being made, and, thus, defines how Internet
governance is currently constituted. As the Internet continues to become further
enmeshed into the political, economic, and cultural fabric of modern society,
understanding the calculus of power is as important a task now as ever.
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Glossary
ARPA – Advanced Research Projects Agency, in DoD
AUP – Acceptable Use Policy
BSA – Business Software Alliance
CDA – Communication Decency Act
CERN - European Organization for Nuclear Research
CERT – Computer Emergency Readiness Team
CERT/CC – Computer Emergency Readiness Team Coordination Center
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CIAO – Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
CII – Critical Infrastructure Information Act
CIPA – Children’s Internet Protection Act
CIPB – Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
CNCI – Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Iniative
COPA – Children’s Online Protection Act
CSIA – Cyber Security Industry Alliance
CYBERCOM – U.S. Cyber Command
(D)DOS – (Distributed) Denial of Service attack
DARPA – Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, in DoD
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
DNPP – Directorate of National Protection and Programs
DNS – Domain Name System
DOD – Department of Defense
DRM – Digital Rights Management
EDT – Electronic Disturbance Theater
EFF – Electronic Frontier Foundation
EIA – Electronics Industries Alliance
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigations
FCC – Federal Communications Commission
FedCIRC – Federal Computer Incident Response Center
FISMA – Federal Information Security Management Act
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
GAO – General Accounting Office
IAB – Internet Architecture Board
IAIP – Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
ICCC - International Conference on Computer Communication
IEEE – Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IESG - Internet Engineering Steering Group
IETF – Internet Engineering Task Force
IPTO - Information Processing Techniques Office, in DARPA, in DOD
ISA – Internet Security Alliance
ISAC – Information Sharing and Analysis Center
ISO – International Organization for Standardization
ISOC – Internet Society
ISP – Internet Service Provider
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ITAA – Information Technology Association of America
ITU - International Telecommunication Union
LAN – Local Area Network
MPAA – Motion Picture Association of America
MS-ISAC – Multi-State Information-Sharing and Analysis Center
NAP – Network Access Point
NCSC – National Cyber Security Center
NCSD – National Cyber Security Division
NCSP – National Cyber Security Partnership
NIAC – National Infrastructure Advisory Council
NII – National Information Infrastructure
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA – National Security Agency
NSC – National Security Council
NSF – National Science Foundation
NSSC – National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
ODNI – Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OSI – Open Systems Interconnection
OSTP – Office of Science and Technology Policy
P2P – Peer-to-peer
PCCIP – President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
PCII – Protected Critical Infrastructure Information program
PCIPB – President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board
PITAC – President’s Information Technology and Advisory Committee
PRECISE – Promoting and Enhancing Cybersecurity and Information Sharing
Effectiveness Act
PREDICT – Protected Repository for Defense of Infrastructure Against Cyber Threats
RFC – Request for Comments
RIAA – Recording Industry Association of America
SEI – Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute
SMTP – Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SRI – Stanford Research Institute
TCP/IP – Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TOS – Terms of Service
URI – Uniform Resource Identifier
URL – Uniform Resource Locator
US-CERT – U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
W3C – World Wide Web Consortium
WTO – World Trade Organization
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